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United Nations Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals: Necessary or Avoidable? 
An Analysis of the Different Options for the Residual Functions of the Ad Hoc 
International Criminal Tribunals 
Katarina Pohlod 		
Abstract 
When closing ad hoc Tribunals, the Security Council is faced with the problem of how to 
deal with the residual functions that need to be carried out after the Tribunals’ closure. In 
the cases of the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL, the Security Council established the UN 
Mechanism for International Tribunals and the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone to 
solve that issue. Tis thesis discusses the question of whether it was necessary to establish 
the UN Mechanism for International Tribunals or whether another solution might have 
been preferable. Obviously, this question was considered by scholars at the time when the 
Residual Mechanism was established. This thesis reconsiders the question in light of the 
case law and practice of the Residual Mechanism. The Residual Mechanism was 
established to operate for an initial period of four years. Unless the Security Council 
decides otherwise after reviewing the Residual Mechanism’s work, it continues to operate 
for subsequent periods of two years. This thesis constitutes the first research of the entire 
legal framework and the case law of the Residual Mechanism. It is a contribution to legal 
literature and history. It provides an examination of different options for dealing with the 
residual functions, because it would still be possible to transfer those. One option would be 
to transfer the functions back to the domestic authorities of the affected countries. But, 
although judicial capacities have improved, issues still exist. Transferring these functions 
to other states would be difficult, because states are not willing or able to take over the 
Tribunals’ functions. The option of an international body, such as the ICC taking over the 
functions would be impracticable because it would require amendments to the Rome 
Statute. Therefore, in order to demonstrate that the international legal system is working 
and to achieve a deterrent effect the Residual Mechanism is necessary. But this thesis also 
points out that it would have been a better option to create a joint mechanism including the 
ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL. Future ad hoc criminal tribunals requiring mechanisms with 
functions similar to those of the Residual Mechanism could be appended to it.  
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I. Introduction 
Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council established the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to pursue violations of international humanitarian 
law during the conflict in former Yugoslavia and the Rwandan genocide. An international 
intervention was necessary because the national legal systems were not reliable. The war in 
former Yugoslavia is considered to be the most devastating conflict in Europe since the 
end of the Second World War, while the Rwandan genocide lasted only three months but 
resulted in the killing of hundreds of thousands of people. The ad hoc Tribunals were 
created to pursue alleged war criminals and bring lasting peace to the countries strongly 
battered by the crimes. But the Tribunals were created with a finite lifespan in mind. 
Furthermore, the Tribunals faced a problematically large financial burden. Hence, a 
conflict existed between the need to end impunity as a main goal on the one hand, and the 
finite lifespan as a main characteristic of the Tribunals on the other. The Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (SCSL) was created to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in Sierra Leone during 
the Sierra Leone Civil War in 1996. The Civil War lasted 11 years and left over 50 000 
dead. The Security Council was asked by the President of Sierra Leone to establish a court 
to bring justice and ensure lasting peace in Sierra Leone.  
 When developing the Tribunals’ Completion Strategies, the Security Council was 
faced with the crucial question of how to deal with the cases of the remaining fugitives and 
other residual functions of the Tribunals that need to be carried out after the Tribunals’ 
closure. The expression ‘residual functions’ describes the essential functions that go to the 
heart of the Tribunals’ core business and their mandate. The control of the archives is 
equivalent to the symbolic and physical control of the past as well as the future. 
 With the adoption of Resolution 1966 (2010) on 22 December 2010, the Security 
Council took its most decisive step toward the closure of the Tribunals and established the 
UN Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (Residual Mechanism), formally 
referred to as the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. The Residual 
Mechanism is an international court mandated to continue the residual functions previously 
performed by the ICTY and the ICTR. It was created as a temporary, small, and efficient 
body. The Residual Mechanism started operating on 1 July 2012 in Arusha, United 
Republic of Tanzania, and on 1 July 2013 in The Hague, the Netherlands. While the 
Arusha branch continues the functions of the ICTR, The Hague branch continues functions 
of the ICTY. The Residual Mechanism operated in parallel with the Tribunals during the 
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initial years of the Residual Mechanism’s existence and will continue to operate after the 
closure of the ICTY and ICTR. The ICTR closed on 31 December 2015 and the ICTY is 
expected to close at the end of 2017. The Residual Mechanism maintains the legacies of 
the two Tribunals. When Resolution 1966 (2010) was adopted, two remaining fugitives of 
the ICTY and nine remaining fugitives of the ICTR were still at large. One of the 
remaining ICTY fugitives was Ratko Mladić, who was considered one of the most 
prominent war criminals in former Yugoslavia. Therefore, the Security Council 
acknowledged the need for some kind of mechanism to continue the residual functions of 
the ICTY and the ICTR.  
 This thesis examines the research question of whether it was necessary to establish 
the Residual Mechanism or whether another solution might have been preferable. 
Obviously, this question was considered by scholars at the time when the Residual 
Mechanism was established. The Residual Mechanism has now been operational for five 
years. This thesis reconsiders the question in light of the case law and practice of the 
Residual Mechanism. The Residual Mechanism was established to operate only for an 
initial period of four years. Unless the Security Council decides otherwise after 
considering reviews of the progress of the Residual Mechanism’s work, the Residual 
Mechanism continues to operate for subsequent periods of two years. It could be argued 
that transferring the Tribunals’ functions to an already existent national or international 
body would have been a more reasonable option. Furthermore, although the Residual 
Mechanism has already been established, the Security Council could accelerate the 
progress of the Residual Mechanism’s work by reducing the workload and transferring all 
or some of the functions. Hence, the costs of the Residual Mechanism could be reduced.  
 One possible solution could be a transfer of the functions to the national authorities 
of the affected countries. The affected countries include, in the case of the ICTR, the 
Republic of Rwanda, and in the case of the ICTY the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of 
Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since the Residual Mechanism was established the 
judicial capacities of the affected countries have probably improved and are therefore able 
to continue the residual functions. In addition, the affected countries are willing to carry 
out the residual functions. But particular residual functions, such as the prosecution of the 
remaining fugitives, the protection of victims and witnesses, or the management of the 
Tribunals’ archives, require national authorities that are objective and impartial. On the 
one hand, it is questionable whether proper prosecution will take place and the rights of the 
accused will be safeguarded at a level deemed acceptable by the UN. But on the other 
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hand, a transfer to domestic courts could allow proceedings to be carried out closer to the 
victims and communities that have suffered from those events.  
 Another possible solution could be a transfer of the functions to external 
international bodies, like the International Criminal Court (ICC), or external national 
bodies of the UN member states. Regarding an external international body, it could be 
difficult to find a suitable international body that provides the capacity to continue the 
Tribunals’ work or take over some of the functions. The ICC is a potential option because 
it would have the capacity to carry on the residual functions. However, it is questionable 
whether the Rome Statute of the ICC allows the ICC to take over the Tribunals’ residual 
functions. It would be possible to transfer the residual functions to different international 
bodies. But the residual functions are closely linked, so the international bodies would 
need to cooperate very closely. An issue for external national bodies could be the lack of 
jurisdiction to bring the Tribunals’ accused to trial. Further, it is questionable whether 
national bodies are wiling in general to continue the residual functions, since the 
Tribunals’ residual functions require a significant amount of capacity.  
 When analysing the question of whether the establishment of the Residual 
Mechanism was the best option, the follow-up question appears to be whether it would 
have been a preferable option to create a joint Residual Mechanism, one that included the 
SCSL, the ICTY, and the ICTR. A joint Residual Mechanism could become a part of the 
international criminal justice landscape. Other Tribunals, including the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon, could also transfer residual functions to the joint Residual Mechanism after 
their closure. In August 2010, the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone (RSCSL) was 
created by an agreement between the UN and the government of Sierra Leone to solve the 
residual issues resulting from the closure of the SCSL. The RSCSL started its work after 
the SCSL was shut down. Although the SCSL is considered to be a hybrid tribunal it is 
more accurately classified with the ad hoc Tribunals because it is a creation of 
international law and not domestic law. But it is questionable whether the SCSL is 
compatible with the Tribunals due to the different legal basis. The Security Council 
established the Tribunals acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, while the SCSL was 
set up by way of an agreement between the government of Sierra Leone and the UN. This 
thesis explains the historical and political background of the SCSL. It describes the 
similarities and differences between the RSCSL and the Residual Mechanism in order to 
answer the question of whether a joint Residual Mechanism would be possible. This thesis 
outlines the residual functions of the RSCSL but does not provide an analysis of the Statute 
and the case law of the RSCSL. Since the thesis concentrates on the creation of the 
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Residual Mechanism, it does not require a detailed analysis of the Statute and case law of 
the RSCSL.  
 When closing the Tribunals, the challenge of the Security Council is to secure the 
legacy of the ICTY and the ICTR. It is necessary to ensure continuity between the 
Tribunals and the Residual Mechanism. In addition, a smooth transition of the Tribunals’ 
functions is needed to ensure that the transfer is effective. When establishing the Residual 
Mechanism, the Security Council was faced with criticism regarding the slow progress of 
the Tribunals’ work. Because of the criticism, the Security Council needed to provide 
appropriate provisions to make the Residual Mechanism more efficient while keeping the 
Residual Mechanism a small body. Therefore, the question arises as to whether the 
Security Council provided the Residual Mechanism with an adequate Statute and Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence to help keep the Residual Mechanism a small and efficient body. 
At the same time, the Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence need to ensure 
continuity between the Tribunals and the Residual Mechanism. 
 The relevant legal literature regarding the Residual Mechanism is still very limited, 
although the Tribunals were a frequent topic. The decisions made during the establishment 
of the Residual Mechanism will influence similar situations in the future. The solutions 
implemented regarding the Tribunals’ closure will become a part of the international 
criminal justice landscape. In addition, it will shape the normative environment for future 
ad hoc tribunals. This thesis explains the political and historical background as well as 
problems that arose during the establishment of the Residual Mechanism. It constitutes the 
first research on the entire legal framework and the case law of the Residual Mechanism. It 
is a contribution to legal literature history. In the legal literature, it is the first examination 
concerning the problems that appeared in the case law of the Residual Mechanism, which 
are connected to the establishment of the Residual Mechanism and in which the transfer of 
the residual functions from the Tribunals to the Residual Mechanism are explained and 
analysed. Because the Residual Mechanism operates in parallel with the Tribunals, it is 
possible that conflicts will arise. When dealing with residual functions, future Tribunals 
will use the Residual Mechanism as an example. This thesis provides examinations of 
different options that can be considered when Tribunals plan their closure in the future, 
along with new perspectives gained by examining the outcomes of cases transferred to 
domestic courts. By examining the decisions of the domestic courts, the thesis provides a 
more specific answer to the question of whether it would have been possible to transfer the 
functions of the Tribunals to domestic authorities from the outset. 
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 The methodology includes the research and review of relevant legal literature as 
well as reports and documents of the Tribunals, the Residual Mechanism and the Security 
Council. The Statutes as well as the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunals and 
the Residual Mechanism were analysed and compared. This study includes examinations 
of the case law of the Tribunals and the Residual Mechanism as well as the case law of the 
national courts of the Republic of Rwanda, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Serbia, 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 This thesis consists of nine chapters. Following the introduction provided in 
Chapter One, Chapter Two summarises the political and historical background of the 
Tribunals’ creation as well as the Tribunals’ Completion Strategies. Chapter Three 
explains the establishment as well as the special nature of the Residual Mechanism and 
lists the residual functions. After determining the residual functions, Chapter Four answers 
the question of whether it would have been or still would be possible to transfer all or some 
of the residual functions to the national authorities of the affected countries. The national 
authorities need to be able to provide a legal framework to make the performance of the 
residual functions possible. It is necessary to ensure that the residual functions will be 
carried out in accordance with international standards, especially considering that the trial 
function, as the most important of the residual function, needs to be carried out properly. 
The national courts of the affected countries have already dealt with cases transferred by 
the ICTY or the ICTR. But it is questionable whether the national courts would be able to 
conduct unbiased proceedings involving fugitives belonging to the most senior leaders 
suspected of committing horrific crimes. In order to determine the ability of the national 
courts to conduct such proceedings, there follows an examination of the transferred cases 
and the corresponding monitoring reports. This will investigate whether the legal systems 
of the affected countries were sufficiently rebuilt to take over the Tribunals’ trial function 
and are able to conduct unbiased proceedings for high-level fugitives. 
 Chapter Five examines the potential options for transferring the residual functions 
to external international bodies, like the ICC, including different options for the ICC to 
perform residual functions. Another option could be to transfer the residual functions to 
external national bodies of member states of the UN. This could reduce both the workload 
and costs of the Residual Mechanism.  
 Chapter Six examines the question of whether it would have been a preferable 
solution to establish a joint Residual Mechanism comprising the ICTY, the ICTR, and the 
SCSL in one. For this it is necessary to determine whether the SCSL is compatible with the 
Tribunals, and whether the legal framework allows for a joint Residual Mechanism.  
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 Chapter Seven comprises an analysis of the Resolution 1966 (2010) and the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence of the Residual Mechanism. Furthermore, it includes a 
comparison between the Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Residual 
Mechanism and the Tribunals’ Statutes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The 
normative environment of Residual Mechanism as well as the residual functions will be 
examined in detail. In addition, issues that appeared in the case law of the Residual 
Mechanism, which are connected to the establishment of the Residual Mechanism and the 
transfer of the residual functions from the Tribunals to the Residual Mechanism are 
explained and analysed in Chapter Seven. This chapter will also answer the question of 
whether the legal framework of the Residual Mechanism addresses the criticism expressed 
during the establishment of the Residual Mechanism regarding the slow progress of the 
Tribunals’ work.  
 Chapter Eight examines one of the most important residual functions, the 
management and preservation of the Tribunals’ archives. When considering how to deal 
with the residual functions that need to be carried out after the Tribunals’ closure, the 
management and preservation of the Tribunals’ archives was one of the most important 
questions on the table, especially as finding a future location for the archives proved to be 
difficult. The Tribunals’ records include a great deal of confidential documents that need to 
be safeguarded. The archives exist to prevent historical revisionism in the affected 
countries, and hence it is very important that the historical record cannot be manipulated in 
order to suit regime interests. Finally, Chapter Nine concludes the thesis by summarising 
the findings and attempting to answer the research question.  
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II. The Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals  
Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter the Security Council established the ICTY 
and the ICTR to pursue violations of international law during the Yugoslavian conflict and 
the Rwandan genocide. The intervention was necessary because the national legal systems 
were not working properly. The SCSL was set up by an agreement between the 
government of Sierra Leone and the UN. It was a result of the request of the Sierra 
Leonean government for a court to address serious crimes committed during the civil war. 
 
1. The Conflicts in Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone 
In 1993, the Security Council created the ICTY through Resolution 827 (1993) as a 
subsidiary organ in the sense of Article 7 (2) and Article 29 of the UN Charter.1 Due to the 
multi-ethnic society in former Yugoslavia and the fact that flagrant violations of 
international humanitarian law had occurred, the intervention by the Security Council was 
required.2 The history of the Yugoslavian state lasted only about 75 years.3 Before the 
conflict started, the country was divided into the six sovereign republics of Slovenia, 
Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH), along with 
two autonomous regions, Vojvodina and Kosovo.4 The people of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, 
Macedonia, and Montenegro were regarded as distinct nations. But the situation in BIH 
was unique, because there was no single ethnic majority, and furthermore there was no 
recognition of a distinct Bosnian nation.5 The population of BIH has been multi-ethnic for 
centuries.6  A main source of conflict between the ethnic groups has been religion. 
Although the major part of the population did not practice their religion because of the 
long years of oppression by the Communist regime, the majority of the Croatians remained 
Roman Catholic, the majority of the Serbians remained Orthodox, and the Bosnian 
Muslims also maintained their faith. The conflict that led to the establishment of the ICTY 
started in the beginning of the nineties with the collapse of the multinational state of 
																																																								
1 UN Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), UN Doc. S/RES/827, 25 May 1993. 
2 Ibid., preamble. 
3 See more in: Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, ‘A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing’ Foreign Affairs 72 (1993) 110; Florence Hartmann, ‘Bosnia’ 
in Roy Gutman and David Rieff (eds.), Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know, (W. W. Norton & Company, London 1999), p. 
50; Herwig Roggemann, Die Internationalen Strafgerichtshöfe (2nd edn, Berlin Verlag, Berlin 1998), p. 337; Karl Arthur Hochkammer, 
‘The Yougoslav War Crimes Tribunal: The Compability of Peace’ Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 28 (1995) 119; Marc Weller ‘The International 
Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ AJIL 86 (1992), 569; Michael Scharf ‘Balkan Justice: The 
Story Behind the First International War Crimes Trial Since Nuremberg’ (Carolina Academic Press, Durham 1997) p.1; Waldemar 
Szulik ‘The Conflict in Former Yugoslavia’ Pol. Q. Int'l Aff 6 (1997), 87-89; Harriet Critchley ‘The failure of federalism in Yugoslavia’ 
International Journal XLVIII (1993) 434, 436- 439. 
4 Vojvodina and Kosovo were closely associated with Serbia. 
5 Cherif Bassioouni, Peter Manikas, The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Transnational 
Publishers Inc. Irvington-on-Hudson, New York 1996), p.17; Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić (Case No. IT-94-1-T), Trial Chamber Opinion 
and Judgement, 7 May 1997, paras. 65- 69; Elihu Lauterpacht, C. J. Greenwood, A. G. Oppenheimer, International Law Reports 160 
Volume Hardback Set: International Law Reports (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999), p. 34. 
6 Until the outbreak of the armed confrontations the population consisted of Bosnian Muslims (47%), Serbians (33%), Croatians (17%), 
and others (3%). 
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Yugoslavia.7 After three years of war and following the Dayton Peace Agreement, BIH 
was declared a state consisting of three ethnic groups: Bosnian Muslims, Croatians, and 
Serbians.8 According to recent estimates, around 100 000 people were killed during the 
war, 20 000 to 50 000 women were raped,9 and over 2.2 million people were displaced.10 
Thus, the Yugoslav wars are considered to be the most devastating conflict in Europe since 
the Second World War.11 
 In the case of Rwanda, the Security Council was asked by the Rwandan 
government to interfere when the Rwandan legal system was unable to pursue the massive 
violations of international humanitarian law that had occurred.12 The Security Council 
created the ICTR on 8 November 1994 by adopting Resolution 955 (1994).13 Like the 
ICTY, the Security Council created the ICTR as a subsidiary organ in the sense of Article 
7 (2) and Article 29 of the UN Charter. It was created as a ‘sister-tribunal’ to the ICTY. 
Rwanda was the scene of a horrible ethnic genocide along with massive politically inspired 
massacres.14 Before the conflict, the Hutu and Tutsi constituted a nation for about 400 
years. They speak the same language and share a uniform culture and worldview. 15 The 																																																								
7 For an overview of the conflict see: Michael Scharf, Balkan Justice: The Story Behind the First International War Crimes Trial Since 
Nuremberg, see note 3, p.1; Cherif Bassioouni, Peter Manikas, The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (Transnational Publishers Inc. Irvington-on-Hudson, New York 1996), p. 5; Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, ‘A Brief History of 
Ethnic Cleansing’ Foreign Affairs 72 (1993) 110, 117; Saskia Hille ‘Mutual Recognition of Croatia and Serbia (+Montenegro)’ EJIL 6 
(1995) 598, 599; David Clapham, Slovenia. Housing Privatization in Eastern Europe (Greenwood Publishing Group, Portsmouth 1996), 
p. 152; Ivana Nizich, Željka Markić and Jeri Laber ‘Civil and Political Rights in Croatia’ Human Rights Watch (1995), p. 26; Maire 
Braniff, Integrating the Balkans: Conflict Resolution and the Impact of EU Expansion (I.B. Taubris, New York 2011), pp. 55-56; Sandra 
Fabijanić Gagro and Budislav Jr. Vukas, ‘The Path of the Former Yugoslav Countries to the European Union: From Integration to 
Disintegration and Back’ Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 19.2 (2012) 300, 308; Klejda Mulaj, Politics of ethnic 
cleansing: nation-state building and provision of in/security in twentieth-century Balkans (Lexington Books, Lanham 2008), p. 53; 
Philip Hammond, Framing Post-Cold War Conflicts: The Media and International Intervention (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester 2007), p. 51; Robert J. Donia, Sarajevo: A biography (The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 2006), p. 284; Milos 
Nikolić, The Tragedy of Yugoslavia- the rise, the reign, and the fall of Slobodan Milošević (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2002), p. 51; Robert 
Heinsch, Die Weiterentwicklung des humanitären Völkerrechts durch die Strafgerichtshöfe für das ehemalige Jugoslawien und Ruanda: 
Zur Bedeutung von internationalen Gerichtsentscheidungen als Rechtsquelle des Völkerrechts (Berliner Wissenschafts- Verlag, Berlin 
2007), p. 56; Drazen Petrović, ‘Ethnic Cleansing - An Attempt at Methodology’ EJIL 5 (1994) 342-359; Lutz Lehmler, Die Strafbarkeit 
von Vertreibungen aus ethnischen Gründen im bewaffneten nicht- internationalen Konflikt: Zugleich ein Beitrag zur neueren 
Entwicklung des Völkerstrafrechts (Nomos, Baden-Baden 1999), p. 109; Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić (Case No. IT-94-1-T), Trial 
Chamber Opinion and Judgement, 7 May 1997, paras. 55, 79, 84; Prosecutor v. Zejnal Delalić et al, (Case No. IT-962-1-T), Trial 
Chamber Judgement, 16 November 1998, paras. 91-119; Letter dated 24 May 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of 
Security Council, UN Doc. S/1994/674, 27 May 1994, para. 26- 27. 
8 The presidents of Croatia, BIH and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as the representatives of the European Union and the 
Balkan Contact Group signed the Dayton Peace Agreement on 14 December 1995. Ronald Slye, ‘The Dayton Peace Agreement: 
Constitutionalism and Ethnicity’ YJIL 21 (1996) 470-473; Marcus Cox, ‘The Right to Return Home: International Intervention and 
Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 47 (1998) 599- 612; Paul Szasz, ‘The Dayton Accord: The Balkan 
Agreement’ Cornell Int'l L.J. 30 (1997) 759-768; James Sloan, ‘The Dayton Peace Agreement: Human Rights Guarantees and their 
Implementation’ EJIL 7.2 (1996) 207-225; Fionnuala Ni Aolain, ‘The Fractured Soul of the Dayton Peace Agreement: A Legal 
Analysis’ Mich. J. Int'l L. 19.4 (1997-1998) 957-1004; Viktor Masenko-Mavi, ‘The Dayton Peace Agreement and Human Rights in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’ HJLS 42.1-2 (2001) 53-68; Payam Akhavan, ‘The Yugoslav Tribunal at a Crossroads: The Dayton Peace 
Agreement and Beyond’ Hum. Rts. Q. 18.2 (1996) 259-285. 
9 The majority were Bosniak. Todd A. Salzman, ‘Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing: Religious, Cultural, and Ethical 
Responses to Rape Victims in the Former Yugoslavia’ Hum. Rts. Q. 20 (1998) 348-378. 
10 UN Resolution 820 (1993), UN Doc. S/RES/820 (1993), 17 April 1993. See also: Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to 
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993; Ronald Slye‚ ‘The Dayton Peace Agreement: 
Constitutionalism and Ethnicity’ YJIL 21 (1996) 459. 
11 Florence Hartmann, ‘Bosnia’ in Roy Gutman and David Rieff (eds.), Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know, (W. W. Norton & 
Company, London 1999), p. 50; Miachel Harsch, The Power of Dependence: NATO-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2015) p. 37. 
12 UN Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), 8 November 1994, preamble. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Filip Reyntjens, ‘Rwanda: Genocide and Beyond’ J Refug Stud (1996) 240, 240-251. 
15 See more in: Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (2nd edn, C. Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, London 1998), p. 
16; Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton University 
Press, Princeton 2002), pp. 58- 69, 113; Jean-Pierre Chrétien (ed.), Scott Straus (trs), The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of 
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worst period of the conflict began on the 6 April 1994, when the presidential jet was shot 
down, killing President Habyarimana and other passengers.16 This event marked the start 
of the following a mass murder, where the presidential guard started to kill opposition 
politicians and prominent people of the Tutsi population. At the beginning of the conflict, 
84% of the population belonged to the Hutu, 14% to the Tutsi, and 2% to the Twa.17 The 
Rwandan genocide lasted three months and hundreds of thousands of people were killed.18 
The Tutsi population was killed brutally, and no distinction was made between men, 
woman or children. During the conflict, more than 500 000 unarmed civilians were killed, 
and some accounts estimate that 800 000 to one million people died.19 In July 1994, the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front became the military superior and captured Kigali on 4 July 
1994.20 The Rwandan Patriotic Front ended the war on 18 July 1994 and proclaimed a new 
government on the following day.21  
 From March 1991 to January 2002, Sierra Leone suffered a decade-long conflict 
marked by systemic and widespread violations of human rights and humanitarian law, 
where government armed forces and the pro-government Civil Defence Forces fought 
against two rebel groups, the Revolutionary United Front and the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council. Between 50 000 and 75 000 people were killed and almost half of 
the country's population was displaced. Atrocities were committed against civilians, 
including murder, torture, rape, the recruitment of child soldiers, and the burning of 
villages. 22 The civil war in Sierra Leone was one of the most brutal wars in recent 
memory.23 																																																																																																																																																																							
History (Zone Books, New York 2003), pp. 69-160; Learthen Dorsey, Historical Dictionary of Rwanda (The Scarecrow Press, Lenham 
1994), p. 38; Hildegard Schüring, ‘Rwanda: Hintergründe der Katastrophe. Opfer, Täter und die internationale Gemeinschaft’ Vereinte 
Nationen (1994) 128; James Jay Carney, Rwanda Before the Genocide, Catholic Politics and Ethnic Discourse in the Late Colonial Era 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013), pp. 124-127; Catherine Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression: Client ship and Ethnicity in 
Rwanda, 1860-1960 (The University of Chicago Press, New York 1988), pp. 195- 196; Paul J. Magnarella, ‘Background and Causes of 
the Genocide in Rwanda’ JICJ 3 (2005) 801-822; Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will be Killed With Our 
Families: Stories from Rwanda (Picador, London 1999), pp. 56–57; Filip Reyntjens, ‘Rwanda: Genocide and Beyond’ J Refug Stud 
(1996) 240, 243-244; Christian L. Marlin, ‘A Lesson Unlearned: The Unjust Revolution in Rwanda, 1959-1961’ Emory Int'l L. Rev. 
12.3 (1998) 1271, 1271-1330; Heiko Ahlbrecht, Geschichte der völkerrechtlichen Strafgerichtsbarkeit im 20. Jahrhundert (Berliner 
Wissenschafts-Verlag, Berlin 1999), p. 304; Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu (Case No. ICTR-96-4-T), Judgement, 2 September 1998, 
para. 82. 
16 Letter dated 1 October 1994 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/1994/1125, 
04.10.1994, para. 42. 
17‘Ibid., para. 45; Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu (Case No. ICTR-96-4-T), see note 15, para. 83. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, see note 15, p. 265; Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human 
Rights, Report 28 June 1994, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/7, para. 24. 
20  Dafna Gozani, ‘Beginning to Learn How to End: Lessons on Completion Strategies, Residual Mechanisms, and Legacy 
Considerations from Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals to the International Criminal Court’ Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 36 
(2015) 331, 351. 
21 Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu (Case No. ICTR-96-4-T), see note 15, para.110; William Schabas, The UN International Criminal 
Tribunals, The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone (Cambridge University Press, New York 2006), p. 25.  
22 Sigall Horowitz, ‘How International Courts Shape Domestic Justice: Lessons from Rwanda and Sierra Leone’ Israel Law Review 
46(3) (2013), p. 355; Open Justice Society Initiative, ‘Legacy: Completing the Work of the Special Court of Sierra Leone’ (2011), p. 2; 
Human Rights Watch Report, ‘Sierra Leone: Sowing Terror, Atrocities against Civilians in Sierra Leone’ Vol. 10, No. 3 (A) (1998); 
Celina Schocken‚ ‘Special Court for Sierra Leone: Overview and Recommendations’ Berkley Journal of International Law Vol. 20:436 
(2002), pp. 437- 441; Kathryn Howarth, ‘The Special Court for Sierra Leone - Fair Trials and Justice for the Accused and Victims’ 
International Criminal Law Review 8 (2008), pp. 400-401. 
23 See more on the conflict in Sierra Leone in Celina Schocken‚ ‘Special Court for Sierra Leone: Overview and Recommendations’ 
Berkley Journal of International Law Vol. 20:436 (2002), pp. 437- 442; Babafemi Akinrinade, International Humanitarian Law and the 
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2. Establishing the ICTY and the ICTR 
The Security Council was very concerned about the massive violations of international 
humanitarian law that had taken place, including mass killings, the systematic detention 
and rape of women, and ethnic cleansing.24 Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
the Security Council established the ICTY by unanimously adopting Resolution 827 
(1993) in May 1993.25 The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY Statute) was found as an Annex to Resolution 827 (1993).26 With this 
Resolution the Security Council reaffirmed all previous resolutions concerning the conflict 
in Yugoslavia, including Resolution 713 (1991), which was the first resolution concerning 
the breakup of Yugoslavia.27  
 The ICTY was the first international war crimes tribunal since the Nuremburg and 
Tokyo Tribunals. It marked an important step in the history of international criminal law. 
By 2000, the ICTY was working on several trials, convicting defendants who played 																																																																																																																																																																							
Conflict in Sierra Leone, 15 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 391 (2001), pp. 392- 405; Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie and Ralph 
Hazelton, ‘The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds, and Human Security’ (Partnership Africa Canada, 2000), pp. 8- 65: Lydia 
Nkansah, ‘ A Dance of Truth and Justice in Post conflict Peace building in Sierra Leone’ African Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 23.2 (2015), pp. 199-225. 
24 Scholars and non-governmental organisations, like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Human Rights Law 
Group and Centre for Reproductive Law and Policy published reports. See: Human Rights Watch ‘War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina’ 
(1993); Henry Siegman, ‘The Holocaust Analogy is Too True: A Muslim People Are Targeted for Extinction, and the West Turns 
Away’ Los Angles Times (11 July 1993); Ben Macintyre, ‘Hawkish Albright Driven by Family History’ The Times (6 April 1999); 
Anne Bodley, ‘Weakening the Principle of Sovereignty in International Law: the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ 
N.Y.U. J. I INT'L L. & POL. 31 (1999) 417, 418; Susan Brownmiller, ‘Making Female Bodies the Battlefield’ in Alexandra Stiglmayer 
(ed.) Mass Rape. The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London 1994), p. 26; 
Beverley Allen, Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 
1996), p.13; Mirko Klarin, ‘Nuremberg Now!’ Borba (1991), translation in Antonio Cassese (ed) ‘The Path to The Hague, Selected 
Documents on the Origins of the ICTY. The Hague, ICTY. Document 7, pp. 35- 36; Galina Nelaeva, ‘Establishment of the International 
Criminal Tribunal in the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): Dealing with the War Raging at the Heart of Europe’ RJEA 11.1 (2011) 103, 104; 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Submitted by 
Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. A/48/92-S/25341, 14 August 1992, p. 20; 
Gideon A. Moor, ‘The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Article 51: Inherent Rights and Unmet Responsibilities’ Fordham Int'l L.J. 
18 (1994) 870, 888-889. 
25 UN Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), see note 1. Some permanent members like China and the Russian Federation felt that the 
Security Council did not have the legal authority to establish a Tribunal. See Michael Scharf, Balkan Justice: The Story Behind the First 
International War Crimes Trial Since Nuremberg, see note 3, pp. 37-49; Michael Scharf and Margaux Day, ‘The ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals, Launching a new era of accountability’ in William Schabas and Nadia Bernaz (eds.), Routledge Handbook of 
International Criminal Law (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, Abingdon und New York 2011) p. 51; James Crawford, ‘The Work of 
the International Law Commission’ in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John R.W.D. Jones (eds.) The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary’ Volume I (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002), p. 23; Christopher Greenwood, ‘The 
international Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia’ International Affairs (1993) 641, 647; Timothy Mak, ‘The Case against an International 
War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ International Peacekeeping 2 (1995) 536, 536-563; David Forsysthe, ‘Politics and the 
International Tribunal‘ Criminal Law Forum 5 (1994) 415; Galina Nelaeva, ‘Establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal in the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): Dealing with the War Raging at the Heart of Europe’ RJEA 11.1 (2011) 105; Daphna Shraga and Ralph 
Zacklin, ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ EJIL 5 (1994) 2; Helpful documents for the Secretary- 
General were submitted by the OSCE, France, Italy, Brazil, Canada, Organisation oft he Islamic Conference, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
the Russian Federation, Slovenia, the United States, the International Committee oft he Red Cross, Amnesty International and the 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. Morris and Scharf, An Insider's Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia: A Documentary History and Analysis (Irvington-on-Hudson, New York: Transnational Publishers, 1995), pp. 211- 310, 
363-462; Letter dated 16 February 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary- 
General, UN Doc. S/25300 (1993); Letter dated 6 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/25540 (1993); Letter dated 13 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative of 
Canada to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary- General, UN Doc. S/25594 (1993); Note verbale dated 12 March 1993 from 
Permanent Representative Mission of Mexico to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/25417 (1993); Note 
verbale dated 30 April 1993 from Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
General, UN Doc. S/25716 (1993); Letter dated 5 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/25537 (1993); Letter dated 20 April 1993 from the Permanent 
Representative of Slovenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/25652 (1993); Letter dated 5 April 
1993 from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. 
S/25575 (1993). 
26 UN Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), see note 1, preamble. 
27 UN Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN Doc. S/RES/808 (1993), 22 February 1993; Magdalena M. Martín Martínez National 
Sovereignty and International Organizations (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1996), p. 279.  
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leadership roles during the war, and had a budget of well over $100 million per annum.28 
At the end of 2016, proceedings against seven accused were still on going, including six 
accused before the Appeals Chamber29 and one at trial.30 The ICTY indicted 161 persons 
for serious violations of international humanitarian law in the area of former Yugoslavia.31 
According to the recent Completion Strategy Report, the ICTY plans to close its doors in 
December 2017.32  
 Eighteen months after the adoption of Resolution 827 (1993), the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 955 (1994) by which it decided to ‘establish an international tribunal 
for the purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and 
Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and similar violations committed in the 
territory of neighbouring states’.33 The establishment of the ICTR was a reaction to the 
killings of Tutsi and moderate Hutu men, women, and children.34 The Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR Statute) was annexed to Resolution 955 
(1994). The ICTR Statue was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and 
corresponds to the Statute of the ICTY, though with some deviations.35 
 Before the closing of the ICTR, the Tribunal indicted 93 persons for genocide and 
other serious violations of international humanitarian law. 36 Three cases were transferred 
to Rwanda37 and two cases to France.38 The ICTR was always smaller in scale than the 
ICTY and has not achieved the same high profile, which has been reflected in the 
Tribunal’s budget.  
 																																																								
28 William Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals, The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, see note 21, p. 24. 
29 One case: Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petković, Valentin Ćorić and Berislav Pušić. 
30 One case: Ratko Mladić. 
31 Figures of the Cases see the Website of the ICTY, http://www.icty.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases, (last visted on 27 March 2017). 
32 Assessment and report of Judge Carmel Agius, President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, provided to the 
Security Council pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1534 (2004) covering the period from 17 November 2015 to 17 
May 2016, UN Doc. S/2016/454, 17 May 2016, para. 6; Letter dated 17 November 2016 from the President of the International Tribunal 
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia since 1991, addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2016/976, 17 November 2016, para. 7. 
33 UN Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), see note 12. The Resolution was adopted with one dissenting vote from Rwanda and one 
abstention, from China. China was troubled with the fact that a Security Council mandated body was interfering into internal matters of 
a sovereign state. William Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals, The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, see 
note 21, p. 29. 
33 See more on the legitimacy and legality of the Tribunal in Daphna Shraga and Ralph Zacklin, ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia’ EJIL 5 (1994) 505. 
34 Preliminary report of the Independent Commission of Experts established in accordance with Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), 
UN Doc. S/1994/1125, Annex, 4 October 1994, paras. 146-149; UN Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), UN Doc. S/RES/935 
(1994), 1 July 1994, para. 1; Lyal Sunga, ‘The Commission of Experts on Rwanda and the Creation of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda’ Human Rights Law Journal 16 (1995) 121; Letter dated 1 October 1994 from the Secretary-Genral addressed tot 
he President oft he Security Council, UN Doc. S/1994/1125, 4 October 1994, p. 2; Report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda 
prepared by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights in accordance with Commission resolution S-3/1 and 
Economic and Social Council decision 19941223, UNSC, UN Doc. A/49/508-S/1994/1157 (1994), Annex I, para. 75. 
35 See more on the legitimacy and legality of the Tribunal in Daphna Shraga and Ralph Zacklin ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia’ EJIL 5 (1994) 505. 
36 Key Figures of the Cases see the Website of the ICTR,  
http://unictr.unmict.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases, (last visited on 27 March 2017). 
37  Prosecutor v. Bernhard Munyagishari (Case No. ICTR-05-89); Prsosecutor v. Ladislas Ntaganzwa (Case No. ICTR-96-9); 
Prosecutor v. Jean Uwinkindi (Case No. ICTR-01-75). 
38 Prosecutor v. Wenceslas Munyeshyaka (Case No. ICTR-05-87); Prosecutor v. Laurent Bucyibaruta (Case No. ICTR-05-85). 
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A. The Temporary Character as a Main Characteristic of the Tribunals 
The Security Council created the ICTY and ICTR with the idea of a finite lifespan.39 But 
the limited lifespan raised two separate but interrelated challenges regarding the residual 
issues and legacy of the Tribunals. Residual issues include the tasks of ongoing legal and 
moral responsibilities to those directly affected by the Tribunals after their closure.40 
Legacy is the lasting impact of a court, including the extent to which a court has had a 
deterrent effect. In addition, legacy should be the basis for future efforts to prevent a 
recurrence of crimes.41 It builds up trust in international judicial processes. 
 Despite the idea of a finite lifespan, the Tribunals’ existence was linked to the 
purpose of restoring and maintaining international peace and security in the territories of 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. According to the Secretary-General’s report presenting 
the Security Council with the draft Statute of the ICTY, ‘the life span of the international 
tribunal would be linked to the restoration and maintenance of international peace and 
security in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and Security Council decisions related 
thereto’.42 The Tribunals were established to pursue alleged war criminals, but at the same 
time the Tribunals were intended to serve as a deterrent for further crimes during the 
conflict. Another objective was to bring justice to the people of a country destroyed by a 
horrible war.43 Holding proper criminal trials helped to create historical records of the 
atrocities. Furthermore, it was important to prevent the glorification of the war criminals as 
heroes. Together, all of these objectives served the major aim of bring lasting peace and 
reconciliation to the countries strongly battered by the horrific crimes. But it is impossible 
to accomplish all of the described aims as long as the main goal to end impunity has not 
been reached because in this case the Tribunals would lose their deterrent effect. Hence, a 
conflict existed between the need to end impunity as a main goal on the one hand and the 
finite lifespan as a main characteristic of the Tribunals on the other. 
 
B. Shutting Down the Tribunals: Completion Strategy 
The materials concerning the creation of the Tribunals give little guidance as to when the 
work to be completed. In 2000, the ICTY began to discuss the issue of concluding when it 
became clear that a completion strategy was necessary to conclude the mandate of the 																																																								
39 Thomas Wayde Pittman, ‘The Road to the Establishment of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals From 
Completion to Continuation’ JICJ 9 (2011), 797, 798; Guido Acquaviva, ’Best Before the Date Indicated:Residual Mechanisms at the 
ICTY’ in Albertus Henricus Joannes Swart, Alexander Zahar, Göran Sluiter (eds.) The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011), p. 5; Cecile Aptel, ‘Closing the UN International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda: Completion Strategy and Residual Issues’ NEW ENG J. INT’L & COMP. L (2008) 169, 171. 
40 Caitlin Reiger, ‘Where to From Here for International Tribunals? Considering Legacy and Residual Issues’ International Canter for 
Transitional Justice (2009) 1. 
41 Ibid.  
42 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), see note 10, para. 28. 
43 Donald Riznik, ‘Completing the ICTY-Project without Sacrificing its Main Goals- Security Council Resolution 1966 – A Good 
Decision?’ GoJIL 3 (2011) 907, 909. 
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Tribunals. Beside the cases that were tried in the early days of the ICTY and were not 
completed, the pendency of new cases increased. The capacity of the Tribunal was limited, 
and because of the accumulation of old and new cases the ICTY started to struggle. 
Between 1997 and 2003, a couple of reforms were introduced in order to reduce the 
workload of the Tribunals by shortening pre-trial and trial proceedings.44 In letters dated 
12 May and 14 June 2000, the President of the ICTY, Judge Claude Jorda, and the 
President of the ICTR, Judge Navanethem Pillay, mentioned the closure of the Tribunals to 
the Secretary-General Kofi Annan for the first time.45 Both recommended an increase in 
the number of judges and the establishment of a pool of ad litem judges in order to 
conclude the work of the Tribunals at the earliest date possible.46 
 On 5 December 2000, the Security Council issued Resolution 1329 (2000), which 
included measures to speed up proceedings by improving the Rules of Procedures and 
Evidence and authorising the appointment of ad litem judges. 47  Furthermore, the 
Resolution explained two approaches to bring the Tribunals to an end; Firstly, to try 
civilian, military, and paramilitary leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes 
rather than minor actors; and secondly, to give power to the Trial Chamber in deciding 
whether to transfer a case involving intermediate- and lower-level accused to competent 
national courts.48 These two approaches are the main components of the Completion 
Strategy. The amendment of the ICTY Statute was a result of the need of both Tribunals to 
‘expedite the conclusion of their work at the earliest possible date’.49 In the eighth annual 
report of the ICTY, Judge Jorda informed the Security Council and the General Assembly 
that the international community would welcome the completion of the Tribunals.50 In 
2002, the ICTY presented a Completion Strategy, which stated that the ICTY would wrap 
up its investigations by the end of 2004, complete all trials at first instance in 2008, and 
complete all work by the end of 2010.51 The Security Council confirmed the agreement 
																																																								
44 Máximo Langer & J. W. Doherty, ‘Managerial Judging Goes International, but Its Promise Remains Unfulfilled: An Empirical 
Assessment of the ICTY Reforms’ YJIL 36 (2011) 2, 241, 247-253; Ninth Annual Report of the ICTY President Claude Jorda, UN Doc. 
A/57/379- S/2002/985, 04 September 2002, para. 37; Tenth Annual Report of the ICTY President T. Meron, UN Doc. A/58/297- 
S/2003/829, 20 August 2003, paras. 13-16; See also Fausto Pocar, ‘Completion or Continuation Strategy? – Appraising Problems and 
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45 Letter dated 12 May 2000 from the President of the ICTY, UN Doc. A/55/382-S/2000/865 (2000), Annex I; Letter dated 14 June 2000 
from the President of the ICTR, UN Doc. A/55/382-S/2000/865 (2000), Annex II. 
46 UN Security Council Resolution 1329 (2000), UN Doc. S/RES/1329 (2000), 5 December 2000, preamble. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid.; N. Piacente ‘Importance of the Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine for the ICTY Prosecutorial Policy’ JICJ 2 (2004) 3, 446; 
Cecile Aptel, ‘Closing the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Completion Strategy and Residual Issues’ NEW ENG J. 
INT’L & COMP. L (2008) 169, 183. 
49 UN Security Council Resolution 1329 (2000), see note 43. 
50 The international community supported the plans to complete the Tribunals mandates by submitting a total of 64 candidates for the 
pool of ad litem judges, although only 54 were required.  
51 Letter dated 17 June 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2002/678, 19 
June 2002, p. 5. 
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regarding the Completion Strategy. 52  However, the ICTR took longer to accept a 
completion strategy, and only in 2002 did the Security Council authorise ad litem judges 
for the ICTR.53 The ICTR developed a Completion Strategy with the plan to complete its 
mandate by 2007 or 2008.54 
 On 28 August 2003, the UN Security Council issued the first resolution treating the 
Completion Strategies of the ICTY and ICTR jointly. It called upon the Tribunals to 
complete investigations by the end of 2004, to complete all trial activities at first instance 
by the end of 2008 and to complete all work by the end of 2010.55 Furthermore, according 
to Resolution 1503 (2003), the Secretary-General decided to split the positions of the 
Prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR so that each Tribunal would have separate Prosecutors.56 
This measure was intended to improve the effectiveness of the Tribunals. On 26 March 
2004, the Security Council issued Resolution 1534 (2004), which underlined the 
importance of fully adopting the Completion Strategies and thereby reconfirmed 
Resolution 1503 (2003).57 Following Resolution 1534 (2004) the Tribunals amended Rule 
11bis of their Rules of Procedure and Evidence to allow the referral of cases regarding 
accused individuals who were subject to a confirmed indictment. In addition, these accused 
individuals need to be considered appropriate for transfer to national courts depending on 
the gravity of the crimes charged and their level of responsibility.58 According to Rule 
11bis of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence (ICTY RPE)59 and 11bis of the ICTR 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (ICTR RPE),60 the President of the Tribunals may 
appoint a bench of three permanent judges selected from the Trial Chambers, the so-called 
Referral Bench, which not only takes into consideration the gravity of the crimes described 
in the indictment, but also whether the national jurisdiction is able to provide a fair trial.61 
Pursuant to Rule 11bis (D) (IV), the Prosecutor is responsible for monitoring the national 																																																								
52 Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2002/21, 23 July 2002; UN Security Council Resolution 1503 
(2003), UN Doc. S/RES/1503 (2003), 28 August 2003, preamble. 
53 UN Security Council Resolution 1431 (2002), UN Doc. S/RES/1431 (2002), 14 August 2002. 
54 Seventh Annual Report of the ICTR, UN Doc. A/57/163–S/2002/733, 2 July 2002, paras. 22-23. 
55 UN Security Council Resolution 1503 (2003), see note 52, para. 7; UN Security Council Resolution 1512 (2003), UN Doc. 
S/RES/1512 (2003), 27 October 2003, preamble; Letter dated 29 September 2003 from the President of the ICTR E. Møse addressed to 
the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2003/946, 3 October 2003.  
56 UN Security Council Resolution 1503 (2003), see note 52, para. 7; UN Security Council Resolution 1512 (2003), UN Doc. 
S/RES/1512 (2003), 27 October 2003, para. 8. 
57 The President of the Security Council would later state that Resolution 1534 (2004) 'emphasized the importance of fully implementing 
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court proceedings of the referred cases. For example, the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) agreed to co-operate with the Office of the Prosecutor and to 
monitor the war crimes cases.62  
 The time following Resolution 1534 (2004) was a period marked by unprecedented 
tribunal activity.63 But even though the Trial Chambers were working at full capacities, it 
became apparent as time went by that the Tribunals would not be able to finish their work 
by the end of 2010. According to Riznik, a reason for this delay was found in ‘the fact that 
the measures implanted to speed up proceedings did not have the expected effect on 
reducing the length of the proceedings.’64 Therefore, several Security Council Resolutions 
the initial deadlines for both Tribunals were postponed year after year.65 In November 
2007, the President of the ICTR reported to the Security Council that, considering the 
current projections, the Tribunal might not be able to dispose of all cases by December 
2008. He reiterated this position in May 2008, indicating that some of the cases tried by the 
ICTR would, at best, be completed in the first half of 2009 with sentences delivered in the 
second half of 2009.66 In its final report the ICTR Tribunal plan was to close by the end of 
2015, which also happened.67  
 
3. Establishing the SCSL 
In response to the atrocities committed during the Balkan wars and the Rwandan genocide, 
the Security Council established the ad hoc Tribunals under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.68 But because of the number of structural, administrative and financial problems, a 
discussion emerged concerning whether there was a more efficient and cheaper justice 
model to end impunity for international crimes.69 Therefore, a model similar in form, 
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69 Ralph Zacklin, ‘The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals’ JICJ 2 (2004) 541, 545; Suzanne Katzenstein, ‘Hybrid Tribunals: 
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substance and international legitimacy to the ad hoc tribunals needed to be developed.70 A 
new generation of courts has been created, which are commonly referred to as the ‘hybrid’, 
‘mixed’ or ‘internationalised’ tribunals.71 These mixed tribunals have the characteristics of 
national as well as international tribunals. The model of hybrid courts ‘endeavours to 
combine the strengths of the ad hoc tribunals with the benefits of local prosecutions.’72 
 The SCSL was created to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in Sierra Leone during 
the Sierra Leone Civil War in 1996. The conflict started when the Revolutionary United 
Front, supported by the special forces of Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia, intervened in Sierra Leone and attempted to overthrow the Joseph Momoh 
government.73 The Civil War began on 23 March 1991, lasted 11 years, and left over  
50 000 dead. Although the SCSL is a ‘close relative of the hybrid tribunals, it is more 
accurately classified with the ad hoc tribunals, because it is a creature of international law, 
not domestic law’.74 The precise legal nature of the SCSL was questioned in the case 
against the former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, who insisted on absolute immunity 
from criminal prosecution and argued that the SCSL was without jurisdiction because it 
did not derive its authority from Chapter VII of the UN Charter and thus would be 
characterised as a national court. 75 The Special Court Appeals Chamber characterised the 
institution as an international criminal court, as it declared in its judgement:76 																																																								
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‘The constitutive instruments of the court contain indicia too numerous to enumerate to 
justify that conclusion. To enumerate those indicia will involve virtually quoting the entire 
provisions of those instruments. It suffices that having adverted to those provisions, the 
conclusion we have arrived at is inescapable.’ 
 The Statute of the SCSL was drafted in October 2000, after President Kabbah 
requested that the Security Council establish a ‘strong and credible court that will meet the 
objectives of bringing justice and ensuring lasting peace’ in Sierra Leone.77 The SCSL was 
set up by way of an agreement between the government of Sierra Leone and the UN. Thus, 
negotiations for a court for Sierra Leone began because of the invitation by the government 
of Sierra Leone.78 Therefore, some authors pointed out the contrast of the SCSL to the 
Tribunals by explaining that both Tribunals were 'imposed' upon rather than 'requested' by 
the countries involved.79 The Statute was adopted and came into force on 16 January 
2002.80 However, unlike the ICTY and ICTR, which were established by resolutions of the 
Security Council and constituted as subsidiary organs of the UN, the SCSL was established 
by an agreement between the UN and the government of Sierra Leone. Therefore, the 
SCSL is a treaty-based sui generis court of mixed composition and jurisdiction.81 The 
agreement needed to be incorporated into the national law of Sierra Leone. Thus, the 
Parliament of Sierra Leone enacted the Special Court Agreement (Ratification) Act, which 
provides the legal framework for the court.82 The applicable law includes international as 
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well as Sierra Leonean law. The hybrid institutional characteristics include staffing of all 
organs of the court by national and international personnel.83  
 According to Article 1 (1) of the SCSL Statute, the Court has ‘the power to 
prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra 
Leone since 30 November 1996’. Another hybrid characteristic is that the SCSL derives its 
subject-matter jurisdiction from international and national law. Articles 2-4 of the SCSL 
Statute define the subject-matter jurisdiction for international crimes, including crimes 
against humanity, other serious violations of international humanitarian law, and violations 
of Article 3 common to the Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol II. Further, Article 
5 of the SCSL Statute allows the SCSL to prosecute persons under the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Children Act, 1926, and the Malicious Damage Act, 1861. According to Article 
8 of the SCSL Statute, the SCSL and the national courts of Sierra Leone have concurrent 
jurisdiction.84 The SCSL also has primacy over the national courts of Sierra Leone, and it 
may at any stage of the procedure formally request a national court to defer to its 
competence.85 However, the primacy of the SCSL is limited to the national courts of Sierra 
Leone and does not extend to the courts of third states. The SCSL also lacks the power to 
request the extradition of an accused person from any third state and to induce the 
compliance of its authorities with any such request.86 The SCSL was the first of the 
Tribunals to close. The judgement of Charles Taylor brought all judicial activities of the 
Special Court to an end. By the end of 2012, the SCSL had indicted thirteen people and 
convicted nine, including the first sitting African head of state to be convicted, Charles 
Taylor. In December 2013, as part of its successful completion of its mandate, the SCSL 
formally handed over the SCSL's landmark courthouse to the government of Sierra 
Leone.87 
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III. Establishing the Residual Mechanism 
Closing a criminal court is not a usual affair and certain legal and practical obligations of 
the Tribunals will necessarily continue beyond their closure. These are legal and ethical 
obligations of the Tribunals, the Security Council, and the UN. With the adoption of 
Resolution 1966 (2010) on 22 December 2010 the Security Council took its most decisive 
step to date toward the closure of the Tribunals.  
 
1. Plans to Establish the Residual Mechanism 
A series of significant steps led to the creation of the Residual Mechanism. In September 
2007, the ICTY and ICTR submitted an informal joint paper to the Security Council 
identifying the potential residual functions of the Tribunals. The Tribunals' joint paper 
explained why the different residual functions needed to continue beyond the closure of the 
Tribunals.1 In addition, the Tribunals established an Advisory Committee on Archives 
(ACA), which had the mandate to provide an analysis of how best to ensure the future 
accessibility of the archives. The ACA, chaired by Justice Richard Goldstone, submitted a 
report on the archives of the Tribunals. 2 The Tribunals’ informal joint paper and the report 
of the ACA provided a basis for dialogue between the Informal Working Group on 
International Tribunals (IWGIT) and the Tribunals during 2007 and 2008, helping the 
IWGIT understand the residual functions.3 The IWGIT was established in June 2000 to 
cope with specific legal issues related to the Tribunals. It was an informal body and 
consisted of legal advisers of the members of the Security Council. The IWIGIT is not a 
decision-making body, but it conducts substantive consideration of the issues and makes 
recommendations directly to the Security Council. The IWGIT was asked to create 
appropriate instruments to enable the future Residual Mechanism to perform the residual 
functions of the Tribunals.4  
 In a statement on 19 December 2008, the President of the Security Council noted 
with concern the fact that the Tribunals would not be able to complete their work by the 
end of 2010 due to the complexity of certain cases and the late arrest of certain accused 
persons. But he also pointed out that ‘the Security Council reaffirms the necessity of 
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persons indicted by the ICTY and ICTR being brought to justice.’5 For the first time, a 
statement of the Security Council’s President contained a formal pronouncement of the 
need for an ad hoc residual mechanism to continue the most important functions of the 
ICTY and the ICTR.6 ‘The Security Council acknowledges the need to establish an ad hoc 
residual mechanism to carry out a number of essential functions of the Tribunals, including 
the trial of high-level fugitives, after the closure of the Tribunals. In view of the 
substantially reduced nature of these residual functions, this residual mechanism should be 
a small, temporary, and efficient structure. Its functions and size will diminish over time.’7 
The residual mechanism would derive its authority from a Security Council Resolution as 
well as from Statutes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence based on those already existing 
for the Tribunals, but with appropriate modification.8  
 In 2008, the IWGIT produced, in cooperation with the UN Office of Legal Affairs, 
the first draft elements for a resolution and began abstract discussions, which resulted in 
the beginnings of a negotiation process. In 2009, the IWGIT requested that the UN Office 
of Legal Affairs produce a series of detailed non-papers on each of the residual functions.9 
In order to allow the IWGIT to accomplish this request the Secretary-General was asked to 
report on the administrative and budgetary aspects of the options for possible locations for 
the seat of the future residual mechanism and the Tribunals’ archives.10 Thereafter, the UN 
Office of Legal Affairs drafted the Secretary-General's report of 21 May 2009.11  
Based on the information in the non-papers and the IWGIT discussions, the Secretary-
General's report made several recommendations for some of the main characteristics of a 
possible residual mechanism for the Tribunals.12 This report aimed to further and facilitate 
the work of the IWGIT. Besides the requested information regarding the location of the 
seat of the Residual Mechanism and the archives, the report also deals with other issues 
that may occur while establishing the Residual Mechanism. The IWGIT members agreed 
to a Residual Mechanism with a trial ‘capacity based on a roster of judges; that it be small, 
temporary and efficient, and made up of a small staff reflective of reduced functions 
following completion of the work of the Tribunals; and to a lesser extent, that its Statute be 
																																																								
5 Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2008/47,19 December 2008.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Brigitte Benoit Landale and Huw Llewellyn, ’The International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals: The Beginning of the End 
for the ICTY and ICTR’ Int'l Org. L. Rev. 8 (2011) 349, 351. 
10 Thomas Wayde Pittman, ‘Establishment of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals From Completion to 
Continuation’ JICJ 9 (2011) 797, 807. 
11 Secretary-General’s Report on the Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Options for Possible Locations for the Archives of the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Seat of the Residual 
Mechanism(s) for the Tribunals, UN Doc. S/2009/258, 21 May 2009; Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. 
S/PRST/2008/47,19 December 2008. 
12 Ibid.  
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based on amended ICTY and ICTR Statutes.’13 But the report also identifies the remaining 
issues, which still had to be resolved: (a) Identifying the residual functions that could be 
transferred to the Residual Mechanism; (b) Establishing one or two residual mechanisms 
and where to locate them; (c) Whether the resolution should determine an explicit date on 
which the Residual Mechanism will commence working or whether that date should be 
determined later depending on the Tribunals’ progress towards completion; (d) Whether 
the jurisdiction of the Residual Mechanism should extend to all fugitives or only to some 
of the indictees, and, if the latter, how to guarantee that there is no impunity for the 
remaining indictees; (e) Whether the Residual Mechanism should have the authority to 
refer cases to national authorities and would the Residual Mechanism have the authority to 
revoke referrals, or any referrals previously made by the Tribunals; (f) What the structure 
of the Residual Mechanism should be, including how to elect the judges of the Residual 
Mechanism; and finally (g) Where to locate the archives, including the question of whether 
the archives should be co-located with the Residual Mechanism.14 
 The Security Council would primarily rely on this document when later issuing 
Resolution 1966 (2010), which established the Residual Mechanism.15 This Resolution not 
only established the Residual Mechanism and its two branches, it also adopted the Statute 
and made it subject to specific transitional arrangements. However, while establishing the 
Residual Mechanism a major challenge was to strike a balance between the need to respect 
due process and fairness on the one side and efficiency and cost-effectiveness on the other. 
 
2. Nature of the Residual Mechanism  
The Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals is formally referred to as the 
International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. According to Acquaviva, the 
expression Residual Mechanism is used to describe ‘the set of means and procedures to 
deal with functions’ that were carried out by Tribunals, but which will be needed after the 
Tribunals have completed all judicial work.16 One option was that the Residual Mechanism 
could be a ‘downsized tribunal’.17 But the IWGIT recommended a different approach, in 
particular that as many of the residual functions as possible should be transferred to the 
affected countries rather than transferred to a Residual Mechanism, because the Tribunals 																																																								
13 Ibid., para. 7. 
14 Ibid., para. 8. 
15  UN Security Council Resolution 1966 (2010), UN Doc. S/RES/1966 (2010), 22 December 2010; Thomas Wayde Pittman, 
‘Establishment of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals From Completion to Continuation’ JICJ 9 (2011) 797, 
805. 
16 Guido Acquaviva, ’Best Before the Date Indicated: Residual Mechanisms at the ICTY’ in Albertus Henricus Joannes Swart, 
Alexander Zahar, Göran Sluiter (eds.) The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2011), p. 1.  
17 Hwu Llewellyn ’The Security Council’s Consideration of the Establishment of Residual Mechanisms for the International Criminal 
Tribunals’ ASIL 104 (2010), 41. 
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were always intended to be temporary and were created in a situation where the affected 
countries were unable or unwilling to prosecute cases.18 Therefore, the Security Council 
considered that the Residual Mechanism should be a small and efficient new institution 
and not a downsized continuation of the ICTY and ICTR.19 However, according to Landale 
and Llewellyn, the Residual Mechanism could be regarded as a ‘downsized tribunal’.20 
This opinion is appropriate, because the Residual Mechanism has the same three-organ 
structure and continues all of the essential residual functions of the ICTY and ICTR, 
including judicial activities, witness protection, and the management of the archives.  
 The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter established the 
Residual Mechanism to restore international peace and security.21 The main goal of the 
Residual Mechanism ‘is to ensure that the closing of the Tribunals will not result in 
impunity for those responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law.’22 
A Residual Mechanism, however, could have the potential ‘to create a safe space within 
which those traumatised by their experiences may overcome them`.23 Because the residual 
issues refer to the enduring tasks of legal and moral obligations to the affected individuals, 
the Residual Mechanism continues the objectives of the Tribunals, including important 
responsibilities regarding matters of life or death and the protection of fundamental human 
rights. 
 
3. The Residual Functions  
While implementing the completion strategies it became clear that a number of functions 
exist that need to be carried out after the closure of the Tribunals, the so-called ‘residual 
functions’, which go to the heart of the core business of the Tribunals and their mandate.24 
The expression ‘residual functions’ describes the essential functions of the ICTY and the 
ICTR that need to be carried out after the Tribunals have completed their mandate.25 But 
the expression ‘residual functions’ does not particularly convey the sense that these are 																																																								
18 Secretary-General’s Report, see note 11; Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2008/47,19 December 
2008, paras. 109-110. 
19 Ibid.; Brigitte Benoit Landale and Huw Llewellyn, ’The International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals: The Beginning of 
the End for the ICTY and ICTR’ Int'l Org. L. Rev. 8 (2011) 349, 352. 
20 Ibid., p. 354. 
21 Ibid., p. 351. 
22  Dafna Gozani, ’Beginning to Learn How to End: Lessons on Completion Strategies, Residual Mechanisms, and Legacy 
Considerations from Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals to the International Criminal Court’ Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev 36 
(2015) 331, 338; Catherine Denis, ’Critical Overview of Residual Functions' of the Residual Mechanisms and its Date of 
Commencement (including Transitional Arrangements)’ JICJ 9 (2011) 819, 820. 
23 Leila Nadya Sadat, ‘The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’ Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute, 3 July 
2012, p. 18; Dafna Gozani, ’Beginning to Learn How to End: Lessons on Completion Strategies, Residual Mechanisms, and Legacy 
Considerations from Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals to the International Criminal Court’ Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev 36 
(2015) 331, 338. 
24 Article 2 of the IRMCT Statute; Gabriel Oosthuizen and Robert Schaeffer, ‘Complete justice: Residual functions and potential 
Residual Mechanisms of the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL’ HJJ 3 (2008) 48, 50. 
25 Secretary-General’s Report, see note 11, para. 5; Guido Acquaviva, ’Best Before the Date Indicated: Residual Mechanisms at the 
ICTY’ in Albertus Henricus Joannes Swart, Alexander Zahar, Göran Sluiter (eds.) The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011), p. 6.  
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crucial ongoing obligations of the international community. Some of those obligations 
concern life-or-death matters and fundamental human rights. According to Acquaviva, it 
would have been a better option to choose a more suitable term in order to transport the 
sense of continuity and on-going support by the international community to domestic 
jurisdictions.26 However, the expression ‘residual functions’ has been established and is 
widely used. 
 In September 2007, the ICTY and the ICTR jointly submitted a report to the UN 
Office of Legal Affairs explaining twelve essential functions that need to be carried out at 
the international level after their closure. The aim was to ensure the continuity of the work 
between the Tribunals and the Residual Mechanism. 27  According to the Residual 
Mechanism’s website, the number of essential functions was downscaled to nine.28 The 
content and the work involved in these functions are precisely described in the report of the 
Secretary-General on the ‘administrative and budgetary aspects of the options for possible 
locations for the archives of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the seat of the Residual Mechanism(s) for 
the Tribunals’, issued on 21 May 2009.29 Five of the functions are ad hoc in nature and 
only temporary: 
• Tracking and prosecution of the remaining fugitives 
• Conducting Retrials 
• Conducting and completing all appellate proceedings  
• Conducting proceedings for review of final judgement   
• Conducting Trials for contempt cases and false testimony 
Another four functions are continuing and require day-to-day follow- up and management:  
• Protection of victims and witnesses  
• Supervision of enforcement of sentences  
• Assistance to national jurisdictions  
• Management and preservation of the archives 
These nine functions were identified as the essential functions that need to be continued 
out after the Tribunals’ closure.  
																																																								
26 Ibid., Gabriel Oosthuizen and Robert Schaeffer, ‘Complete justice: Residual functions and potential Residual Mechanisms of the 
ICTY, ICTR and SCSL’ HJJ 3 (2008) 48, 50. 
27 These document and correspondence are not publicly available. However, references thereto and a part of the contents can be found in 
other documents. See Assessment and report of Judge Patrick Robinson, President of the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, provided to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 6 of Council Resolution 1534 (2004), UN Doc. S/2008/729, 24 
November 2008, Annex I, para. 40; Secretary-General’s Report, see note 11, para. 9.  
28 IRMCT Website, http://www.unmict.org/en/about (last visited on 11 April 2017); Giorgia Tortora, ‘The Mechanism for International 
Criminal Tribunals: A Unique Model and Some of Its Distinctive Challenges’ ASIL Insight 21, 6 April 2017, 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/21/issue/5/mechanism-international-criminal-tribunals (last visited on 30 May 2017). 
29 Secretary-General’s Report, see note 11, paras. 17- 59.  
	
24	
4. Legality of the Residual Mechanism 
The question arises as to whether the creation of Residual Mechanism falls within the 
power of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The use of 
enforcement measures requires, for example, a ‘threat to the peace’, ‘breach of peace’, or 
‘act of aggression, according to Article 39 of the UN Charter.  The conflict in former 
Yugoslavia and the Rwandan genocide required a measure under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. However, the current situation in the affected countries does not constitute a threat 
to international peace and security any longer. According to Happold, the existence of a 
specific situation mentioned in Article 39 of the UN Charter is required to justify the action 
taken under Chapter VII.30 But when the Residual Mechanism was created, the Security 
Council reaffirmed the determination to combat impunity ‘and the necessity that all 
persons indicted by the ICTY and ICTR are brought to justice.’31 However, this affirmation 
justifies the Security Council for acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, although no 
contemporary threat to peace exists in the affected countries. Galand argues that the 
context in which Resolution 1960 (2010) was adopted displays an agreement of the 
Security Council members to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.32 But Nolte argues 
that an enforcement measure under Article 39 of the UN Charter would be ultra vires if a 
majority of the Security Council members approved the measure, even though no 
contemporary threat to peace exists.33 According to Galand, the fight against impunity can 
trigger the power of the Security Council under Article 41 of the UN Charter.34 Galand is 
correct, because if the Tribunals had been closed down without any form of mechanism to 
conduct trials for crimes committed in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, Security Council’s 
aim to end impunity would have been jeopardised. But Galand argues that a resolution 
under Chapter VI of the UN Charter could have possibly been sufficient to allow the 
Residual Mechanism to perform most of its residual functions. 35  However, residual 
functions regarding the conduct of a criminal trial required all states to cooperate. It was 
necessary to oblige the states to provide judicial assistance to the Residual Mechanism. 
Therefore, the Residual Mechanism needs to be a measure under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter in order to be able to acquit and convict all remaining fugitives.  
																																																								
30 Mattew Happold, ‘Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the United Nations’ Leiden J Intl L 16 (2003) p. 602.  
31 UN Security Council Resolution 1966 (2010), see note 15, para. 6. 
32 Alexandre Skander Galand,‘Was the Residual Mechanism’s creation falling squarely within the Chapter VII power of the Security 
Council?’ QIL 40 (2017), p. 12. 
33 Georg Nolte, ‘The Limits of the Security Council’s Powers and its Functions in the International Legal System: Some Reflections’ in 
M Byers (ed.) The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2001), p. 316.  
34 Alexandre Skander Galand,‘Was the Residual Mechanism’s creation falling squarely within the Chapter VII power of the Security 
Council?’ QIL 40 (2017), p. 13. 
35 Ibid, p. 18. 
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IV. Transferring the Residual Functions to the National Authorities of 
the Affected Countries 
The question appears of whether there was still need for the Security Council to interfere 
where the domestic legal systems were sufficiently rebuilt to take over the work of the 
Tribunals. It is questionable whether it would have been a better option to transfer the 
residual functions to national authorities instead of establishing the Residual Mechanism. 
‘Transfer’ involves the completely handing over of responsibilities concerning a particular 
residual function.1 Although the Residual Mechanism already exists, it still could be 
possible to transfer a residual function to national authorities of the affected countries in 
order to reduce the workload of the Residual Mechanism. 
 
1. Tracking and Prosecution of the Remaining Fugitives 
The prosecution of the remaining fugitives is the most important residual function. And 
holding international trials is very expensive. But it is questionable whether national 
jurisdictions would be able to conduct trials in accordance with international fair trial 
standards. Whether transferring the trial function to domestic courts would be more 
efficient is controversial in the legal literature.2 According to Acquaviva, it would be 
difficult to justify keeping open an expensive international tribunal when the other judicial 
activities diminish over time just for the eventuality that the remaining high-level fugitives 
may be apprehended.3  The remaining fugitives could envision prosecution before a 
domestic court.4 The Tribunals were established as temporary organs and are ad hoc in 
nature, the reason being that the national jurisdictions of the affected regions were not able 
to carry out proceedings at that time.5 But the judicial capacity of these regions has 
improved since the end of conflicts in the affected areas. Therefore, it would be possible to 
consider transferring residual functions to national jurisdictions. Moreover, transferring 
functions regarding the prosecution of the remaining fugitives to national authorities could 
be seen as the restoration of the national jurisdiction.6 The national authorities should have 
performed these functions from the beginning but were not able to do so. Although the 
original national authorities are no longer existent new domestic judiciaries have emerged 																																																								
1 Gabriël Oosthuizen, ‘Draft Briefing Paper: The residual functions of the UN international criminal tribunals of the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone: the potential role of the International Criminal Court’ (2008) International Criminal 
Law Services, para. 27 (xi). 
2 Guido Acquaviva, ’Best Before the Date Indicated: Residual Mechanisms at the ICTY’ in Albertus Henricus Joannes Swart, Alexander 
Zahar, Göran Sluiter (eds.) The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2011), p. 8; Gabriel Oosthuizen and Robert Schaeffer, ‘Complete justice: Residual functions and potential Residual Mechanisms 
of the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL’ HJJ 3 (2008) 48, 50. 
3 Guido Acquaviva, ’Best Before the Date Indicated: Residual Mechanisms at the ICTY’, see note 2, p. 8. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Assessment and progress report of the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Theodor 
Meron, for the period from 16 November 2015 to 15 May 2016, UN Doc. S/2016/453, 17 May 2016, paras. 75-76. 
6 Guido Acquaviva, ’Best Before the Date Indicated: Residual Mechanisms at the ICTY’, see note 2, p. 8. 
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in their place. According to Acquaviva, the following principle needs to remain valid: 
‘criminal proceedings are normally dealt with at the national level.’7 In addition, domestic 
trials would be less expensive than holding international trials, because the need for 
translators or travel of witnesses to travel to and from the Tribunals would be lessened and 
proceedings would rely on existing local administration and infrastructure. But various 
NGOs and individuals have expressed criticism regarding the idea of fugitives escaping 
justice or not being tried in The Hague. 8 According to Acquaviva, it can be argued that the 
UN, by giving the ICTY primacy over national courts, assumed responsibility only for 
ensuring that trials take place but not that they are carried out by a particular international 
body.9 
 According to Acquaviva, because the start date of the Residual Mechanism’s 
judicial activities would be uncertain, the support staff for a ‘dormant’ Residual 
Mechanism could become expensive in the long term.10 Therefore, pretrial activities could 
have a form of virtual courtroom where the Residual Mechanism does not detain the 
accused. This ‘virtual courtroom’ would work on an electronic platform operated by the 
Registry in order to ensure disclosure and other obligations before trial proceedings begin. 
The real courtroom would only be necessary for traditional trial activities or status 
conferences. 11  Another possible approach could be to use domestic courts with an 
international component, such as the Special War Crimes Chamber in the State Court of 
BIH. The Special War Crimes Chamber functions in part with the help of international 
assistance by prosecutors, judges, other legal experts, and international financial 
contributions.12 The domestic solution could be based on the premise that an international 
body monitors the work done by domestic courts. That would ensure international 
standards for the prosecutorial and defence activities carried out. It would be plausible, 
because the Residual Mechanism is already responsible for monitoring cases referred to 
national courts through international or national bodies. However, ‘dormant’ is a misnomer 
because the other residual functions would be active even if there were no trial activity. In 
terms of merely budgetary aspects, referral to national jurisdictions would indeed be a 
preferable approach. But considering due process standards and fairness regarding all 
concerned persons, trials of the remaining fugitives at an international level are 
																																																								
7 Ibid., p. 9. 
8Gabriel Oosthuizen and Robert Schaeffer, ‘Complete justice: Residual functions and potential Residual Mechanisms of the ICTY, ICTR 
and SCSL’ HJJ 3 (2008) 48, 55. 
9 Guido Acquaviva, ’Best Before the Date Indicated: Residual Mechanisms at the ICTY’, see note 2, p. 16. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
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necessary.13 This indicates the significance of international trials even if the UN is faced 
with a potentially expensive option. 
 According Oosthuizen and Schaeffer, the option to let the high-level accused face 
justice before national courts would raise issues.14 In the case of Rwanda, there were 
concerns as to whether the high-level accused would receive fair trials. According to 
Oosthuizen and Schaeffer, the Residual Mechanism is necessary to be able to urge national 
and international authorities to apprehend accused persons at large, request and arrange for 
their transfer into custody, and prosecute and try them fairly and expeditiously.15 The 
Residual Mechanism must have the capacity and authority to conduct trials and appeals 
proceedings regarding the high-level fugitives who cannot or should not be tried by 
national courts in former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, or elsewhere. Transfer to domestic courts 
would allow the proceedings to occur closer to the victims and communities that have 
experienced the events in question. But when the ICTY Prosecutor met victims’ groups in 
Sarajevo these groups were bitter about the Completion Strategy because they believe that 
all high-level cases needed to be tried in The Hague. These victims see the Tribunal as a 
promise of justice and a concrete sign that the international community cares about their 
suffering. They think it would be unjust to envisage closing the Tribunal without 
completing its task successfully. In their minds, Karadžić and Mladić were the two persons 
most responsible for the genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed in 
BIH. According to the victims, there is no place other than The Hague to try them.16 This 
shows that although proceedings before domestic courts would be closer to the victims and 
communities that have experienced those events, the victims still prefer that the fugitives 
be tried before an international body. For many, the importance of these cases has to be 
respected by trying those persons responsible for the atrocities at an international level.  
 At the time the Residual Mechanism, was created a powerful signal was sent to the 
countries where the remaining fugitives were hiding as well as to the entire world 
community. The symbolic impact of ending impunity must not be underestimated. With 
the establishment of the Residual Mechanism, the Security Council sent a powerful 
message to the remaining fugitives from the ICTR: that they cannot escape justice. This 
signalled recognition of the importance of the Tribunals’ work over the last decades and an 
acknowledgement of the victims’ suffering.  
																																																								
13 Ibid. 
14Gabriel Oosthuizen and Robert Schaeffer, ‘Complete justice: Residual functions and potential Residual Mechanisms of the ICTY, 
ICTR and SCSL’ HJJ 3 (2008) 48, 55. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Progress report of the Prosecutor of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Serge Brammertz, for the period 
from 16 November 2015 to 15 May 2016, UN Doc. UN Doc. S/2016/453, Annex II, 17 May 2016, para. 6. 
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A. Review of the Transferred Cases of the Ad Hoc Tribunals 
In order to decide whether it would have been an option to transfer this particular residual 
function to national jurisdiction it is necessary to examine the transferred cases in detail. 
The handling of the transferred cases indicates the ability of the national jurisdictions to 
conduct trials in accordance with international fair trial standards. The Tribunals were 
hesitant to refer cases to national jurisdictions of the affected countries. The ICTY 
transferred eight cases, and the ICTR transferred five.17  
 
a. Transferred Cases of the ICTY 
The ICTY referred eight cases against 13 accused persons to national jurisdictions of BIH, 
Croatia, and Serbia.18 The cooperation with Croatia regarding war crimes cases was 
described as efficient and professional.19 In 2003, the Croatian parliament adopted the 
legislation that transferred the jurisdiction to investigate and try war crimes cases to four 
county courts in Zagreb, Rjeka, Split and Osijek.20 Lengthy delays occurred in several 
cases at all stages of the procedure at county courts as well as at the Supreme Court of 
Croatia. According to the Human Rights Watch Report issued in October 2004, patterns 
observed in war crimes trials in Croatia include issues regarding a ‘hugely disproportionate 
number of cases being brought against the ethnic Serb minority, some on far weaker 
charges than cases against ethnic Croats.’21 A significant differential between Serbs and 
Croats was observed in the rate of conviction and acquittal.22 Convictions of ethnic Serbs 
existed where the evidence did not support the charges.23 The OSCE Mission to Croatia 																																																								
17 Figures of the Cases see the Website of the ICTY, http://www.icty.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases, (last visited on 27 March 2017); 
Key Figures of the Cases see the Website of the ICTR, http://unictr.unmict.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases, (last visited on 27 March 
2017). 
18 Transferred to BIH: Prosecutor v. Gojko Janković (Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT), Decision on Rule11 bis Referral, 15 November 2005, 
para. 5; Prosecutor v. Paško Ljubičić (Case No: IT-00-41-PT), Decision to Refer the Case to Bosnia and Herzegovina pursuant to Rule 
11 bis, 12 April 2006; Prosecutor v. Mitar Rašević and Savo Todović (Case No. It-97-25/1-PT), Decision on Referral of Casue Under 
Rule 11bis, 8 July 2005; Prosecutor v. Željko Mejakić, Momčilo Gruban, Dušan Fuštar, Duško Knežević (Case No. Case No. IT-02-65-
PT), Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, 30 July 2005; Prosecutor v. Milorad Trbić (Case No. 
IT-05-88/l-PT), Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, 27 April 2007; Prosecutor v. Radovan Stanković (Case No. IT-96-23/2-
PT), Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, 17 May 2005; Transferred to Croatia: Prosecutor v. Rahim Ademi and Mirko 
Norač (Case No. Case No.: IT-04-78-PT) Decision for Referral to the Authorities of the Republic of Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, 14 
September 2005; Transferred to Serbia: Prosecutor v. Vladimir Kovačević (Case No. IT-01-42/2-1), Decision on Referral of Case 
Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, 17 November 2006. 
19  Twentieth annual report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, UN Doc. A/68/255-S/2013/463, 2 
August 2013, para. 56; Nineteenth annual report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, UN Doc. A/67/214-
S/2012/592, 1 August 2012, para, 77; Thirteenth annual report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible 
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, UN Doc. 
A/61/271-S/2006/666, 21 August 2006, para. 78; Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markač (Case No. IT-06-90-A ), Judgement’, 
16 November 2012; Eighteenth annual report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, UN Doc. A/66/210-
S/2011/473, 31 July 2011, paras. 65-66; Sixteenth annual report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
covers the period from 1 August 2008 to 31 July 2009, UN Doc. A/64/205-S2009/394, 31 July 2009, para. 65. 
20 OSCE, Supplementary Report: ‘War Crime Proceedings in Croatia And Findings From Trial Monitoring’ 22 June 2004, p. 5. 
21 Human Rights Watch ‘Justice at Risk: War Crimes Trials in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro’ Volume 
16, No 7 (D), October 2004, p. 2.  
22 OSCE, Supplementary Report, see note 20, p. 20. 
23 Ibid., p. 7; Milena Sterio ‘Seeking the best Forum to Prosecute International War Crimes: Proposed Paradigms and Solutions’ Florida 
Journal of International Law (2006), p. 891; Article 20 of the ICTR Statute; ‘to be tried in his or her presence, and to defend himself or 
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pointed out that there is a considerable lack of impartiality amongst parts of the judiciary. 
The proceedings relied primarily on witness testimony, but reliability issues appeared 
regarding the reliability when trials concerned Croat defendants. The predominantly 
supportive atmosphere in which war crimes trials against Croats were conducted 
influenced witnesses.24 Witnesses reported being threatened by former high-ranking army 
officials.25 Therefore, the parliament enacted the Croatian Witness Protection Act, which 
entered into force in January 2004. 26 When transferring the first and only case to Croatia 
concerning Rahim Ademi and Mirko Norač, the Referral Bench concluded that under the 
Croatian Witness Protection Act the arrangements for witness availability and witness 
protection in Croatia are sufficient to ensure a fair trial.27 According to the Referral Bench, 
the measures are comparable to those applied at the ICTY, ranging from relocation of 
witnesses, non-disclosure of the witnesses’ identity, use of pseudonyms, and use of image 
and voice distortion during testimony. Further, the Referral Bench concluded that minor 
differences exist between the law as applied by the Tribunal and the law as applied by the 
Croatian Court. However, appropriate provisions exist to address most of the criminal acts 
of the accused, and the Croatian legal system provides an adequate penalty structure.28 But 
in the case of Rahim Ademi and Mirko Norač the Supreme Court of Croatia concluded that 
war crimes appeared as part of a lawful military action by the Croatian Army that has been 
criticised by Amnesty International.29 
 In 2003, a special war crimes chamber in the Belgrade District Court was 
established.30 The Human Rights Watch was concerned that the newly created war crimes 
chambers in Serbia required police cooperation in order to obtain evidence.31 But issues 
emerged in Serbia regarding police investigations, because the police had committed war 
crimes during the war. Therefore, it was difficult to make any real progress in the criminal 																																																																																																																																																																							
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investigations.32 According to the Human Rights Watch report, government officials of 
Serbia openly opposed the work of the ICTY.33 Hence, the report pointed out that transfers 
appeared unlikely as long as Serbia remains unwilling to cooperate with the ICTY. ICTY 
President Theodor Meron expressed that ‘Belgrade has shown such a lack of cooperation 
that we cannot send accused Serbian war criminals back.’34 However, on 17 April 2007 the 
case of Vladimir Kovačević was transferred to Serbia.35 The Referral Bench was satisfied 
that an adequate legal framework existed that criminalised the alleged conduct of the 
accused, provided an appropriate punishment, and ensured compliance with the 
requirements of a fair trial. 36 In April 2006, the ICTY found the accused unfit to enter a 
plea or stand trial. The Belgrade District Court acknowledged this.37 Because of the special 
situation regarding the health of the accused, the Referral Bench examined Serbian law and 
noted that the Serbian Criminal Procedure Act38 provides regulations which ensure that an 
accused will not have to stand trial if he is found to be unfit.39 According to the annual 
assessment and progress report of the Residual Mechanism, the Residual Mechanism 
continues to monitor for any change of status in the Vladimir Kovačević case.40  
 The cooperation of Serbia with the ICTY proved to be difficult. The third annual 
report of the ICTY pointed out that the indictees Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić 
were not arrested for a long period and moreover remained in official positions. There was 
no effort by the Serbian authorities to apprehend the fugitives known to be hiding in their 
territory.41 Although Serbia practically suspended any cooperation with the ICTY in the 
beginning of 2004, in 2005 the Serbian authorities publicly recognised the need for full 
cooperation with the ICTY. This was due to Serbia’s desire to be integrated into the 
European Union. But from October 2006 to March 2007 the cooperation deteriorated 
seriously, and no progress was made regarding the indictees Karadžić and Mladić.42 
Finally, with the arrest of Ratko Mladić on 26 May 2011 and the arrest of Goran Hadžić on 
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20 July 2011, Serbia met a key obligation to the ICTY.43 However, according to the most 
recent annual report issued in 2016, Serbia has failed to cooperate with the ICTY and has 
not executed the arrest warrants of the ICTY for three Serbian indictees.44  
 In BIH, a special war crimes chamber was created as part of the State Court of BIH 
to try the most serious war crimes cases.45 The chamber was staffed with international and 
local judges. But the number of international staff decreased over time.46 In the case of 
Radovan Stanković, the question appeared as to whether the War Crimes Chamber is a 
‘national court’ because it includes international judges. 47 The Referral Bench argued that 
Article 9 (1) of the ICTY Statute does not require justification for giving any meaning to 
‘national court’ other than the usual connotation that it constitutes a court of or pertaining 
to a nation.48 The War Crimes Chamber is a part of the State Court of BIH and was created 
according to the statutory law of BIH. According to the Referral Bench, including judges 
who are not nationals of BIH does not make the State Court any less a ‘national court’.49  
 Since the establishment of the Special War Crimes Chamber of the State Court of 
BIH in March 2005 significant results were achieved.50 In particular, BIH demonstrated 
more ethnic diversity in prosecutions than elsewhere in former Yugoslavia.51 But many 
persons whose prosecutions were approved by the ICTY remained at liberty in those parts 
of BIH in which the ethnic group to which they belonged was the majority. Political elites 
helped many suspects approved by the ICTY for prosecution to remain at large. 52 
According to the third annual report of the ICTY, BIH has been by far the most 
cooperative party, because it replying to nearly every warrant addressed to it.53 But the 																																																								
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ICTY’s Prosecutor expressed concern in the annual report of 2010 after political figures in 
BIH made statements supporting individuals convicted of violations of international 
humanitarian law, and denying any existence of committed crimes. The Office of the 
Prosecutor expressed that such statements are damaging and affect directly the cooperation 
with the ICTY.54 
 When transferring the case of Radovan Stanković, the Referral Bench concluded 
that there was an appropriate legal framework to address the criminal acts of the accused 
and that there was an adequate penalty structure. 55 Further, Chapter II of the BIH Law on 
Protection of Vulnerable Witnesses and Witnesses under Threat provides measures for the 
anonymity of witnesses in order to protect them.56 But according to the monitoring report 
in the case of Gojko Janković, the Law of Protection of Witnesses was not always applied 
uniformly. This resulted in the provisions missing clarity or not regulating all matters.57  
 Issues arose regarding fair trial standards. The trials appeared to have problems 
with witness testimony. In case where a witness shared the same ethnicity as the accused, 
the witness was often afraid or otherwise unwilling to testify in war crimes trials. 58 In 
addition, problems appeared regarding communication with the defence counsel lawyer.59  
Further, according to the report of the Commission for Human Rights of the Parliament of 
BIH, violence occurred against Serb and Croat prisoners in the Zenica Correctional 
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Facility.60 But the Referral Bench took into consideration that the authorities of BIH took 
the necessary steps to solve these problems.61 The Law of BIH on Execution of Criminal 
Sanctions, Detention, and other Measures ensures that the operation of the detention 
facility is in accordance with international standards. 62 In addition, an agreement was 
reached between the ICTY Prosecutor and the chairman of the OSCE Mission BIH. The 
OSCE Mission BIH monitors the transferred proceedings, so the case may be revoked if 
the national authorities do not provide detention facilities in accordance with international 
standards.63 Concerns exist regarding national or ethnic bias in the judicial system of 
BIH.64 According to Article 4 of the BIH Law on the State Court,65 the Parliamentary 
Assembly of BIH elects the judges of the State Court upon recommendation by the 
Commission for the Nomination of Judges to the Court. However, the Parliamentary 
Assembly is composed of two chambers: the House of Peoples and the House of 
Representatives, after Articles IV.1 and IV.2 of the Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BIH Constitution).66 One-third of the Delegates of the House of Peoples and 
one-third of the members of the House of Representatives must be from the area Republika 
Srpska. According to Article VI.1 (a) of the BIH Constitution, the Constitutional Court 
consists of nine members, four of whom are selected by the House of Representatives of 
the Federation, two by the Assembly of Republika Srpska, and the remaining three by the 
President of the European Court of Human Rights after consultation with the Presidency of 
BIH. According to Article V of the BIH Constitution, the Presidency is composed of three 
members, and one is being a Serb directly elected from the area of Republika Srpska. 
Therefore, the inclusion of Republika Srpska in the judge nomination provides a guard 
against biased judgements based upon nationality or ethnicity. 67  
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 The reports of the OSCE Mission BIH show problems concerning custody 
judgements.68 The first report of the OSCE Mission BIH regarding the case of Radovan 
Stanković notes that the defendants right to have a judge, which reviews his detention 
pursuant to Article 5 (3) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), has been 
breached, because the Preliminary Hearing Judge considered himself bound by the 
primacy of the ICTY’s order for Detention on Remand.69 The decision on custody was not 
sufficiently justified. In addition, the Appellate Panel did not provide the judicial review 
required by Article 5 (4) of the ECHR, because it did not substantially re-examine the 
findings of the Preliminary Hearing Judge, but instead practically rubber-stamped the first 
instance decisions.70 Another issue appeared in the case of Radovan Stanković when the 
rehearing on the motion on custody was held prematurely because the hearing was held 
before the decision on the BIH Prosecutor’s indictment was reached.71 Scheduling the 
hearings prematurely could give the impression that the judge perceived the indictment as 
adapted and confirmed prior to having reviewed the adapted charges and the evidence 
supporting the new counts.72 The Court did not provide the Defence with the BIH 
Prosecutor’s indictment or equivalent information, while it expected the Defence to 
position themselves on the issue of pre-trial custody at the hearings in question. This 
hearing was intended to provide the Defence with an opportunity to challenge the 
lawfulness of pre-trial custody. But the Defence was called to present argumentation 
regarding a hypothetical situation. The European Court of Human Rights has found that 
the detained person must be told the reason for his or her detention.73 Article 132 (1) of the 
Criminal Procedure Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH CPC) considers the existence 
of a grounded suspicion as the essential pre-condition for ordering custody. The European 
Court of Human Rights also requires such a suspicion.74 Further, the procedural right of 																																																								
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equality of arms had been breached because the Prosecutor had knowledge of the accused 
and the evidence proposed whereas the Defence did not. The justification given by the 
Preliminary Hearing Judge as to the lack of available courtroom space is not convincing, 
especially when one balances it against the infringement of the defendant’s rights.75 The 
Appellate Panel argued that holding a hearing on custody before the indictment is 
confirmed is the correct procedure in general according to the BIH CPC. It would be 
pointless and purposeless to call the accused to give his opinion on the grounded suspicion 
for detention after the indictment is confirmed.76 However, it is logical that the motion on 
custody may be argued upon and evaluated only after an indictment was confirmed. 
 Problems appeared regarding the transparency of proceedings. In the case of 
Radovan Stanković, the Trial Panel decided upon the motion of the Prosecutor to exclude 
the public from the main trial.77 The right to a public trial is a fundamental guarantee of 
criminal procedure incorporated in domestic law and international human rights 
standards.78 However, Article 235 of the BIH CPC provides an exception and foresees the 
exclusion of the public when it is necessary to protect the personal and intimate life of the 
accused or to protect the interest of a minor or a witness. Article 6 (1) of the ECHR 
provides the same and implies a complex balancing act between the rights of the accused 
to a public trial and the interests of victims and witnesses involved in the proceedings. The 
court’s written decision to exclude the public does not examine the necessity of ordering 
this measure on a case-by-case basis, while it also considers an argument to which the 
panel did not give the defendants an effective opportunity to reply.79 In the case of Gojko 
Janković, the Court refused to allow journalists access to information concerning the audio 
record of a hearing that was held completely in an open session and that was prima facie 
public.80 However, the right of the applicant to appeal and information on to whom such an 
appeal might have to be addressed was not provided. But the Freedom of Information Act 
(FIA) requires that the public needs to have access to information in order to control the 
public authorities, including the judicial authorities. In addition, Article 14 (3) (a) of the 
FIA requires the explanation of the legal basis for a decision when refusing case access, 
including public interest factors and all material issues. But the Presiding Judge of the case 
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failed to provide that explanation, instead using only stereotypical phrases and copies of 
legal provisions without sustaining them with relevant facts.81  
 A major issue was the escape of Radovan Stanković, who was indicted by the 
ICTY for crimes against humanity and war crimes, and who remained at large after the 
ICTY transferred Stanković to BIH.82 He escaped on 25 May 2007 while being taken to a 
dentist at a hospital in the Centre of Foča. That visit was arranged because of a medical 
certificate, which was later found to be falsified.83 When Stanković reached the yard of the 
hospital and exited the prison car he headed to another car driven by an accomplice and 
drove away. The prison guards were unable to stop him.84 The Minister of Justice 
explained at a press conference that mistakes were made, and disciplinary and criminal 
proceedings in relation to the escape of Radovan Stanković were conducted.85 The nine 
guards escorting Stanković were suspended from duty and five were placed under criminal 
investigation. Further, the Assistant Chief Warden of Security of the Foča Penal 
Correctional was suspended from duty, criminally charged, and detained, while the 
Director of Foča Penal Correctional was dismissed from duty.86 There were delays after 
the escape in issuing an international arrest warrant against the fugitive. The decision to 
send Stanković to Foča Penal Correctional was criticized, because he has close 
acquaintances in that area from when he lived in Foča. 87 But BIH authorities had not red-
flagged that prison. After Stanković was on the run for nearly five years, he was arrested in 
Foča in January 2012 and returned to the same prison. Stanković is serving his sentence in 
the Foča Penal Correctional.88  
 
b. Transferred Cases of the ICTR  
The transfer of cases to Rwanda remained difficult for a long period. 89 It took time for 
Rwanda’s legal framework to provide an adequate basis upon which to seek referral. 
Problems existed regarding the capacity of the Rwandan judicial system to deal with such 
cases, because it was already coping with thousands of local cases related to the 																																																								
81 Ibid. 
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genocide.90 However, Rwanda enacted a series of important legal reforms by 2007, 
including the abolition of the death penalty and other important procedural protections in 
order to ensure fair trials. In 2010, the Prosecutor successfully launched referral 
applications. 91 The transfer of the cases to other countries also remained challenging. The 
Prosecutor attempted agreements with African states to accept referrals of cases from the 
ICTR and failed. Many suspects were in countries where judicial systems were under 
strain due to their own judicial workloads, or had investigated the cases but not pursued 
them and did not want to re-open these cases. 92  Another challenge was the non-
retroactivity or nulla crimen sine lege principle.93 Further, the domestic courts required a 
certain nexus to the crime, for instance that the accused either be present or have 
previously lived in that country before proceedings against them could be initiated. In 2007 
the Prosecutor succeeded in referring two cases to France, where the two ICTR fugitives 
Laurent Bucyibaruta94 and Wenceslas Munyeshyaka95 were apprehended.  
 During the conflict in Rwanda, the Genocide Convention of 1948 as well as the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977 were binding. 
Rwanda ratified the Convention of 1968 on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations 
to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. Treaties that Rwanda has ratified are more 
binding than organic and ordinary laws, according to Article 190 of the Rwandan 
Constitution of 2003.96 In addition, Rwanda attempted to solve the fair trial issues by 
adapting the Organic Law No. 11/2007 of March 2007 (Transfer Law) concerning the 
transfer of cases to Rwanda from the ICTR.97 The Transfer law deals with the prosecution 
of persons transferred from the ICTR. Therefore, the Referral Bench was satisfied that s 
sufficient legal framework existed.98 According to the monitoring reports, the witness 
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programmes Victim and Witness Support Unit and the Witness Protection Unit are fully 
operational and functioning.99  
 The death penalty has been abolished pursuant to the Abolition of the Death 
Penalty Law.100 But the death penalty was replaced with life imprisonment ‘with special 
provisions', which would include detention in isolation. This led to concerns.101 But the 
monitoring reports show that the accused transferred to Rwanda did not face life 
imprisonment in isolation.  
 Because of external influences and corruption, the question of whether Rwanda 
would be able to guarantee the independence and impartiality of their criminal justice 
system emerged. 102 In a report from 2013, Amnesty International expressed concerns 
regarding the Rwandan judiciary’s capacity in dealing with high-profile political cases.103 
The Amnesty International report pointed out official statements made by the Rwandan 
authorities before the trial of Victoria Ingabire and gave evidence that the judge favoured 
the prosecution.104 But in the case of Jean Uwinkindi, the Trial Chamber argued that the 
Rwandan judges benefit from the same presumption of impartiality that applies to the 
judges of the ICTR. Article 140 of the Rwandan Constitution mandates that the judiciary is 
independent and separate from the legislative and executive arms of government. 105 In 
addition, according to the Law on the Statutes for Judges and other Judicial Personnel, 
judges are completely independent in exercising their duties and are independent of the 
legislative and executive powers.106 The monitoring reports show that the judges acted 
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impartially throughout the hearings. No indications exist that the accused do not get a fair 
trial.  
 The Referral Chamber noted that the criminalisation of genocide ideology was a 
barrier for fair trials in Rwanda because of the fear of prosecution of potential witnesses.107 
For example, Victoria Ingabire was an opposition politician who returned from exile to 
contest the elections in Rwanda in 2010. The Supreme Court of Rwanda sentenced her to 
15 years in prison.108 The decision was based on the punishment of the crime of genocide 
ideology because of her speech, which referred to problems with reconciliation and ethnic 
violence.109 But Rwanda reduced the applicable sentences for the crime of genocide 
ideology and eliminated criminal responsibility for minors in the draft Penal Code.110 And 
Article 13 of the Transfer Law provides protection for witnesses who testify.111 According 
to the monitoring reports, no witness was punished for the crime of genocide ideology in 
relation to the transferred cases. 
 The Human Rights Watch Submissions stated that the Rwandan legal system is still 
limited in its ability to provide financial support.112 The monitoring reports pointed out that 
the counsel for Jean Uwinkindi had not been paid for his work. The budget did not provide 
for hiring investigators or to travel to identify potential Defence witnesses. 113 However, 
Rule 11bis of the ICTR RPE does not require a specific level of funding. Instead it only 
requires funding in accordance with the principle of equality of arms, which was provided, 
at least according to the Referral Chamber. Therefore, the Referral Chamber was satisfied 
that an adequately funded legal aid system existed to help the accused. 114 
 According to the monitoring reports, Bernard Munyagishari complained that his 
request for an interpreter in Rwanda had been denied.115 According to Article 5 of the 
Constitution of Rwanda, the national language of Rwanda is Kinyarwanda.116 The Court 
decided to provisionally appoint a French-Kinyarwanda interpreter for the accused in order 																																																								
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to provide the accused the opportunity to answer the Prosecution’s assertions that he was 
Rwandan and understood Kinyarwanda.117  
 Most recently, in the case of Jean Uwinkindi, fair trial concerns appeared regarding 
the inability of the accused to communicate confidentially with his Defence Counsel. But 
the Chamber concluded that these problems were considered by the Rwandan authorities 
and were not ‘ripe for current consideration as a basis for revocation pursuant to Article 6 
(6) of the Statute.’118 Therefore, the request of the accused was denied. However, this 
shows that the Residual Mechanism is flexible and willing to revoke referrals if the 
accused’s fair trial rights are at risk.  
 
B. Concluding Remarks 
In practice, the trial function only concerns some ICTR accused still at large.119 In the case 
of Rwanda it is important to emphasise that state authorities were implicated in the 
genocide. 120  Although the majority of the Rwandan population is Hutu, since the 
overthrow of the previous regime the Tutsi population is controlling the government. 
According to the amicus curiae of the International Criminal Defence Attorneys’ 
Association, 90% of prosecutors and 90% of the judges belong to the Tutsi population.121 
However, the Trial Chamber in the case of Ildephonse Hategekimana noted that this fact 
does not in itself proof that the Rwandan justice system is biased. 122  
 A critical point was the fact that the Rwandan Prosecution did not always pursue 
atrocities perpetrated by the Rwandan Patriotic Front that took power in July 1994. 
Amnesty International argued that the justice system has to show its impartiality by 
prosecuting crimes committed by persons, regardless of which party the person belongs 
to.123 Although the Appeals Chamber in the Munyakazi transfer decision eventually ruled 																																																								
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that the Rwandan justice system is sufficiently independent from executive influence, the 
Appeals Chamber also noted that a concern exists regarding genocide cases.124 The 
Chamber argued that there could be a lack of sufficient guarantees against outside pressure 
on the judiciary regarding genocide cases, because of the past actions of the government.125 
However, the monitoring reports of the transferred cases show that the Rwandan judicial 
system is able to provide fair trials for the accused. Therefore, it could have been an option 
to transfer the residual functions to Rwanda instead of creating the Residual Mechanism. 
But at the time when the Security Council decided to establish the Residual Mechanism, no 
monitoring reports were available that could show whether the Rwandan justice system 
was able to conduct fair trials. However, the successful completion of the Tribunals’ work 
depends on trials conducted with the highest standards of international human rights and 
due process. Further, it is necessary that impunity be prevented.126 It is questionable, 
therefore, whether the requirements would have been met in the cases of the high-level 
accused. Although the analyses of the monitoring reports do not demonstrate any violation 
of the accused’s fair trial rights, it does not guarantee that the impartiality would have been 
extended to the high-level accused.  
 Even if Rwanda would were completely prepared to fairly try cases, Rwanda does 
not benefit from the same authority that the ICTR does when asking for international 
cooperation and obtaining the arrest of the fugitives. High-level fugitives in particular 
often benefit from the help and protection of state entities and the Tribunals can ask these 
states to operate according to international legal obligations. The Security Council acted 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter when establishing the Tribunals, and it particularly 
requested all states to cooperate with the Tribunals. This constitutes an obligation under 
international law, which results in the duty to surrender the fugitives.127 Rwanda does not 
benefit from such power. Therefore, the Residual Mechanism has an authority similar to 
the ICTR, which makes the request for cooperation from other states easier.  
 Although BIH can conduct war crimes cases in accordance with international 
standards, there are remaining matters of concern, including witness protection, custody 
questions, and transparency of proceedings. The incident with Stanković especially invites 
criticism. When deciding on the establishment of the Residual Mechanism the two 
remaining fugitives of the ICTY were Goran Hadžić and Ratko Mladić, who was one of 																																																								
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the most prominent war criminals of the war. Transferring the judicial responsibility of 
cases concerning such high-level accused to a national jurisdiction, where war criminals 
could escape from prison, would not have been plausible. In order to maintain the legacy 
of the ICTY, it was of crucial importance to guarantee a proper trial for the two high-level 
fugitives. Although the support for domestic prosecutions of members of the ethnic 
majority and also the willingness to cooperate with the ICTY increased in BIH, the risk 
remained that the high-level fugitives might still receive help from political elites. On the 
other hand, the violation of the accused’s fair trial rights could have appeared. As 
explained above, problems appeared during the trials regarding custody questions and 
transparency of proceedings. Especially in the case of such high profile cases, the 
exclusion of the public from the main trial requires proper justification. With respect to 
victims a proper conviction needed to be guaranteed.  
 In light of the fact that Croatia has been part of the European Union since 1 July 
2013 and Serbia wants to become a part of the European Union, it would have been 
reasonable to transfer the residual functions to one of these countries. But it would not 
have been efficient to transfer residual functions to two different countries because the 
residual functions are connected. Furthermore, a unity of jurisdiction needed to be ensured, 
which is a part of the accused’s fair trial rights. This could not be guaranteed if different 
judicial systems were to release judgements regarding the war criminals. In addition, it is 
not possible to transfer the residual functions to only one of the countries of former 
Yugoslavia. Because of the longstanding conflict between the different ethnicities, which 
culminated during the terrible war, it is not possible to pick out one country that should 
have the power to make judgements on the war crimes, as this could result in new conflicts 
among the countries. Therefore, it was the preferable option to locate the residual functions 
outside the area of former Yugoslavia. Thusly, none of the countries will be disadvantaged. 
In order to demonstrate that the international legal system is functioning and achieving the 
desired deterrence effect, the preferable option was to create the Residual Mechanism and 
not to transfer the functions of the Tribunals to the national authorities. 
 In order to effectively perform the trial function, the Residual Mechanism relies on 
other residual functions, including protection of witnesses, trial of contempt cases, 
supervision of enforcement of sentences, and review of judgements.128 The Secretary-
General’s report suggested that all residual functions needed to be carried out by the 
Residual Mechanism or any other suitable body. The report pointed out that domestic 																																																								
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courts were not the preferable solution regarding certain residual functions. Different 
approaches between the various domestic jurisdictions when carrying out the residual 
functions would be unavoidable and would put at risk the rights of the accused.129  
 Therefore, establishing the Residual Mechanism was an appropriate decision 
because only an institution on an international level has the power and the authority to urge 
states to cooperate. And the assistance of the international community is easier to achieve 
for an international body like the Residual Mechanism. Further, in the case of referral to 
domestic courts, the downside would be the lack of guarantee that proper prosecutions 
would take place and that the rights of the accused would be protected at an acceptable 
level. High fairness and due process standards are of crucial importance for a legal system, 
and these standards would be put at risk when transferring the cases of the remaining 
fugitives to domestic courts. In particular, referring cases of a high-level fugitives to 
countries affected by their atrocities could very well jeopardize the rights of the accused 
given the aftermath of the war left in the minds of the affected population. With regard to 
the longstanding conflict between the ethnicities of former Yugoslavia and the atrocities 
committed against the Tutsi population in Rwanda, it cannot be expected that people have 
already forgotten what happened or would be able to look past their emotional reactions to 
the crimes. Therefore, it is not certain whether the affected countries could provide fair 
trials in accordance with international standards. 
 
2. Transferring other Judicial Residual Functions to National Jurisdictions 
Since appellate proceedings are considered to be a part of any trial proceedings, it is not 
possible to separate those two functions. Such an approach would pose a threat to the 
consistency of the Tribunals’ jurisprudence. Therefore, the same arguments against the 
transfer of the trials function to national courts apply to the appellate proceedings. There 
would be no guarantee that proper prosecution would take place and that the rights of the 
accused would be ensured at a level deemed acceptable by the UN. Fairness and due 
process standards would be at especially high risk when transferring the cases to domestic 
courts. Regarding the costs, the ‘Report of the International Residual Mechanism for 
Criminal Tribunals on the progress of its work in the initial period’, issued on 20 
November 2015, estimated that a month of pre-appeal activity and a month of appeal 
activity at the Residual Mechanism would produce savings in judicial expenses of close to 
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one half as compared to the expenses incurred for the same judicial activity at the two 
Tribunals.130 Hence, costs were reduced already.  
 Retrials require the same approach as trials. Hence, the retrial function cannot be 
transferred to national authorities. The arguments against the transfer of trials and retrials 
are similar. Transferring the retrial function to national courts could destroy the Tribunals’ 
legacy. National courts would be able to set aside the judgements of the Tribunals, and 
convicted persons could attempt to obtain revocation of their convictions entered by 
Tribunals. Thus, this approach could lead to impunity. 
 The review of judgements is a residual function of crucial importance. Therefore, 
the unavailability of that function would violate the rights of the convicted individuals. 
Scholars have also expressed concerns, as removing or unfairly limiting the rights of a 
convicted individual regarding the review of their cases could lead to a violation of 
fundamental human rights. 131 But according to Acquaviva, that position does not identify 
what ‘unfairly limit’ means and is not helpful in answering the question of how to ensure 
the review of judgments. The review of judgements is one function that could reasonably 
be transferred to a domestic jurisdiction, but certain guarantees have to be ensured.132 
Further, the transfer is a feasible option because the states of former Yugoslavia and also 
the states in which convicted persons are now serving sentences imposed by the ICTY are 
subject to the supervision of the European Court of Human Rights. The European Court of 
Human Rights has an excellent system to ensure that human rights are protected. This 
leads to the conclusion that as long as the review of judgments takes place under 
circumstances similar to those envisaged by the Tribunals’ standards, further judicial 
proceedings in these systems would most probably be compatible with the standards of the 
European Court of Human Rights.133  
 The Secretary-General pointed out that review by national jurisdictions could be 
impractical because the various jurisdictions would have different approaches.134
 
The 
Secretary-General’s report considered the complex challenges in terms of fairness towards 
all convicted persons. The Secretary-General further explained that it could be difficult for 
national jurisdictions to review a judgement based on the Tribunals’ Statutes and Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence. 135 Furthermore, in order to ensure that review does not end in a 
completely new trial, the institution dealing with review should have access to the 																																																								
130 Report of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals on the progress of its work in the initial period, UN Doc. 
S/2015/896, 20 November 2015, para. 16. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Guido Acquaviva, ’Best Before the Date Indicated: Residual Mechanisms at the ICTY’, see note 2, p. 21. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Secretary-General’s Report, see note 128, para. 80. 
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Tribunals’ archives, which contain all information considered in all previous cases, 
including the relevant records and evidence. The right to review a final judgement is 
fundamental and needs to be guaranteed on an international level. Transferring the review 
of judgement to national authorities of the affected countries or third countries could lead 
to legal uncertainties. Although the states of former Yugoslavia are subject to the 
supervision of the European Court of Human Rights, the approach of the different 
jurisdictions could result in a lack of fairness towards all convicted persons. This could 
lead to situations where the various states convict the accused persons differently for the 
same crime because of the different judicial systems. In addition, national jurisdictions 
would not be required to review judgements based on the Tribunals’ Statutes and Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence. The lack of knowledge of the Tribunals’ jurisprudence could 
result in an unfair limitation of the convicted persons’ rights. However, transferring these 
functions to national courts would not deprive the accused of the right to review the 
judgement. It could be argued that the accused could still exercise his right but at a national 
level. The major argument against this, however, is that national courts would be able to 
set aside the judgements of the Tribunals, thus destroying the Tribunals’ legacy. Therefore, 
the Residual Mechanism is an unbiased international body that provides the review of 
judgment in accordance with the Tribunals’ jurisdiction at an international level.  
 Regarding contempt cases, it was discussed in the legal literature whether it would 
be a better option to transfer those cases to national jurisdictions in general.136 According 
to Acquaviva, it is questionable whether the Residual Mechanism is the best option to deal 
with contempt and false testimony cases once the core activities of the Tribunals are 
over.137 After some time, the contempt cases will most likely decrease in number because 
less confidential information will remain sensitive and a lesser number of witnesses or 
victims will need protection. Further, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTR noted that a 
Chamber should ‘consider carefully if [contempt] proceedings are the most effective and 
efficient way to ensure compliance with obligations flowing from the Statute or the Rules 
in the specific circumstances of the case’.138 According to Acquaviva, after the Tribunals 
closed, criminal proceedings by an international body could increasingly lose their 
efficiency in protecting the integrity of international justice. Therefore, in some cases 
national jurisdictions could be a better option to achieve the same result.139 However, the 
protection of individuals, essential state interests, and the credibility of international 																																																								
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criminal justice as a whole are very important.140 In order to achieve that protection, 
persons, ‘who wilfully divulge confidential information which creates a real threat or 
danger to protected persons or other important interests’ need to be punished. 141 According 
to Acquaviva, although that particular residual function could be transferred to a domestic 
jurisdiction, the Residual Mechanism has the better access to the archives, which makes it 
easier to identify and pursue persons who are in contempt of court or give false 
testimony.142 But according to Denis, concerns appear regarding the transfer of contempt 
cases or false testimony. First, it is questionable whether national jurisdictions have the 
competence to prosecute persons for contempt of the Residual Mechanism or for giving 
false testimony. 143 A legal base would be necessary for exercising such an extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. Usually, an extraterritorial jurisdiction requires a link with the concerned 
state. That link may be found in the nationality of the perpetrator144 or the victim145, or if 
the criminal activities may cause prejudice, the state itself.146Although extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is recognised in principle,147it requires that the crimes affect the whole 
international legal order.148 According to Denis, it is difficult to argue that contempt of the 
Residual Mechanism, or giving false testimony before it, falls within the universal 
jurisdiction or protective principle, because those cases do not prejudice the interests of 
states and do not affect all of humanity. Only the nationality principle or passive principle 
may be relevant for those cases and therefore, mainly Rwanda and states of former 
Yugoslavia would have the competence to prosecute those cases of contempt or false 
testimony on those principles. However, it could be argued that there needs to be a 
distinction between contempt in the courtroom and offences committed outside the 
courtroom, which could be tried at the national level. National courts are able to prosecute 
such offences. 
 Second, it could be impractical for a national jurisdiction to determine a problem 
that is connected to international proceedings, as the national jurisdiction was not involved 
in these proceedings. Further, the national jurisdictions are completely unfamiliar with 																																																								
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international proceedings. 149  Such cases are affiliated with the corresponding trial 
proceedings. The national courts would need to familiarise themselves with the Tribunals’ 
and the Residual Mechanism’s Statutes, Rules of Procedure and Evidence and case law. 
This very high workload could lead to mistakes in jurisprudence. The Tribunals interpret 
the elements of the crimes in their own way. A consistency in the case law would be at risk 
if the different domestic courts would rule on cases of contempt and false testimony. The 
various national jurisdictions would most likely approach the issues differently. That 
would lead to different standards. Further, the proceedings would require access to the 
relevant information and records of the concerned case, which would also include 
confidential documents. Therefore, it is questionable whether it would be efficient for the 
Residual Mechanism to transfer the relevant documents to the national courts when 
instances of contempt and false testimony only touch a small part of the case. The whole 
case involves many pages, and it would be an enormous workload for the Residual 
Mechanism to transfer all the transcripts of testimony, documentary evidence and exhibits 
to the national courts. The cost implications of such a procedure should also be pointed 
out.  
 Persons who knowingly and wilfully interfere with the administration of justice or 
give false testimony need to be prosecuted, or else the integrity of the Tribunals and the 
Residual Mechanism would be put at risk. However, the Residual Mechanism has the 
jurisdiction to refer cases concerning offences against the administration of justice to 
national jurisdictions. 150  It can be expected that the national jurisdictions consider 
themselves able to determine issues connected to proceedings tried before international 
jurisdictions. Article 70 (4) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
stipulates that contempt offences can be prosecuted by national jurisdictions instead of the 
Court. Hence, this approach is recognised in international criminal justice, and the 
Residual Mechanism could adopt that procedure and transfer proceedings concerning 
contempt cases to national jurisdictions. This would reduce the workload of the Residual 
Mechanism.  
 
3. Transferring Victim and Witnesses Protection and Assistance to National 
Jurisdictions 
According to the Secretary-General’s report, it is not possible to transfer the protection of 
victims and witnesses to national authorities without risking their safety. Therefore, the 
Secretary-General’s report suggests a centralised body that monitors the protection of 																																																								
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witnesses after the function has been transferred to national authorities.151 According to 
Acquaviva, an international monitoring body with the authority to access the Tribunals’ 
confidential records and modify the protective measures, if needed, is the best option in 
order to guarantee the protection of the witnesses.152 However, both options require a 
monitoring body that causes additional costs. Therefore, neither option is more efficient 
than transferring the function to the Residual Mechanism.  
 After the physical closure of the Tribunals, court orders regarding the protection of 
victims and witnesses must continue to have effect. Transferring this function to national 
authorities of the affected countries would be impossible because there are tensions left 
between the different ethnic groups, particularly in the view of the atrocities committed. 
But transferring the function to a third country would be challenging, because it could not 
be ensured that the national authorities would also apply protection standards at an 
international level. This would result in risk to the safety of the victims and witnesses. In 
the case that a witness needs relocation to another country for his or her safety, national 
authorities could find it more difficult to negotiate relocation than an international body.153 
A particularly difficult issue is the extreme situation where a witness claims that the 
national authorities are not sufficiently protecting him or her. Furthermore, the different 
national jurisdictions would most likely apply different standards of protection. 
 The Residual Mechanism appears to be the best solution to implement the 
protection of victims and witnesses, because it is an international body that is able to 
effectively carry out this function. The Tribunals protect a large number of individuals. 
That protection should not simply end because the Tribunals close their doors. Many of 
these individuals put their lives at risk by providing evidence to the Tribunals. A failure to 
provide uninterrupted protection would damage the credibility of the Tribunals and 
endanger the work of the ICC as well as any future Tribunals. Witnesses will be less likely 
to assist if they have heard that witnesses were put at risk following the closure of 
operations. 
 National authorities would not be able to provide assistance to the same extent as 
an international body. Because staff members of the Tribunals continue to work for the 
Residual Mechanism, the Tribunals have provided knowledge of and experience with the 
affected countries to the Residual Mechanism. Therefore, transferring the function of 
assistance to national jurisdictions to another international institution would be time and 
cost consuming. However, the disclosure of material regarding protected witnesses 																																																								
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requires a decision of a Chamber to vary the protective measures. Hence, it appears 
necessary that some sort of administrative Residual Mechanism is needed to cope with 
requests for additional information from national authorities.  
 
4. Transferring Supervision of Enforcement of Sentences to National Authorities 
Although this function is essentially an on-going administrative function, it also has ad hoc 
judicial aspects, because the President takes several criteria into account when deciding 
whether to grant pardon, including the gravity of the crime, the treatment of similarly 
situated prisoners, the prisoner’s demonstrated rehabilitation, and all cooperation of the 
prisoner with the Prosecutor.154 The President of the Residual Mechanism applies the same 
criteria when deciding on a pardon or commutation as the Tribunals’ Presidents.155 These 
are standard criteria, and it would be possible to transfer this function to national 
authorities. National authorities already carry out this function. Article 26 of the IRMCT 
Statute provides that a person convicted by the Tribunals or the Residual Mechanism is 
eligible for a pardon or commutation of sentence if the applicable law of the state in which 
the person is imprisoned allows it. Hence, regarding this function the national authorities 
work with familiar provisions.  
 But it could be argued that if such function would be completely transferred to 
national jurisdictions, the different approaches would result in unequal treatment between 
the convicted persons. Applying the standard criteria have generally resulted in the 
sentence being commuted when the convicted person has served about two-thirds of his 
sentence. But in the case of Biljana Plavšić, who received an eleven-year sentence for 
pleading guilty to persecution and other crimes against humanity, the ICTY President 
granted her request. The reason was her minimal cooperation with the Tribunal and the fact 
that she publicly withdrew her acceptance of responsibility.156 Hence, decisions regarding 
early release can be difficult. In the case that a commutation request is filed based on 
special personal circumstances, the measures would be more complex and may require 
evidentiary hearings. Furthermore, the procedure related to the transfer and the subsequent 
execution of sentences were not completely satisfactory. In the case of Radovan Stanković, 
this almost resulted in impunity.157 The President of the ICTY, Fausto Pocar, sent a letter 
to the BIH Justice Minister expressing his deep concern that even after transferring the 
jurisdiction of the case to BIH, the ICTY Tribunal retains its responsibilities with respect 																																																								
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to victims and witnesses. The ICTY has an interest in ensuring that the sentence of persons 
convicted is enforced by the state receiving the transfer.158 In addition, it needs to be 
considered that the Tribunals’ commands could diminish once the Tribunals wound down 
its activities, leading to less pressure on national authorities to feel bound to the Tribunals’ 
orders and judgments. Therefore, an international body is needed with the authority to 
ensure that an imposed sentence is effectively enforced. This residual function will likely 
need to be exercised for many decades, because, for example, the ICTY sentenced Milomir 
Stakić to 40 years, and the ICTR sentenced Juvénal Kajelijeli to 45 years.159  
 But national authorities contribute to the enforcement of sentences already. A good 
solution could be to transfer the function to national authorities but to implement a 
monitoring system. That would reduce the workload of the Residual Mechanism. 
According to Rule 128 IRMCT RPE, the Security Council ‘may designate a body to assist 
it and to proceed to supervise the sentences after the Mechanism legally ceases to exist’. 
Therefore, the regulatory framework of the Residual Mechanism would allow such an 
approach in general. However, the requirements and character of such a body are not 
defined in the IRMCT RPE. But in order to avoid unfairness, independent experts and an 
intervention system would be needed to prevent unjustified unequal treatment. 
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V. The Different Options for the Residual Functions 
Besides the possibility of transferring the residual functions to national authorities, other 
options exist to carry on the residual functions after the Tribunals’ closure. However, it is 
questionable whether these options would be appropriate and realistic. 
 
1. Transferring all Residual Functions to External International Bodies 
Considering residual functions such as tracking the remaining fugitives, management of 
the archives, and protection of witnesses, a centralised residual mechanism with the 
capacity to coordinate and continue the residual functions is necessary. All residual 
functions are closely intertwined. In addition, the Residual Mechanism needs to have 
power to issue decisions, which are binding for states, other entities, and individuals when 
needed. It would be impossible to transfer all residual functions of the Tribunals to 
different external entities, because it would be very difficult to establish links and 
hierarchies of authority between different states and organisations. Furthermore, 
transferring all residual functions of the Tribunals to non-judicial entities and NGOs is 
impossible because residual functions related to judicial activities are juristically very 
complex so an experienced court is required to carry these out properly.  
 
2. Transferring all Residual Functions to One External National Body 
Transferring all residual functions of both Tribunals to one state or those of each Tribunal 
to different states would be very difficult, because only a few states have the capacity to 
perform all residual functions of the Tribunals and it is unlikely that one of these would 
take on such a burden. Furthermore, it is would be questionable whether such states would 
have the authority to perform residual functions toward external entities, other states, the 
UN, and foreigners. A possible solution could be to oblige all states and other entities by a 
Chapter VII resolution to cooperate with the state, but it is doubtful that this would work. 
Also, the review of the earlier conviction of the Tribunals’ high-level accused by a national 
court would be incongruous. 
 However, in general very few states are willing and able to undertake the expensive 
and complex trials. In 2006, the first request for transfer was filed by the Prosecutor of the 
ICTR in the case against Michael Bagaragaza.1 The Prosecutor suggested Norway as the 
country of destination, but the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber rejected this 
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request.2 Afterwards, the case of Michel Bagaragaza was transferred to the Netherlands for 
trial. But the Netherlands determined that they had no jurisdictional basis to try this case.3 
This shows the difficulties encountered by the ICTR when attempting to transfer cases to 
national courts. The ICTR Prosecutor secured the cooperation of only a few countries. 
Beside Norway and the Netherlands, the only two states that agreed to accept cases were 
Rwanda and France.4 France agreed to take over the cases of Laurent Bucyibaruta and 
Wenceslas Munyeshyaka, who were residing in France.5 At the Prosecutor’s request, these 
two cases were officially referred to France. But explorative talks with other states were 
unsuccessful. However, the ICTR was faced with difficulties when consulting national 
authorities to envisage the transfer of cases, including the lack of national legislation to 
allow prosecution of individuals for the crimes committed in Rwanda. Other states 
investigated the cases and decided not to pursue them, because judicial systems were 
already overstretched and therefore unable to cope with additional cases.6 Therefore, most 
of the cases that had to be transferred to domestic courts would had nowhere to go but 
Rwanda. It would have been even more difficult to find a state that would completely take 
over the trial function of the Tribunals. And referring the cases to different national 
authorities would result in different application of the Tribunals’ jurisdiction, leading to an 
uncertain legal situation that could result in a violation of the accused’s rights. The legacy 
of the Tribunals’ jurisprudence would be in danger. 
 
3. Transferring the Residual Functions to the ICC 
It is questionable whether a transfer to the ICC would be an option. At the time the 
Residual Mechanism was established, the ICC was discussed as a possible future host 
institution for the joint ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL Residual Mechanism. The possibility was 
raised to simply incorporate the residual functions into the role and function of the ICC, so 
that the ICC would perform all the residual functions in its own name.7 
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A. The Legal Basis of the ICC 
The ICC is a permanent and independent international court with its headquarters in The 
Hague. It is a separate and distinct international legal entity and has been operational since 
1 July 2002, when the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) 
came into force.8 According to Article 34 of the Rome Statute, the court comprises the 
following organs: Presidency, Trial Division, Appeals Divisions, Pre-Trial Division, the 
Office of the Prosecutor and the Registry.9 The Assembly of State Parties10 of the ICC 
consists of all the nations that have ratified or acceded the Rome Statute.11 When becoming 
party to the Rome Statute, the state becomes a member state of the ICC.12 But it is 
important to note that even though all the states of former Yugoslavia are a party to the 
Rome Statute, Rwanda is not. This makes it more difficult to transfer the residual functions 
of the ICTR to the ICC. Additionally, BIH did not even sign the Agreement on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court until January 2012.13  
 A difference between the legal basis of the ICC and that of the Tribunals as well as 
the Residual Mechanism is problematic. The Tribunals and the Residual Mechanism were 
established on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, whereby the Rome Statute is a 
multilateral treaty. The relationship of the ICC with the UN as well as the Security Council 
differs significantly from that of the Tribunals and the Residual Mechanism.14 The ICC 
was not established by and is not an organ of the Security Council. But the Negotiated 
Relationship Agreement between the ICC and the UN defines the cooperation between the 
institutes and confirms the unique role of the Security Council in the Courts’ operations. 
Therefore, the two institutions have to respect each other’s status and mandate. 15 However, 
the independence of the ICC is a paramount characteristic of its existence.  																																																								
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Criminal Court’ Fordham Int'l L.J 25 (2002) 638. 
14 See e.g. ICC Statute arts 2, 5-33, 53(2) and (3), 87(5) and (7), and 115; Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International 
Criminal Court and the United Nations, 4 October 2004, ICC-ASP/3/Res.1.  
15 Article 3 of the Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations, 4 October 
2004, ICC-ASP/3/Res.1; According to the relationship agreement the parties agreed that ‘with a view to facilitating the effective 
discharge of their respective responsibilities, they shall cooperate closely, whenever appropriate, with each other and consult each other 
on matters of mutual interest pursuant to the provisions of the present Agreement and in conformity with the respective provisions of the 
Charter and the Statute’. 
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B. Principle of Complementarity with National Criminal Jurisdiction 
The difference in jurisdiction between the ICC and the Tribunals as well as the Residual 
Mechanism is problematic. 16 A key difference is that the jurisdiction of the ICC is based 
on the principle of Complementarity with national criminal jurisdiction. The ICC is a court 
of last resort and rules otherwise inadmissible cases.17 The objective is to strengthen the 
capacities of national courts to prosecute atrocity crimes. When a situation is referred to 
the ICC, the Prosecutor notifies the nation that normally would exercise national 
jurisdiction over the atrocity crimes covered by the referral.18 But the Rome Statute does 
not require such notification to states when the Security Council refers the situation to the 
court acting under Chapter VII authority in connection with a threat to or breach of 
international peace and security. Further, under Article 17 (1) (a)-(d) of the Rome Statute it 
is upon the ICC to decide whether to proceed with the trial. The court determines that a 
case is inadmissible in the cases of Article 17 (1) (a)-(d) of the Rome Statute. So it is 
inadmissible if a state with jurisdiction over the case is investigating or prosecuting it, 
unless the state is ‘unwilling or unable genuinely’ to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution. The state is unable to prosecute the case only when there is an indication of ‘a 
total or substantial collapse or unviability of the state’s judicial system.’19 This possibility 
only appears if a nation failed or is a country totally divested in the wake of war or 
atrocities. 20 Therefore, states parties have the primary responsibility and the preferred 																																																								
16 G. Gaja, ‘ The Long Journey towards repressing Agression’ in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John R.W.D. Jones (eds.) The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary’ Volume I (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002), pp. 427-441; David 
Scheffer, State Parties Approve New Crimes for International Criminal Court (ASIL Insight, Wash. D.C. 2010), p. 10; Cale Davis, 
Susan Forder, Tegan Little and Dali Cvek, ‘The Crime of Aggression and the International Criminal Court’ The National Legal Eagle 17 
(2011) 11,12; Matthew Gillett, ‘The Anatomy of an International Crime: Aggression at the International Criminal Court’ Int'l Crim. L. 
Rev.13 (2013) 829; Roger S. Clark, ‘Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Considered at the first 
Review Conference on the Court, Kampala, 31 May – 11 June 2010’ GoJIL 2 (2010) 689, 693-695; Beth Van Schaack, ‘Negotiating at 
the Interface of Power & Law: The Crime of Aggression’ Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 49 (2011) 505; Report of the Special Working Group 
on the Crime of Aggression (ICC-ASP/6/20/Add.1/Annex II); Michael Anderson, ‘Reconceptualising Aggression’ Duke L.J. 60 (2010) 
411, 412-413, 418; Antonio Cassese, ‘On Some Problematic Aspects of the Crime of Aggression’ Leiden J Int'l L. 20 (2007) 841, 846; 
Claus Kress, ‘The ICC Review Conference at Kampala: Mission accomplished or Unfulfilled Promise’ JICJ 8 (2011) 1179, 1191; Keith 
Petty, ‘Criminalizing Force: Resolving the Threshold Question for Crime of Aggression in the Context of Modern Conflict’ Seattle U L 
Rev 33 (2009) 105, 120; Keith Petty, ‘Sixty Years In The Making: The Definition of Aggression for the International Criminal Court’ 
Int’l. & Comp. L. Rev. 31 (2008) 531, 548; David Scheffer ‘The International Criminal Court’ in William Schabas and Nadia Bernaz 
(eds.) Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, Abingdon and New York 2011), p. 70: 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 78, p. 
277; William Schabas ‘Genocide in International Law’ (2nd edn, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2009), pp. 454- 461; Antonio 
Cassese ‘Genocide’ Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John R.W.D. Jones (eds.) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
A Commentary’ Volume I (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002), pp. 340- 347; Antonio Cassese International Criminal Law (2nd edn, 
New York, Oxford University Press 2008), p. 146; Stéphane Bourgon, ‘Jurisdiction ratione loci’ in Antonio Cassese, Professor Paola 
Gaeta, and Mr John R.W.D. Jones ‘The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002), pp. 
559- 570; Stéphane Bourgon ‘Jurisdiction ratione temporis’ in Antonio Cassese, Professor Paola Gaeta, and Mr John R.W.D. Jones ‘The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (Oxford, 2002), pp. 543- 558; William Schabas Introduction to the International 
Criminal Court (2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004), p.70. 
17 For a detailed description of admissibility issues see ICC Statute arts 17-19. See also ICC Statute art 1.; Ruth B. Philips, ‘The 
International Criminal Court Statute: Jurisdiction and Admissibility’, Criminal Law Forum 10 (1999) 77; John T. Holmes, ‘The 
Principle of Complementary’ in Roy Lee (ed.) The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, 
Results (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 1999), pp. 41- 78; Per Saland, ‘The International Criminal Law Principles’ in Roy Lee 
(ed.) The International Criminal Court, The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results (The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International 1999), pp. 189- 216. 
18 Article 18 (1) of the Rome Statute. 
19 Article 17 (3) of the Rome Statute. 
20 John T. Holmes, ‘The Principle of Complementary’ in Roy Lee (ed.) The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome 
Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 1999), pp. 75-76; David Scheffer ‘The International 
Criminal Court’ in William Schabas and Nadia Bernaz (eds.) Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law (Routledge, Taylor & 
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forum for trial to prosecute the accused in their own courts. But under Articles 17 (2) (a)-
(c) of the Rome Statute and 17 (3) of the Rome Statute the Courts jurisdiction can be re-
established in circumstances where the national court is unwilling or unable to prosecute 
an individual.  
 Therefore, the question arises as to whether the ICC would be able to demonstrate 
that the domestic systems of Rwanda and the states of former Yugoslavia are unwilling or 
genuinely unable to carry out the investigation or prosecution of these cases. Rwanda and 
the states of former Yugoslavia are willing to prosecute the cases regarding the conflicts. 
The requirement of inability in a case, which only arises when there is a total or substantial 
collapse or unviability of the state’s judicial system, would not be met anymore. The 
conflicts in both regions took place are relatively long time ago. This has allowed Rwanda 
and the states of former Yugoslavia to rebuild their judicial systems. Therefore, the 
principle of Complimentary with national criminal jurisdiction would be an obstacle for 
the ICC in taking over the prosecution of the Tribunals’ cases.  
 
C. Amending the Rome Statute  
It is a complicated process to seek amendments to the Rome Statute. According to Articles 
121-123 of the Rome Statute, proposals need the consent of the states parties. If there is no 
consensus among the states, approval by a two-thirds majority is necessary. Article 122 of 
the Rome Statute particularly regulates amendments to provisions of an institutional 
nature.21 For the states parties, the amendment would enter into force one year after the 
amendment was approved by seven-eighths of the states parties. According to Article 121 
(1) of the Rome Statute, amendments during the first seven years from the entry into force 
of the Statute are excluded in general. Therefore, this would be impossible as a short- to 
medium-term option. But there are further potential obstacles. Some states parties but also 
states that are not party to ICC Statute and whose approval in the Security Council is 
required for the transfer could be against the idea of transferring the residual functions of 
the Tribunals to the ICC. A possible obstacle would be the expense of the ICC associated 
with the transfer of residual functions. But arrangements could be made to guarantee that 
the states parties but also other donors do not have to bear the extra costs. Articles 115 and 
Article 116 of the Rome Statute declare that the state parties’ voluntary contributions and 
funds provided by UN cover expenses of the ICC. Article 32 of the ICTY Statute regulates 
that expenses of the ICTY are borne by the regular budget of UN and according to the 																																																																																																																																																																							
Francis Group, Abingdon and New York 2011), p. 75. William Schabas Introduction to the ICC (4th edn, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2011), p. 85-89. 
21 For example Article 35, Article 36, (8) and (9), Article 37, Article 38, Article 39, (1) (first two sentences), (2) and (4), Article 42, (4) 
to (9), Article 43, (2) and (3), and Articles 44, 46, 47 and 49. 
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annual report of the ICTY voluntary contributions exist as well.22 For example, the 
expenses concerning the Charles Taylor trial were funded by the SCSL. Therefore, 
arrangements could be met to guarantee that states parties do not have to bear the extra 
costs resulting from to the ICC carrying out the residual functions.  
 
D. Different Options for the ICC to Carry Out Residual Functions  
There are different options when considering the ICC to carry on the Tribunals’ residual 
functions.23 The potential role of the ICC ranges from the ICC continuing all or only some 
of the Tribunals’ residual functions in its own name to a residual mechanism only using the 
facilities of the ICC. In addition, variations of each of these options are possible that could 
be used in combination, for example, the ICC performing only a couple of residual 
functions or ICC staff working on a part-time or ad hoc basis. Transferring the residual 
functions to the ICC seems to be a potential solution because the ICC is permanent, has 
jurisdiction over the same general types of crimes and provides experts who understand 
how to track fugitives, oversee sentence enforcement, protect witnesses, preserve and 
protect archives. But issues appear when considering any role for the ICC. 24 On the one 
hand, carrying on the residual functions could strengthen the ICC as a permanent 
international criminal court. But on the other hand, the ICC needs to focus on its core 
mandate and sorting out its own problems, especially considering that the ICC’s workload 
is increasing.  
 Oosthuizen analysed different opinions of decision-makers, stakeholders, and 
experts regarding the potential role of the ICC.25 According to Oosthuizen, opponents of 
the ICC do not want the ICC to take over residual functions because the court could 
possibly gain in stature and importance.26 Further, considering the role of the Tribunals as 																																																								
22 ICTY 2006/7 annual report pars 113-116, which refer to voluntary contributions as well. 
23 Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Non-paper, Work in Progress, Residual Functions and the ICC, 30 Aug 2007, pp 2-3: 
‘For several reasons, including the breadth of its own caseload, and jurisdictional, statutory, and practical roadblocks, the ICC may not 
be capable of assisting these institutions in their judicial and/or prosecutorial functions’; International Center For Transitional Justice, 
University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law, Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, Final Report of the Expert Group 
Meeting on ‘Closing the International and Hybrid Criminal Tribunals: Residual Mechanisms to Address Residual Issues, (Mar. 24, 
2010), para. 9; Gabriël Oosthuizen, ‘Draft Briefing Paper: The residual functions of the UN international criminal tribunals of the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone: the potential role of the International Criminal Court’ (2008) 
International Criminal Law Services, paras. 40- 42. 
24 Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Non-paper, Work in Progress, Residual Functions and the ICC, 30 Aug 2007, pp. 2-3: 
‘For several reasons, including the breadth of its own caseload, and jurisdictional, statutory, and practical roadblocks, the ICC may not 
be capable of assisting these institutions in their judicial and/or prosecutorial functions’; International Center For Transitional Justice, 
University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law, Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, Final Report of the Expert Group 
Meeting on ‘Closing the International and Hybrid Criminal Tribunals: Residual Mechanisms to Address Residual Issues, (Mar. 24, 
2010), para. 9.  
25 Gabriël Oosthuizen, ‘Draft Briefing Paper: The residual functions of the UN international criminal tribunals of the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone: the potential role of the International Criminal Court’ (2008) International Criminal 
Law Services, para. 40- 42. Only a few of those decision-makers, stakeholders and experts who have been interviewed agreed to be 
identified, including Fausto Pocar (President of the ICTY), Valerie Oosterveld (Assistant Professor on the University of Western Ontario 
Faculty of Law in Canada), Mariana Pena (Liaison Officer to ICC, La Fédération Internationale des Droits de l'Homme), Wasana 
Punyasena, Christopher Staker (Deputy Prosecutor of the SCSL), William Roelants de Stappers (Legal Adviser to the Permanent 
Mission of Belgium to the UN), Herman von Hebel (Registrar of the SCSL). 
26 Ibid., para. 42 (i). 
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paramount, it is questionable whether the ICC is strong enough or has the experience 
required to perform the Tribunals’ residual functions. It is also questionable whether 
residual functions would be properly prioritised. Another issue is whether the ICC, which 
does not have experience concerning the relevant law of armed conflict, would be able to 
carry on residual functions in the best interest of convicts and accused, victims and 
witnesses, and the states of former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. It is doubtful whether putting 
the appropriate structures in place and involving the staff of the Tribunals in any ICC role 
could address these concerns.27 Also problematic from a political perspective would be the 
relationship of the ICC and the Security Council as well as the link of the Security Council 
with the Tribunals. For example, the role of the Security Council in global affairs could be 
extended so that the ICC could help the Security Council in completing the work of 
Security Council organs.28 Also worth consideration is that an additional link between the 
ICC and the Security Council or its organs could jeopardize the ICC’s independence. 
Therefore, the role of the Security Council needs to be limited. According to Oosthuizen, 
some ICC states parties who see the Tribunals as western-dominated entities have 
reservations about the ICC playing any role. Some of the Security Council’s permanent 
members, including some that are states parties to the ICC Statute and some that are not, 
have concerns regarding the role of the ICC in Africa.29 Bearing in mind the enormous 
archives of the Tribunals, the lack of space of the ICC would be an issue.30 Therefore, 
extra space would be necessary. But the ICC playing a role does not have to mean that all 
residual functions have to be carried out by the ICC. According to Oosthuizen, whenever 
the ICC would play a role in the Tribunals’ residual functions, especially in the case of the 
ICTR, the ICC would create the possibility of having a more fixed presence in central and 
eastern Africa.31 Further, it is questionable whether it would be the most practical and cost-
efficient solution if the ICC were to take part in the performance of the residual functions. 
Thus, different options are possible when considering if the ICC should take over the 
residual functions.  
 
a. Transferring All Residual Functions to the ICC 
One option could be to transfer some or all of the residual functions to the ICC. The ICC 
would perform the residual functions in its own name. When considering transfer, the 
effectiveness regarding other residual functions, hierarchies of authority, and the guarantee 																																																								
27 Ibid., para 42 (ii). 
28 Ibid., para. 42 (iii). 
29 Ibid., para. 42 (v). 
30 Ibid., para. 42 (iv). 
31 Ibid.  
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of human rights regarding the accused need to be taken into account.32 Difficulties appear 
when considering a transfer of residual functions to the ICC, because of the different law, 
jurisdictions, and procedures. Certain governing instruments of the Rome Statute need to 
be changed directly or by annexing amendments in order to be able to for the ICC to be 
able to carry on residual functions properly. However, the relevant amendment procedure 
of the Rome Statute would be extremely difficult, because the necessary amendments 
would go beyond mere institutional changes under Article 122 of the Rome Statute.33  
 In order to transfer all residual functions, amendments under Article 121 of the 
Rome Statute would be required. The review conference concerning possible amendments 
to the Rome Statute was held in 2010.34 Even if the required amendments could have been 
agreed on in 2010, the amendments would not have come into effect before about 2014. 
This would have required that the states parties ratified the amendments pursuant to their 
constitutional procedures in two to three years. However, the ICTY branch commenced 
working on 1 July 2013 while the ICTR branch commenced working on 1 July 2012 
(Commencement Dates). This was two years regarding the ICTR and one year regarding 
the ICTY prior to the entry into force of any possible amendments of the Rome Statute. 
However, amendments to the ICC Statute constitute a complicated process, and the 
outcome would not have entered into force on time. Therefore, this option would not have 
been able to replace the establishment of the Residual Mechanism in general. Although it 
would still be possible to transfer all residual functions to the ICC, the needed amendments 
to the ICC Statute would be too complex to make this option work. In addition, it is very 
doubtful whether the states parties would give their consent. 
 
b. Transferring Some of the Residual Functions to the ICC 
It is possible to transfer only some of the residual functions. The ICC would perform these 
certain functions in its own name. But at the same time, a residual mechanism would still 
be necessary to perform the remaining residual functions of the Tribunals. It is not possible 
to consider the different functions in isolation because this would result in expensive and 
ineffective solutions. The entity that carries on the residual functions needs to be 
transparent and effective. Further, it has to be vested with legal authority. According to 
Oosthuizen, a decisive criterion is whether the required hierarchies of authority can be 
																																																								
32 Ibid., para. 27 (xi). 
33 Article 122 (1) of the Rome Statute refers to Article 35, Article 36, para. 8 and 9, Article 37, Article 38, Article 39, para. 1 (first two 
sentences), 2 and 4, Article 42, para. 4- 9, Article 43, para 2 and 3, and Articles 44, 46, 47 and 49. 
34 Resolution ICC-ASP/6/Res.2, Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the Assembly of States Parties, 14 December 2007, 
para. 53. 
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achieved among the entities responsible for carrying on the different residual functions.35 
In particular, the judicial determinations need to be binding.  
 However, transferring only some of the residual functions raises further important 
issues. First, the different residual functions of each of the Tribunals are closely 
intertwined, making it difficult to identify any major residual function that could be 
separated from the other residual functions and transferred to the ICC to be performed 
independently. On the other hand, transferring just a single, simple residual function would 
raise questions about the purpose of such a transfer. Second, in order to transfer any major 
residual function to the ICC, an amendment in accordance with Article 122 of the Rome 
Statute would be required. However, this seems to be an insurmountable obstacle, because 
the amendments in accordance with Article 122 of the Rome Statute would not allow the 
transfer of any major residual function. Therefore, having ICC judges, prosecutors and 
registry staff performing residual functions in their capacity as ICC staff and in the name 
of the ICC appears to be an unrealistic option. 
 
c. Outsourcing Residual Functions to the ICC 
Another possible option would be to outsource some residual functions of the Tribunals or 
parts of such functions to the ICC. According to Oosthuizen, this means that ICC staff 
would perform the functions in the name of the relevant residual mechanism at The Hague 
or in the name of the ICC. But the relevant Residual Mechanism would be responsible for 
the proper performance of the outsourced function and retain the authority to reverse the 
outsourcing.36 When considering outsourcing the residual functions, the effectiveness 
regarding other residual functions, hierarchies of authority, and the human rights of 
affected parties needs to be ensured. Also regarding the option of outsourcing, it should be 
taken into consideration that the different residual functions and their components are 
intertwined. Further, hierarchies between the authorities responsible for performing 
different residual functions need to be clarified.37 
 However, in order to outsource any major residual function to the ICC an 
amendment in accordance with Article 121 of the Rome Statue would be necessary. This 
includes certain components of the residual functions; for example, an amendment would 
be required when the ICC judges review cases or want to make decisions regarding 
sentence-commutation matters referred by a residual mechanism. The ICC judges would 																																																								
35 Gabriël Oosthuizen, ‘Draft Briefing Paper: The residual functions of the UN international criminal tribunals of the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone: the potential role of the International Criminal Court’ (2008) International Criminal 
Law Services, para. 42 (iv). 
36 Ibid., para. 27 (xi). 
37 Ibid., paras. 52-53. 
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need to make themselves familiar with a large quantity of the case materials. The Rome 
Statute appears not to allow the ICC to perform a major residual function in its own name 
or in the name of a residual mechanism. It is not possible for the ICC, as an independent 
court, to carry out the residual functions of an external entity such as a residual 
mechanism. To continue a residual function, the ICC is required to have authority vis-à-vis 
third parties including states that are not ICC states parties, such Rwanda. States as well as 
other entities could be obligated to work with the ICC in performing certain residual 
functions, possibly by Security Council resolution according to Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.38 But amendments to governing instruments would be necessary as well. 
 Regarding the option of outsourcing, an amendment pursuant to Article 121 of the 
Rome Statute seems to be an insurmountable obstacle. And amendments in accordance 
with Article 122 of the Rome Statute would not allow the outsourcing of any major 
residual function. Further, it is not possible to identify any major residual function that 
could be separated and outsourced to be performed separately from the Residual 
Mechanism. However, outsourcing only a minor residual function would not be efficient.  
It is questionable whether it would be an option to outsource a major residual function or a 
component of a residual function without amending the Rome Statute. For example, the 
storage of some of the archives could be outsourced, but the Residual Mechanism would 
remain responsible for their preservation, management, and access. Also, the function to 
organise the travel of witnesses could be transferred. If all decision-makers were to agree, 
it would be possible to outsource such minor residual functions without any Rome Statute 
amendment.39 It depends on the concrete responsibility and component of the residual 
function. However, the amendment of other governing instruments would still be required. 
This would include the relationship agreement between the ICC and the UN.  
 
d. ICC Staff Operating Double-Hatting  
A possible solution could be that the ICC judges, prosecutors and registry personnel 
perform residual functions on an ad hoc or part-time basis, not as ICC staff but as staff of 
the Residual Mechanism.40 Technically, this solution would not include a transfer of the 
residual functions but rather the continuation of the Tribunals. The ICC staff would be paid 
by and worked for in the name of the Residual Mechanism. Further, it would apply the 
procedures and the law of the Residual Mechanism. However, this option would not 
require an amendment in accordance with Article 121 of the Rome Statute, because no 																																																								
38 Ibid., para. 54. 
39 Ibid., para. 55. 
40 Ibid, para. 57. 
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amendments regarding the crime definitions, jurisdiction, procedures, and structures of the 
ICC would be needed. However, it depends on certain residual functions whether an 
amendment pursuant to Article 122 of the Rome Statute would be required instead. 
Further, amendments of governing instruments, like the ICC Rule of Procedure and 
Evidence or other ICC regulations, would be necessary.41 The relevant amendments 
pursuant to Article 122 of the Rome Statute are easier to implement. But the idea of ICC 
staff preforming a double function would raise an issue regarding the spare time of the ICC 
staff. According to Oosthuizen, concerns appear regarding the additional burden that this 
solution would put on the managers of ICC teams.42 Volume concerning the residual 
functions work is high. The priority of the ICC staff is to concentrate on the duties 
regarding the ICC.43 The proper performance of the residual functions could fade into the 
background, which would put the Tribunals’ legacy on risk. The ICC would need to recruit 
staff in order to be able to operate the double function and to properly perform both tasks. 
Further, it is doubtful whether the ICC staff would perform the residual functions better 
than the Tribunal’s staff because of their lack of experience regarding the Tribunals’ cases. 
Therefore, this option would not be more efficient. 
 
e. Using the Facilities of the ICC 
Another option could be to seek an agreement with the ICC to use the facilities of the court 
in order to perform residual functions.44 For instances, Charles Taylor is being detained in 
the ICC detention facility. His trial was moved to The Hague because of special security 
considerations.45 The trial was taking place before the SCSL using the facilities of the ICC. 
But according to Oosthuizen, some state parties were not keen on the ICC hosting the trial 
of Charles Taylor.46 According to Articles 2 (2) and 2 (3) of the 2006 Memorandum, the 
ICC provides the SCSL with facilities and services, but only to the extent that the 
functioning of the ICC is not negatively affected. And in the event of any irreconcilable 
conflict between the ICC and the SCSL, the interests of the ICC take priority. In addition, 																																																								
41 Ibid., para. 53; International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 3-10 September 2002, ICC-ASP/1/3 and Corr.1, part 
II.A. For example: Article 51 of the Rome Statute, Rule 3 of the ICC RPE, Article 52 of the Rome Statute, Article 44(3) of the Rome 
Statute, Rule 9 of the ICC RPE, Rule 14 of the ICC RPE. 
42 Gabriël Oosthuizen, ‘Draft Briefing Paper: The residual functions of the UN international criminal tribunals of the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone: the potential role of the International Criminal Court’ (2008) International Criminal 
Law Services, para. 62. 
43 Article 40 of the Rome Statute. 
44 Ibid., para. 63-67. 
45 Prosecutor v. Taylor, Decision on Defence Oral Application for Orders Pertaining to the Transfer of the Accused to The Hague, 
SCSL-03-1-PT, Trial Chamber II, 23 June 2006; UN Security Council Resolution 1688 (2006) UN Doc. S/RES/1688 (2006) 16 June 
2006; Memorandum of Understanding regarding Administrative Arrangements between the International Criminal Court and the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, ICC-PRES/03-01-06, 13 April 2006; Headquarters Agreement between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, DJZ/VE-262/06, 19 June 2006. 
46 Gabriël Oosthuizen, ‘Draft Briefing Paper: The residual functions of the UN international criminal tribunals of the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone: the potential role of the International Criminal Court’ (2008) International Criminal 
Law Services, para. 37. 
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the SCSL has to reimburse the ICC for all costs that appear as a result of providing agreed 
facilities and services.47 Therefore, the SCSL deposits all funds in advance in a trust fund 
created by the ICC. This also includes expenses regarding the salaries of ICC staff that 
have to manage the use of the ICC facilities and expenses regarding depreciation in the 
value of the property and equipment of the ICC. However, the SCSL only uses the 
courtroom, archiving, and detention facilities of the ICC.48 According to the agreement, the 
ICC provides courtroom usage time, including court reporting services, ‘satellite video link 
capability, safe keeping of evidence, and use of vaults’. 49 But the SCSL also uses its own 
offices close to the ICC, while the ICC provides overall security regarding the detainee.50  
 The Tribunals could enter into similar arrangements. The Assembly of State Parties 
indicated a willingness to consider this option when in November 2009, the Assembly of 
State Parties adopted a resolution encouraging the ICC to ‘continue the dialogue with other 
international courts and tribunals to assist with their planning on residual issues’ and to 
report to the Assembly of State Parties on this dialogue.51 The ICTY was already seated in 
The Hague. The main advantage of this option would be the saving of costs. But this 
depends on how much the Residual Mechanism would use the ICC facilities and to which 
entity the remaining residual functions of the Tribunals would be transferred. For example, 
the residual function regarding the protection of victims and witnesses could be performed 
in the affected countries. But this would require monitoring of the national institution to 
ensure the safety of the victims and witnesses. This approach would not be feasible 
because separating the residual functions would place the proper performance of the 
functions in danger. Therefore, it would be necessary to perform all the residual functions 
at the ICC facilities. The main issue with this solution would be the availability of ICC 
facilities, which are well occupied.52 The residual functions will be most demanding in the 
first few years after the Tribunals finished their mandates. But the idea to use the facilities 
of the ICC after the workload has been reduced is also not practicable. The facilities for the 
two branches have already been set up. If the two branches were to be moved, the 
advantage of cost-savings would disappear. The costs of moving to The Hague must not be 
underestimated, especially regarding the ICTR branch.  
 
																																																								
47 Article 3 of the 2006 Memorandum; see Articles 12 and 18 of the 2006 Memorandum.  
48 Articles 5- 7 of the 2006 Memorandum.  
49 Article 5 of the 2006 Memorandum. 
50 Article 7 of the 2006 Memorandum. 
51 International Criminal Court, Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the Assembly of States Parties, para. 3, ICC-
ASP/8JRes.3 (2009). 
52 Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Non-paper, Work in Progress, Residual Functions and the ICC, 30 August 2007, pp. 4-
7. 
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4. Concluding Remarks 
Different options exist to carry on the residual functions after the Tribunals’ closure. But 
all residual functions are closely intertwined. Therefore, it would be impossible to transfer 
all residual functions to different international entities, because it would be very difficult to 
establish links and hierarchies of authority between different states and organisations. 
Transferring all the residual functions of both Tribunals to one national or international 
body would be very difficult, because only few states or international entities have the 
capacity to perform all residual functions of the Tribunals, and it is unlikely that one of 
these would take on such a burden. In the case of Rwanda, it was even difficult to find a 
state, other than Rwanda that would accept referrals of cases from the ICTR. In addition, 
the Residual Mechanism needs to have the power to issue decisions, which are binding for 
states, other entities, and individuals when needed. This could only be achieved by 
obliging all states and other entities by a Chapter VII resolution to cooperate. A potential 
international body with the capacity to perform the residual functions is the ICC. The ICC 
could have played and still could play different roles in the performance of residual 
functions. Although the Residual Mechanism is established, it would be possible to 
transfer residual functions to the ICC. But there are important legal differences between 
the ICC and the Tribunals. The ICC has different temporal and geographic jurisdiction, 
some of the crimes are differently defined in the Rome Statute, Rwanda is not a state party 
to the Rome Statute and the procedures used by each of the Tribunals differ from those of 
the ICC.53 None of the options would be more feasible regarding political, policy, legal, 
financial and practical questions than creating the independent Residual Mechanism. For 
the ICC to perform residual functions in its own name, amendments under Article 121 of 
the Rome Statute would be necessary. This would be very complicated, and makes a 
complete absorption of residual functions by the ICC unrealistic. Even considering the 
option to only use the ICC facilities and ICC staff would raise many problems. The 
potential obstacles and efforts to avoid them, the necessary amendments of the ICC 
provisions, and the time required to make agreements between the decision-makers would 
make it very difficult for the ICC to play a role in the residual functions. In addition, the 
Residual Mechanism already has its own staff and facilities. This path was and still is 
impracticable. Furthermore, the Residual Mechanism with one branch seated in Arusha 
offers logistical advantages and ensures a fixed presence in eastern and central Africa.																																																								
53 International Criminal Court, R. PROC. & EVID., paras. 121-26, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/ NR/rdonlyres/FIEOAC IC-
A3F3-4A3C-B9A7-B3E8Bl11 5E886/140164/Rules ofprocedureandEvi- denceEnglish.pdf (last visited on 11 April 2017). The RPE of 
the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL differ slightly from each other, but differ significantly in many aspects from the RPE of the ICC. For 
example, the ICC's Rules cover a procedure called a ‘confirmation of charges’ hearing that is not a procedure used by any of the time-
limited tribunals. 
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VI. A Joint Residual Mechanism as the Preferable Solution 
It is questionable whether it would have been a preferable solution to create a joint 
Residual Mechanism that takes over the residual functions of the SCSL, the ICTY, and the 
ICTR. 
 
1. Differences and Similarities between the SCSL and the Tribunals 
The ICTY and the ICTR are in effect joined at the hip, because the Tribunals share some 
of their institutions and have identical Statutes. The Prosecutor and the composition of the 
Appeals Chamber are the same for both Tribunals. This leads to consistency regarding 
prosecutorial policy and appellate jurisprudence. In 2000, the Statute of the ICTR was 
amended in order to allow the appointment of two appellate judges. The judges sit in The 
Hague. Working with five colleagues from the ICTY, they make up the Appeals Chamber 
of the ICTY and ICTR.1  
 The question appears of whether it would have been possible to create a joint 
Residual Mechanism, because the treaty-based nature of the SCSL differs from the 
Tribunals in important aspects. The SCSL was held inside Sierra Leone rather than in a 
third country. Therefore, the Sierra Leonean government had significant involvement 
regarding the administration. In addition, the SCSL Statute applies international as well as 
Sierra Leonean law. Therefore, the SCSL needed to be incorporated into the law of Sierra 
Leone. Another important difference is that the Security Council and the UN supported the 
SCSL less financially than the Tribunals. However, payments to the SCSL were voluntary 
as opposed to the mandatory method of assessing payments for Tribunals.2 In contrast to 
the SCSL, which had concurrent jurisdiction with Sierra Leonean Courts, the Tribunals 
have primacy over national courts. While the SCSL only had jurisdiction over crimes 
committed after 7 July 1999, the jurisdiction of the ICTR is limited to the period of the 
genocide, from January 1994 through December 1994.3 But the jurisdiction of the SCSL is 
similar to the unlimited jurisdiction of the ICTY. 4  These differences in temporal 
jurisdiction exist because the conflicts in Sierra Leone and former Yugoslavia lasted longer 
than the genocide in Rwanda. Regarding individual criminal responsibility, the language in 
the SCSL Statute is nearly identical to that of the Tribunals.5 However, the individual 
criminal responsibility described in Article 5 of the SCSL Statue has to be determined in 																																																								
1 UN Security Council Resolution 1329 (2000), UN Doc. S/RES/1329 (2000), 5 December 2000; William Schabas Introduction to the 
International Criminal Court (2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004), p. 12.  
2 Letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Secretary Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/40, 12 January 2001, paras. 
10-13. 
3 Article 7 of the ICTR Statute; Article 1 (1) of the SCSL Statute.  
4 Article 8 of the ICTY Statute.  
5 Article 1 of the SCSL Statute, Article 6 of the ICTR Statute, Article 6 of the ICTY Statute.  
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accordance with Sierra Leonean law. A comparable domestic legal provision does not exist 
in the cases of the ICTY and the ICTR.6  
 Unlike the Tribunals, which have the power to request assistance from third states, 
or the ICC, which can request assistance from any member of the treaty, the SCSL did not 
have the power to demand assistance from a third country.7 Another result of the bilateral 
nature of the SCSL is that an accused person could be tried in a court outside of Sierra 
Leone. Furthermore, an accused person could also be retried for a crime by the SCSL 
under Articles 2 through 4 of the SCSL Statute even if the accused was already tried in a 
Sierra Leonean national court.8 Therefore, the SCSL has the power to try the accused 
already tried in Sierra Leone if the Prosecutor thinks there was a sham trial or a weak 
investigation. The Tribunals can request that a national court defer prosecution of 
individuals if the Tribunal is interested in trying them.9 The subject matter jurisdiction of 
the SCSL is similar to the Tribunals’ Statutes. But genocide was not included on the list of 
crimes, since the attacks on civilians in Sierra Leone did not appear to have an ethnic 
element. There are two primary ethnic groups in Sierra Leone, the Mende and the Temne. 
Both suffered during the conflict. Because of the unique bilateral arrangement, crimes 
under Sierra Leonean law are included in the Statute. In contrast, the ICTR and ICTY do 
not provide jurisdiction for crimes committed under Rwandan and Yugoslavian law. The 
structure of the SCSL and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are similar to those of the 
Tribunals. This results from the fact that the Rules of Procedure and Evidence were mostly 
copied from the ICTR RPE. Further, the Appellate Chamber was guided by decisions of 
the Tribunals’ Appeals Chambers and the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone in the 
application of the laws and legal principles of Sierra Leone.10  
 
2. Residual Functions of the SCSL 
Since 2007, the Office of the Registrar of the SCSL was specifically tasked with 
identifying legal, judicial, and administrative functions that need to be carried on by an 
appropriate Residual Mechanism.11 Although the Tribunals differ from the SCSL in some 
aspects, the issues and challenges the SCSL faces regarding its continuing legal and 
																																																								
6 Article 7 of the ICTR Statute; Article 8 of the ICTY Statute. 
7 Article 7 of the ICTR Statute, Article 8 of the ICTR Statute; Article 8 of the ICTY Statute, Article 9 of the ICTY Statute; Article 13 of 
the Rome Statute; Article 12 (1) (a) of the SCSL Statute. 
8 Article 9 (2) of the SCSL Statute. 
9 Article 8 (2) of the ICTR Statute; Article 9 (2) of the ICTY Staute. Michaela Frulli, ‘The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Some 
Preliminary Comments’ Eur. J. Int'l L. (2000) 860. 
10 Article 20 (3) of the SCSL Statute; Celina Schocken‚ ‘Special Court for Sierra Leone: Overview and Recommendations’ BJIL 20 
(2002) 437, 445- 452. 
11 Binta Mansaray and Shakiratu Sanusi, ‘Residual matters of ad hoc courts and tribunals: the SCSL experience’ Commonwealth Law 
Bulletin 36 (2010) 593. 
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administrative obligations are similar.12 Therefore, the SCSL convened the Residual Issues 
Expert Group Meeting on 20 and 21 February 2008.13 The SCSL hired a consultant to 
analyse all residual issues that could arise from the completion of the judicial activities. 
Further, the consultant was required to examine all possible options that could be used to 
respond to the residual issues.  
 In the so-called Donlon Report, ten critical residual functions were identified and 
divided into two categories, 'ongoing' functions and 'ad hoc' functions.14 While ‘ongoing’ 
functions require a small and continuous secretariat, ad hoc functions may only be required 
at times and may, in practice, never be required at all. The 'ongoing functions' are those 
that involve ‘ongoing’ day-to-day responsibilities and the 'ad hoc functions' may only 
require a 'notional' Residual Mechanism that will be called upon to perform a service as 
needed, which may be very rarely or in fact never performed. For the ‘ongoing’ functions, 
however, a permanent standing Residual Mechanism was necessary. The report examined 
the functions to determine the capacity of the Residual Mechanism needed, the workload 
of the Residual Mechanism assessed, and the timeline. 
 The following residual functions were identified: (1) The long-term maintenance 
and preservation of the SCSL archives needs to be guaranteed in a secure and suitable 
environment, including management of access to and classification of records. (2) The 
witness protection and support is of crucial importance and includes responding to any 
threats to SCSL witnesses. A substantial part of this function has to be performed in Sierra 
Leone. (3) Assistance to national prosecution authorities includes the management of 
government requests for evidence and information to support investigations, prosecutions, 
forfeiture proceedings and asylum cases. (4) Supervision of prison sentences, pardons, and 
commutations, and early releases includes inspection of the conditions of imprisonment, 
tracking of time served, and dates of release.  
 Another six functions are ad hoc functions: (5) The Trial of Johnny Paul Koroma 
needs to be conducted. (6) The review of convictions and acquittals has to be ensured in 
order to guarantee the rights of the convicted. (7) Contempt of court proceedings needs to 
be pursued in order to ensure respect for and implementation of court orders, as well as the 
need to sanction persons who violate them. (8) Dealing with Defence Counsel and legal aid 																																																								
12 Ibid.  
13 Participants in the meeting included representatives from the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, several missions to the United 
Nations, ICTR, ICTY, ICC, leading international non-governmental organisations, and the international donor community. In addition, 
Sierra Leonean stakeholders participated in the meeting, which included involvement from local representatives of the Sierra Leone 
government, the Sierra Leone police, the Sierra Leone judiciary, the Sierra Leone Bar Association, and Sierra Leonean-based non-
governmental organizations. SCSL, Fifth Annual Report of the President of the Special Court for Sierra Leone for the period of June 
2007 to May 2008, p. 38. The report is available from the website of the RSCSL at http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/AnRpt5.pdf (last 
visited on 9 April 2017). 
14 Binta Mansaray and Shakiratu Sanusi, ‘Residual matters of ad hoc courts and tribunals: the SCSL experience’ Commonwealth Law 
Bulletin 36 (2010) 601. 
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issues. (9) Dealing with claims for compensation. (10) Double jeopardy needs to be 
prevented. When the SCSL has completed a prosecution, that person should not be tried 
again for the same offence by other courts. 15 
 One of the most difficult issues was the location of the archives. The Government 
of Sierra Leone preferred the archives to remain in Sierra Leone. Although it could be 
argued that the archives belong to Sierra Leone, the archives legally belong to the SCSL. 
The long-term preservation and the security of the archives were very important when 
considering the future location. Because it was not possible to find a suitable facility in 
Sierra Leone the Government of the Netherlands offered to host the archives. The 
Government of Sierra Leone accepted the offer, but the original archives may be returned 
to Sierra Leone ‘when there is a suitable facility for their preservation and sufficient 
security for maintaining the archives in accordance with international standards.’16 In 
2011, the Sierra Leone Peace Museum was launched under the recommendation of the 
Government of Sierra Leone, as a memorial to the war.17 The Sierra Leone Peace Museum 
provides access to a complete copy of the archives of the SCSL. It honours the victims of 
the war and sends a strong a message to future generations about the consequences of the 
violent conflict. 
 
3. Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone (RSCSL) 
There were three options for carrying out the residual functions: a downsized SCSL, 
transferring the functions to the domestic courts in Sierra Leone, or creating a completely 
new independent body. According to Article 23 of the SCSL Agreement, the SCSL will be 
closed by agreement of the Government of Sierra Leone and the UN after the SCSL 
completed its judicial activities.18 However, the parties could have decided that the SCSL 
has not finished its judicial activities yet. But the Government of Sierra Leone and the 
donors of the SCSL desired to close the SCSL, to show that the SCSL had fulfilled its 
mandate. In addition, creating a new body would allow to address the inefficiencies in the 
structure and practices of the SCSL and to come up with a new funding mechanism.  
 Transferring the functions to domestic courts would give ownership of the SCSL 
back to Sierra Leone. The judicial system of Sierra Leone had suffered great damage 
during the civil war. Therefore, the President asked the UN to create a court to prosecute 																																																								
15 Ibid., pp. 602-603; SCSL, Fifth Annual Report of the President of the Special Court for Sierra Leone for the period of June 2007 to 
May 2008, p. 38. The report is available from the website of the RSCSL at http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/AnRpt5.pdf (last visited 11 
April 2017).  
16 Article 7 (3) of the Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of Residual 
Special Court for Sierra Leone signed on the 11th August, 2010 and for other related matters (The Residual Special Court for Sierra 
Leone Agreement (Ratification) Act, 2011), .Sierra Leone Gazette Vol. CXLIII, No. 6 of 9 February 2012. 	
17 Sierra Leone Peace Museum, availiable at http://www.slpeacemuseum.org/about-us/background.html (last visited 11 April 2017). 
18 Agreement between the the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, UNTS Volume Number: 2178,  16. January 2002. 
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the persons most responsible for crimes. The domestic courts still were overloaded so it 
would be unreasonable to impose additional work on the judicial system. Further, the 
judges in the domestic courts would need to familiarize with the jurisprudence of the SCSL 
in order to be able to review judgments, and to decide on applications for early release. 
Another legal issue was the Lomé Peace Accord, under which the Government of Sierra 
Leone granted a blanket amnesty to members of the rebel groups.19 But the Lomé Peace 
Accord did not apply before the SCSL.20 Therefore, unless the amnesty was revoked, the 
domestic judicial system would not have jurisdiction over the persons indicted by the 
SCSL. Hence, they would lack jurisdiction over the only remaining fugitive of the SCSL, 
Johnny Paul Koroma. Finally, the SCSL is not part of the judicial system of Sierra Leone. 
It was questionable whether the judiciary of Sierra Leone could review judgments issued 
by the SCSL, or remove confidentiality restrictions placed on SCSL documents.  
 The RSCSL was supported and shaped by the local population and civil society. 
This helps to ensure that the SCSL leaves a lasting legacy in Sierra Leone. In contrast to 
the Residual Mechanism, the RSCSL started its work after the SCSL shut down instead of 
during its last phases. In August 2010, the RSCSL was created by an agreement between 
the UN and the government of Sierra Leone to solve the residual issues resulting from the 
closure of the SCSL. The Parliament of Sierra Leone ratified the agreement in December 
2011.21 In contrast, the Security Council established the Residual Mechanism acting under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.22 Pursuant to the RSCSL Statute, the purpose of the 
RSCSL is to carry out the functions of the SCSL, which have continued after the closure of 
the Special Court. The RSCSL is seated in Sierra Leone, where the crimes in question were 
committed. 23 This is advantageous because it provides increased accessibility to witnesses 
and victims and allows increased visibility of the court's work. This presence creates the 
possibility that the SCSL's work could help to recreate the justice system in Sierra Leone 
and serve as a symbol against impunity for horrific crimes committed in that area. In 
addition, it increases the access of the affected communities to the court and its archives. 
The RSCSL presides over ad hoc judicial proceedings, like review proceedings or 
contempt of court cases arising out of witness tampering. Of the 557 witnesses who 																																																								
19 Peace Agreement between the Governement of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (Lomé Peace 
Agreement), UN Doc. S71999/777, 7. July 1999. See Article IX (2): After signing oft he present Agreement, the Government of Sierra 
Leone shall also grant absolute and free pardon and reprieve to all combatants and collaborators in respect of anything done by them in 
pursuit of their objectives, up to the time of the signing of the present Agreement’. See also Article IX (3): To consolidate the peace and 
promote the cause of national reconcilation, the Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no official or judicial action is taken 
against any member of the RUF/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or CDF in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as 
members of those organisations, since March 1991, up to the time of the signing of the present Agreement.’	
20	Article 10 of the SCSL Statute: ‘An amnesty granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Court in respect of the 
crimes referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution.’	
21 Agreement between the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
Freetown 11 August 2010, with annexed Statute of the RSCSL (RSCSL Statute). 
22 UN Security Council Resolution 1966 (2010), UN Doc. S/RES/1966 (2010), 22 December 2010. 
23 Article 6 of the RSCSL Statute.  
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testified in SCSL proceedings, approximately 100 require ongoing post-trial witness 
protection.24 The RSCSL also had the jurisdiction to try the case against the last remaining 
fugitive of the SCSL, Johnny Paul Koroma, but also had the option of referring the case to 
a competent national authority.25 The archives of the SCSL became the property of the 
RSCSL and are collocated in both Sierra Leone and in the Netherlands, where the RSCSL 
interim seat is located. In order to preserve and promote the legacy of the SCSL, electronic 
access to the public archives is available to the public in Sierra Leone, along with printed 
copies. The archives that will be made available to the public through the Sierra Leone 
Peace Museum are ‘one of the richest resources on the nation's conflict.’26  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Because it is located in the country where crimes were committed, the situation of the 
SCSL is unique. The RSCSL in Sierra Leone provides accessibility to the trials and 
documents for victims and witnesses and the visibility of the progressing work of the court 
in the country. Access to the archives is of special importance. Further, the work of the 
RSCSL is a possibility to rebuild the Sierra Leonean judicial system and it also serves as a 
symbol against impunity for atrocities committed in that area. That would be at risk if the 
Residual Mechanism were to have been located outside Sierra Leone. But the funding of a 
RSCSL was problematic. Because it is not possible for Sierra Leone to contribute to a 
Residual Mechanism, the international community needed to devise a sustainable funding 
arrangement. Therefore, it could have been an option to create a joint Residual Mechanism 
with the ICTR and ICTY. This Residual Mechanism would have been located outside 
Sierra Leone but with an office in Sierra Leone.  
 The legal basis of the SCSL is different from the legal basis of the ICTY and ICTR, 
which could make a joint Residual Mechanism complicated. However, the legal 
differences would not have made that option unfeasible. But when deciding on a joint 
Residual Mechanism the question would have been where to locate the institution. It would 
have been a good option to create a third branch to the ICTY and ICTR Residual 
Mechanism with regard to funding and efficiency. A joint Residual Mechanism could 
become a part of the international criminal justice landscape. Other Tribunals could also 
																																																								
24 Ninth Annual Report of the President of the Special Court for Sierra Leone for the period of June 2011 to May 2012, p. 38. The report 
is available from the website of the RSCSL at http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/AnRpt9.pdf (last visited on 11 April 2017); Defna 
Gozani, ‘Beginning to Learn How to End: Lessons on Completion Strategies, Residual Mechanisms and Legacy Considerations from Ad 
Hoc International Criminal Tribunals to the International Criminal Court’ Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law 
Review Vol. 36:331 (2015), p. 360. 
25 Ninth Annual Report of the President of the Special Court for Sierra Leone for the period of June 2011 to May 2012, p. 39. The report 
is available from the website of the RSCSL at http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/AnRpt9.pdf (last visited 11 April 2017). 
26 Ibid., p. 36; Article 7 (2) of the RSCSL Statute. 
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transfer residual functions to the joint Residual Mechanism after their closure, like the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon or other future Tribunals. 
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VII. Structure and Functions of the Residual Mechanism 
The structure, functions and regulatory framework of the Residual Mechanism are defined 
in Security Council Resolution 1966 (2010) and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of 
the Residual Mechanism (IRMCT RPE).1 Annex 1 of Resolution 1966 (2010) contains the 
Statute of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT Statute) 
and the Statutes of the Tribunals as well, as the Residual Mechanism are subject to the 
Transitional Arrangements set out in Annex 2 to the Resolution.2  
 
1. Resolution 1966 (2010)  
On 22 December 2010, the Security Council established the Residual Mechanism with two 
branches through Resolution 1966 (2010). The ICTY branch commenced functioning on 1 
July 2013 and the ICTR branch on 1 July 2012.3 Resolution 1966 (2010) was adopted by a 
vote of 14 to none, with one abstention by the Russian Federation.4 The representative of 
the Russian Federation expressed criticism, pointing out that Resolution 1966 (2010) was 
required only because the Tribunals were drawing out their activities. In addition, he 
stressed that according to Resolutions 1503 (2003) and 1534 (2004) the work of the 
Tribunals needed to end by the deadlines established within the Completion Strategy and 
that the Tribunals had had every opportunity to do so. He concluded that the Russian 
Federation firmly believes that Resolution 1966 (2010) is ‘the last on the issue of the 
duration of the Tribunals’ activities, and that they will be fully wound up by the end of 
2014.’5 The representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, and Austria 
welcomed the adaption of the resolution. According to the representative from the United 
Kingdom, the resolution ensures the continuation of the Tribunals’ essential legal 
functions, including the trial of the remaining fugitives ‘who need to be brought to 
justice.’6 The Austrian representative pointed out that the ‘establishment of the Residual 
Mechanism sends a strong Security Council message against impunity.’7 Further, the 
representative of Japan emphasized that the establishment of the Tribunals ‘was the 
manifestation of the full determination of the international community not to tolerate 
impunity. The Tribunals have contributed significantly to the furtherance of international 
criminal justice,’ and the Residual Mechanism is an ‘extremely important organ that will 
take over essential functions and maintain the legacies of the Tribunals.’ But the 																																																								
1 UN Security Council Resolution 1966 (2010), UN Doc. S/RES/1966 (2010), 22 December 2010. 
2 Ibid, Annex II. 
3 Ibid., para. 1. 
4 In favour: Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Turkey, Uganda, United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. 
5 UN Security Council 6463rd meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.6463, 22 December 2010, p. 3.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., p 4. 
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representatives of Japan also found that the resolution requires the Tribunals to complete 
their work expeditiously and to ‘prepare their closure and ensure a smooth transition to the 
Residual Mechanism.’8 
 The objective of the Residual Mechanism is to carry on the jurisdiction, essential 
functions, rights and obligations of the ICTR and ICTY in accordance with the provisions 
of the Resolution.9 In addition, all international agreements and contracts concluded by the 
UN concerning the Tribunals that are still in force on the Commencement Dates apply to 
the Residual Mechanism as well, but with appropriate modifications.10 The Secretary-
General was requested to make all practical arrangements in order to ensure the 
functioning of the Residual Mechanism by the first Commencement Dates, including 
preparations for the selection of the judges and information security as well as the access 
system for the Tribunals’ archives.11 The Secretary-General was asked to submit a draft of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the Residual Mechanism. The IMRCT RPE 
needed to be based on the ICTY RPE and the ICTR RPE but in accordance with the 
provisions of Resolution 1966 (2010). However, the draft of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence needed to be considered, amended, and adopted by the Residual Mechanism’s 
judges unless the Security Council decided otherwise.12  
 The Resolution recalls the obligation of states to cooperate with the Residual 
Mechanism and the Tribunals, including the obligation concerning assistance to locate, 
arrest, detain, surrender and transfer accused persons.13At the time when Resolution 1966 
(2010) was adopted, two remaining fugitives of the ICTY14 and nine fugitives of the ICTR 
were at large.15 If necessary, states are required to take measures according to their 
domestic law to implement the regulations of Resolution 1966 (2010).16 In particular, 
states where fugitives are suspected to be at large are requested to intensify their work with 
the Tribunals. Further, these states have to provide assistance to the Tribunals and the 
Residual Mechanism in order to arrest the fugitives expeditiously.17 The Resolution 
underlines the importance of referring cases that do not concern the most senior leaders 
suspected of being most responsible for crimes to national jurisdictions. The referral 																																																								
8 Ibid., p. 4. 
9 Ibid, para. 1. 
10 Ibid, para. 4. 
11 Ibid., para 13; Article 32 of the IRMCT Statute. UN Security Council Resolution 1966 (2010), UN Doc. S/RES/1966 (2010), 22 
December 2010. 
12 Ibid., paras. 5-6. 
13 Phénéas Munyarugarama, Aloys Ndimbati, Fulgence Kayishema, Ladislas Ntaganzwa, Charles Ryandikayo, Charles Sikubwabo, 
Félicien Kabuga, Augustin Bizimana and Protais Mpiranya.  
14 Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić. 
15 Assessment and progress report of the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Theodor 
Meron, for the period from 16 November 2015 to 15 May 2016, UN Doc. S/2016/453, Annex I, 17 May 2016, para. 45; Progress report 
of the Prosecutor of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Serge Brammertz, for the period from 16 November 
2015 to 15 May 2016, UN Doc. UN Doc. S/2016/453, Annex II, 17 May 2016, para. 6. 
16 Ibid., para. 9. 
17 Ibid., para. 10. 
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should be undertaken in accordance with the Tribunals’ and the Residual Mechanism’s 
Statutes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence.18 In this context, states were asked to 
cooperate closely with the Tribunals and the Residual Mechanism in order to receive 
referred cases.19 But the Tribunals and the Residual Mechanism were also asked to 
cooperate with the affected countries and interested entities. Information and 
documentation centres need to be established in order to provide access to copies of public 
records of the archives.20 Finally, the Resolution points out that the Residual Mechanism 
operates for an initial period of four years from the first Commencement Date. After that 
initial period the progress of the work will be reviewed, and the work may continue for an 
additional two years. The progress will be reviewed regularly. 21  The Resolution 
emphasizes once more that the Tribunals have to take all possible measures to 
expeditiously complete all their remaining work no later than 31 December 2014, as set 
forth in Resolution 1966 (2010). Further, the Tribunals should prepare for their closure and 
guarantee a smooth transition of the functions to the Residual Mechanism. 22 
 
2. Statute of the Residual Mechanism – Annex 1 
The Residual Mechanism was established by the Security Council acting under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter,23 with the purpose of carrying out residual functions of the 
Tribunals.24 Annex 1 to Resolution 1966 (2010) contains the IRMCT Statute, including the 
Preamble and 32 Articles. The question appears of whether the Security Council 
considered the expressed criticism against the slow progress of the Tribunals’ work and 
provided provisions to oblige the Residual Mechanism to be more efficient.  
 
A. Structure and Staffing of the Residual Mechanism 
According to Article 3 of the IRMCT Statute, the Residual Mechanism is an institution 
with two branches. The branch for the ICTY is seated in The Hague, and the branch for the 
ICTR is seated in Arusha.25 Arrangements between the UN and the host countries 
determined the seats of the branches.26 Each branch has its own Trial Chamber, but the two 
branches share a common Appeals Chamber.27 Because the Residual Mechanism is 
designed as one institution that is divided into two distinct branches, it is obviously cost-																																																								
18 Ibid., para. 11. 
19 Ibid., para. 12. 
20 Ibid., paras. 14-15.  
21 Ibid., para. 17. 
22 Ibid., para. 3. 
23 Ibid; Annex I ‘Statute of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT)’, preamble. 
24 Article 2 of the IRMCT Statute. 
25 Article 3 of the IRMCT Statute. 
26 UN Security Council Resolution 1966 (2010), see note 11, para. 7. 
27 Article 4 (1) of the IRMCT Statute. 
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efficient to create a common Appeals Chamber that can conceive of itself as the ICTY or 
ICTR Appeals Chamber depending upon which Tribunal’s jurisdiction it is exercising. The 
organisation of separate trial capacity and one shared Appeal Chamber according to Article 
10 (1) of the ICTR Statute and Article 11 (1) of the ICTY Statute mirrors the already 
existing link between the ICTR and the ICTY.  
 The number of Trial Chambers was reduced. While the ICTY and the ICTR have 
three Trial Chambers each, the Residual Mechanism has only one Trial Chamber for each 
branch.28 Further, the Residual Mechanism consists of the Chambers, the Prosecutor, and 
the Registry, which are equivalent to the three organs of the Tribunals.29 But the difference 
from the structure of the Tribunals is the common Prosecutor and Registry for both 
branches.30 While the Tribunals always used to have separate Registrars, the Prosecutor 
was common to both institutions until Resolution 1503 (2003) provided a Prosecutor for 
each Tribunal.31 Sharing one Prosecutor and one Registry ensures close cooperation 
between the two branches of the Residual Mechanism. 
 
a. Election of Judges 
The Residual Mechanism’s Statute provides some differences from the Tribunals’ policy 
framework regarding staffing. Articles 8-12 of the IRMCT Statue regulate the roster and 
election of judges. The Residual Mechanism shall have a roster of 25 judges, of whom no 
more than two may be nationals of the same state, pursuant to Article 8 (1) of the IRMCT 
Statute. According to Article 8 (4), the roster system of judges works on a per diem basis, 
so the judges of the Residual Mechanism receive remuneration for each day they exercise 
their function and not simply for being on the roster. In contrast, the Tribunals’ approach 
was to appoint permanent judges and ad litem judges, according to Article 12 (1) of the 
ICTY Statute and 11 (1) of the ICTR Statute. These judges were present full-time.32  
 In the case of Milan Lukić, Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti pointed out the problem 
regarding the remuneration of judges.33 He explained that the remuneration of judges is not 
only compensation for the work carried out but also a guarantee to the accused and the 
victims that the judge is not corrupt, because he is being adequately paid.34 In the case of 
the Residual Mechanism, the judge will be remunerated on a one-off basis for the work 
completed. But according to Judge Antonetti, this provision raises numerous problems 																																																								
28 Article 4 (1) of the IRMCT Statute; Article 11 (1) of the ICTY Statute; Article 10 (1) of the ICTR Statue. 
29 Article 4 (1) of the IRMCT Statute; Article 10 (1) of the ICTR Statute; 11 (1) of the ICTY Statute. 
30 Article 4 (b) (c) of the IRMCT Statute.  
31 UN Security Counsil Resolution 1503 (2003), UN Doc. S/RES/1503 (2003), 28 August 2003, para.8. 
32 Articles 12, 13 bis of the ICTY Staute; Articles 11, 12 bis of the ICTR Statute.  
33 Prosecutor v. Milan Lukić and Sredoje Lukić (Case No. MICT-13-52-R.1), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti, 1 
October 2015, p. 8. 
34 Ibid. 
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because it results in different forms of remuneration within the same bench. The President 
of the Residual Mechanism receives a monthly salary and his colleagues receive lower 
compensation while doing the same work.35 At the same time, this system leads to 
conflicts between the judges because each judge produces his or her own assessment that 
the judge sends to the President. For example, one judge might claim a different number of 
hours worked on a case than the other judge. This leads to judges being differently 
remunerated in the same case. The President could receive documentation from the judges 
that could lead him or her to believe either that one judge worked more than the other or 
that one judge exaggerated in assessing the number of hours worked. Judge Antonetti 
pointed out that in particular cases, the Prosecutor and judge's assistant would receive a 
monthly salary and the defence attorney would be compensated for his or her job.36 
However, only the judge would be paid an hourly rate for his work. This could lead to the 
issue that the judges would only be able to familiarise themselves with a draft decision 
prepared by the President, and the work of the judges would most likely be rushed. 
Further, Judge Antonetti critically pointed the fact that the judges of the Residual 
Mechanism already have other professional activities, because they otherwise would not be 
able to afford to live from their hourly fee. 37 According to Carcano, the judgements issued 
by the Residual Mechanism may be poorly reasoned because the judges may contribute 
less than they could if they were working remotely. Under the leadership of the presiding 
judge, experienced legal officers that are assigned to a case will draft the judgement with 
assistance in the form of written suggestions from the other judges. The judges contribute 
less in shaping the content of those judgments, which may prevent the Residual 
Mechanism from producing judgments of the highest quality.38 
 Judge Antonetti and Carcano make a valid point, because the decisions of the 
Residual Mechanism’s judges have an impact on future international jurisprudence. An 
appropriate remuneration for the judges is necessary in order to guarantee the quality of the 
decisions and to avoid corruption. The remuneration system needs to allow judges to work 
with full concentration on their cases. But taking into account that the Tribunals’ costs 
have already been under strong criticism, the Security Council needed to reduce the costs 
of the Residual Mechanism as much as possible when creating the Residual Mechanism. 
The work of the judges is of crucial importance ensure the proper functioning of the courts. 																																																								
35 Ibid., p. 9. 
36 See: Assessment and progress report of the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Theodor 
Meron, for the period from 16 November 2015 to 15 May 2016, UN Doc. S/2016/453, 17 May 2016, para. 47. 
37 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
38 Andrea Carcano, ‘Of efficiency and fairness in the administration of international justice: Can the Residual Mechanism provide 
adequately reasoned judgments?’ QIL 40 (2017), p. 36; Giorgia Tortora, ‘The Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals: A 
Unique Model and Some of Its Distinctive Challenges’ ASIL Insight 21 (2017). 
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The judges may feel disadvantaged, which could have a direct impact on the quality of the 
decisions. However, the Security Council could solve the problem by returning judges for 
certain cases to The Hague on a permanent basis. For example, in appeals cases the judge 
could receive remuneration while in The Hague until the decision has been issued, which 
would make the so the remuneration system fairer.  
 Another difference is found in the fact that the Residual Mechanism’s roster 
consists of 25 judges in contrast to the Tribunals’ roster of 16 permanent judges 
supplemented by either nine39 or twelve40 ad litem judges. Furthermore, the numbers of 
judges who may be nationals of the same state were increased from one to two.41 While the 
President has to be attendant full time at either seat of the branches of the Residual 
Mechanism, the remaining judges shall only be present at the seats of the branches at the 
request of the President. Further, Article 8 (3) enables the President to decide whether the 
judges may exercise their function remotely, that is away from the seats of the branches of 
the Residual Mechanism. But it is questionable whether a Chamber would be able to 
function if the judges were not all in the same location. In the case of Milan Lukić, judge 
Jean-Claude Antonetti pointed out the problems that may appear if the judges were to 
exercise their functions remotely, including issues with telephone communication and 
problems with Internet access. Judge Antonetti argued that it is necessary to conceive 
deliberations when meeting in person.42 However, nowadays the Internet provides many 
ways to communicate, including programs that allow videoconferences. Therefore, it is not 
necessary for all the judges to be in the same location.  
 Article 9 (1) of the IRMCT Statute determines the qualification of a judge and 
outlines that the judge has to be a ‘person of high moral character, impartiality and 
integrity who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for 
appointment to the highest judicial offices’. In particular, the experience as a judge of the 
Tribunals needs to be taken into account. The General Assembly elects the judges of the 
Residual Mechanism from a list submitted by the Security Council. The list is determined 
upon receipt of nominees forwarded by states upon the Secretary-General’s invitation, 
according to Article 10 (1) of the IRMCT Statute. The term of appointment of the Residual 
Mechanism’s judges is four years, and the Secretary-General can reappoint the judges after 
consulting the President of the Security Council and of the General Assembly, pursuant to 
Article 10 (3) of the IRMCT Statute. 43  																																																								
39 11 (1) of the ICTR Statute. 
40 12 (1) of the ICTY Statute. 
41 Article 12 (1) of the ICTY Statute, Article 11 (1) of the ICTR Statute. See also Article (10) (d) of the IRMCT Statute.  
42 Prosecutor v. Milan Lukić and Sredoje Lukić (Case No. MICT-13-52-R.1), see note 33, p.10. 
43 Compare 13 bis/13ter with 12 bis/12 ter ICTY Statute and ICTR Statute. 
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 Compared to the assignment of judges and the composition of the chambers at the 
Tribunals, some development can be found in Article 12 of the IRMCT Statute. First, 
Article 12 (1) introduces the Single Judge, who deals with all judicial matters that do not 
concern the trial or referral consideration of a case brought under Article 1 (2) or 1 (3) of 
the IRMCT Statute. That means the Single Judge will not try cases involving core crimes 
but rather cases involving contempt and false testimony, because Article 12 (1) refers to 
Article 1 (4). A Single Judge will conduct proceedings for contempt and false testimony 
that were previously conducted by the Trials Chamber with three judges at the Tribunals. 
Another difference is found in Article 12 (3) of the IRMCT Statute, which states that in the 
event of an appeal against the decision made by the Single Judge, the Appeals Chamber 
shall be composed of three judges, while the Statutes of the Tribunals provide that the 
Appeals Chamber has to be composed of five judges for each appeal, pursuant to Article 
11 (3) of the ICTR Statute and 12 (3) of the ICTY Statute. This approach is not a reduction 
of functions. Rather, it ensures the efficiency of the Residual Mechanism and expresses the 
Security Council’s intention to keep the Residual Mechanism a small body.  
 Compared to the Tribunals’ Statutes, the provision regarding the adoption of the 
IRMCT RPE by the judges of the Residual Mechanism includes three new provisions.44 
However, the Statutes share one common requirement, namely that the IRMCT RPE have 
to govern 'the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and appeals, the 
admission of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate 
matters’.45 The first new provision found in Article 13 (2) of the IRMCT Statute allows 
amendments to the IRMCT RPE to be remotely decided by the Residual Mechanism’s 
judges by written procedure. In contrast, Rule 6 (A) of the ICTY RPE requires a plenary 
meeting of the Tribunals’ judges convened with a notice of the proposal addressed to all 
judges. The amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence can only be adopted if 
agreed to by not less than ten permanent judges. According to Article 6 (A) of the ICTR 
RPE, amendments to the IRMCT RPE can be adopted if agreed upon by not less than a 
majority of all judges. A second development found in Article 13 (3) of the IRMCT Statute 
provides that ‘Rules of Procedure and Evidence and any amendments thereto shall take 
effect upon adoption by the judges of the IRMCT unless the Security Council decides 
otherwise.’ The Statutes and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunals do not 
provide the Security Council with such power.46 Finally, according to Article 13 (4) of the 
IRMCT Statute, the IRMCT RPE have to be consistent with the IRMCT Statute. This is 																																																								
44 Article 13 of the IRMCT Statute. 
45 Compare Article 13 (1) of the IRMCT Statute with Articles 15 of the ICTY Statute and 14 of the ICTR Statutes. 
46 Article 15 of the ICTY Statute and 14 of the ICTR Statute; Rules 1 and 6 (D) of the ICTY RPE and Rules 1 and 6 (C) of the ICTR 
RPE. 
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another new condition compared to the provisions in the Statutes and the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunals. These amendments prevent the Residual 
Mechanism from making changes to the IRMCT RPE that could jeopardise the Security 
Council’s aim to reduce the Residual Mechanism’s workload. For example, provisions that 
were specifically amended in order to reduce the workload could not be amended without 
the consent of the Security Council.  
 
b. President of the Residual Mechanism 
The Secretary-General appoints the President of the Residual Mechanism.47 According to 
Article 11 (1) of the IRMCT Statute, the Secretary-General appoints a full-time President 
from among the judges of the Residual Mechanism after consulting the judges of the 
Residual Mechanism and the President of the Security Council. Similar to the provision of 
the ICTY Statute, the President of the Residual Mechanism shall act as the Presiding Judge 
of its Appeals Chamber.48 In the case of Milan Lukić Judge, Jean-Claude Antonetti pointed 
out the problems regarding the duties of the President of the Residual Mechanism 
overlapping with his duties when presiding over a case.49 Considering the time required for 
working on a case, the question arises of how the President of the Residual Mechanism, 
who travels and is involved in representation and colloquia, would be able to work on 
cases. According to Judge Antonetti, there is a risk that a legal team would end up doing 
the work for the President instead. Judge Antonetti recommended determining the precise 
duties of the President by amending Article 11 (2) of the IRMCT Statute and deleting the 
sentence at the beginning of Article 12 (3) of the IRMCT Statute providing that ‘the 
President of the Residual Mechanism shall be a member of the Appeals Chamber, appoint 
the other members, and preside over its proceedings.’50 According to Judge Antonetti, a 
court would be more independent if a distinction were made between the person who 
assigns judges and the person who presides over proceedings.51 Judge Antonetti has a valid 
point. For example, in the case of a request for the disqualification of a judge appointed by 
the President, the President himself rules on this request or designates a bench to do so, 
according to Rule 18 of the IRMCT RPE. Although the President could reconsider his 
decision regarding the appointment of a judge, it would be more reasonable if the request 
for the disqualification of a judge were to be reviewed by a third person. This would make 
the decision more transparent. Judge Antonetti indeed points out the problem, which is a 																																																								
47 Article 11(1) of the IRMCT Statute; Artilce14 (1) of the ICTY Statute; Article 13 (1) of the ICTR Statute. 
48 Article 12 (3) of the IRMCT Statute; Article 14 (2) of the ICTY Statute.  
49 Prosecutor v. Milan Lukić and Sredoje Lukić (Case No. MICT-13-52-R.1), see note 33, p. 7. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., p. 8. 
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result of the Security Council’s attempt to keep the Residual Mechanism as small as 
possible. Hence, the President has to fulfil several tasks simultaneously. The duration of 
the proceedings would be unnecessarily extended if the duties of the President overlapped 
with his duties when presiding over a case. This could result in violation of the fair trial 
rights of the accused. In the case that a legal team would do the work for the President 
instead, it would more reasonable to appoint another Judge for this task in the first place. 
The President should only deal with the tasks inherent to his position involving 
administration and representation.  
 
c. Office of the Prosecutor and Registry 
Articles 14 and 15 of the IRMCT Statute regarding the Registry and Prosecutor organs 
correspond to Articles 15 and 16 of the ICTR Statute and Articles 16 and 17 of the ICTY 
Statute. The Residual Mechanism consists of a Prosecutor and Registry common to both 
branches. The Registrar and the Prosecutor have to be present at either seat of the branches 
when it is necessary to carry out their functions. Furthermore, each organ is additionally 
staffed by an officer in charge at the seat of each branch of the Residual Mechanism.52 
According to Articles 14 (5) and 15 (4) of the IRMCT Statute, the Offices of the 
Prosecutor and the Registry retain a small number of staff. This corresponds with the 
reduced functions of the Residual Mechanism in general. But the Offices also maintain a 
roster of qualified potential staff that allows the Residual Mechanism to recruit additional 
staff rapidly when needed to perform its functions.53 Similar to judicial nominees, persons 
with experience at the Tribunals shall be preferred.54 The Secretary-General appoints the 
staff of the Offices on recommendation of the Registrar or the Prosecutor. Article 16 of the 
IRMCT Statute provides the Prosecutor with the power to conduct investigations against 
persons covered by Article 1 of the IRMCT Statute, but prohibits the Prosecutor from 
preparing new indictments against persons other than those covered by Article 1 of the 
IRMCT Statute.  
 An important development was the implementation of the ‘one office’ approach to 
integrating the staff and resources of the Office of the Prosecutor of the Residual 
Mechanism and that of the ICTY.55 The staff of the Prosecution is available to ‘double-
hat’, so it can work for either the Residual Mechanism or the Tribunals depending on 
requirements and the case-related knowledge needed. The resources of both Offices are 																																																								
52 Articles 14 (3), 15 (2) of the IRMCT Statute. 
53 Articles 14 (5), 15 (4) of the IRMCT Statue. 
54 Articles 14 (3), 15 (2) of the IRMCT Statue. 
55 Progress report of the Prosecutor of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Serge Brammertz, for the period 
from 16 November 2015 to 15 May 2016’ Annex II, UN Doc. S/2016/453, 17 May 2016, para 41. 
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deployed where necessary. Further, the Office of the Prosecutor integrated the 
management teams to provide help in carrying out the responsibilities of the Residual 
Mechanism and the Tribunals. 
 
B. Jurisdiction 
Regarding the exercise of jurisdiction, the provisions of the IRMCT Statute mirror the 
provisions of the Tribunals’ Statutes. Article 1 of the IRMCT Statute governs the 
jurisdiction of the Residual Mechanism as continuing ‘the material, territorial, temporal 
and personal jurisdiction of the ICTY and the ICTR’, as set out in Articles 1 to 8 of the 
ICTY Statute 56 and Articles 1 to 7 of the ICTR Statute.57 These provisions cover the core 
crimes and modes of responsibility applicable to the Tribunals. Hence, Article 1 (1) of the 
IRMCT Statute provides that each branch is created to carry on the jurisdiction of its 
parent Tribunal. The jurisdiction continuity between the Residual Mechanism and the 
Tribunals in particular is essential for the legacy of the ICTY and the ICTR in order to 
prevent impunity for fugitives after the closure of the Tribunals.58  
 
a. Jurisdiction Ratione Personae 
Article 1 (2) of the IRMCT Statute restricts the jurisdiction to the prosecution of only 
‘persons indicted by the ICTY or the ICTR who are among the most senior leaders 
suspected of being most responsible for the crimes covered by paragraph 1 of this Article, 
considering the gravity of the crimes charged and the level of responsibility of the accused’ 
(high-level fugitives). This provision is derived from Rule 11bis of the ICTY RPE, which 
refers to Resolution 1534 (2004) that requests indictments be restricted to the most senior 
leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes.59 These criteria of Article 1 (2) are 
identical to the Rule 11bis (C) of the ICTY RPE, which defines the requirements that need 																																																								
56 Articles 1-8 of the ICTY Statute: Pursuant to Article 1 of the ICTY Statute the Tribunal has jurisdiction over individuals responsible 
for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991. 
Articles 2- 5 of the ICTY Statute empower the Tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for grave breaches of the Geneva Convention 
of 1949, violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity. According to Article 6 the ICTY has 
jurisdiction over natural persons. Article 7 governs the individual criminal responsibility, including a person who planned, instigated, 
ordered, committed, or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation, or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2- 5 of 
the ICTY Statute. According to Article 8 the territorial jurisdiction of the ICTY extends to the territory of the former Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, including its land surface, airspace, and territorial waters. 
57 Articles 1-7 of the ICTR Statute: Pursuant to Article 1 of the ICTR Statute the Tribunal has the competence to prosecute individuals 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens 
responsible for such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring states between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994. 
According to Articles 2- 5 the ICTR has jurisdiction over individuals responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations 
of Article 3 common to the Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol II committed on the territory of Rwanda as well as to the 
territory of neighbouring states. Article 5 provides that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over natural persons and Article 6 governs the 
individual criminal responsibility, where the Tribunal has the competence to conduct individuals who planned, instigated, ordered, 
committed, or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2- 4 of the ICTR 
Statute.  
58 Secretary-General’s Report on the Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Options for Possible Locations for the Archives of the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Seat of the Residual 
Mechanism(s) for the Tribunals, UN Doc. S/2009/258, 21 May 2009; Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. 
S/PRST/2008/47,19 December 2008, para. 99. 
59 UN Security Council Resolution 1534 (2004), UN Doc. S/RES/1534 (2004) of 26 March 2004. 
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to be considered by a Chamber when determining whether to refer a case for trial from the 
Tribunals to domestic courts. Article 1 (3) of the IRMCT Statute only allows for the 
prosecution of those persons indicted by the Tribunals that do not belong to the most senior 
leaders (lower-level fugitives) after it has made all reasonable efforts to refer the case to 
national jurisdiction for prosecution under Article 6 of the IRMCT Statute. Hence, the 
gravity of the alleged crimes and the level of responsibility of the accused determine 
whether the accused falls within the jurisdiction of the Residual Mechanism. The 
regulation that requires the Residual Mechanism to focus on high-level fugitives is now a 
statutory provision. This shows the Security Council’s intention to reduce the Residual 
Mechanism’s work as much as possible. Establishing Rule 11bis of the ICTY RPE was an 
important part of the Tribunals’ Completion Strategy. The Security Council addressed the 
criticism expressed against the establishment of the Residual Mechanism by putting an 
important regulation of the Completion Strategy into the IRCMT Statute.  
 Among the IWGIT members there was a principle agreement throughout the 
negotiations that there should be no impunity for the fugitives from the two Tribunals. But 
when the IWIGIT negotiated Resolution 1966 (2010), some discussion arose as to whether 
all or only specific fugitives should fall within the jurisdiction of the Residual 
Mechanism.60 The Security Council’s President reaffirmed the need to bring persons 
indicted by the ICTY and ICTR to justice.61 But it was clear that the workload of the 
Residual Mechanism would be reduced if the Residual Mechanism did not try all 
remaining fugitives. According to the Secretary-General’s report, the ‘illustrative examples 
demonstrate that the level of staffing, and therefore the staffing costs, do not vary greatly 
as a result of the number of functions transferred to the Residual Mechanism, but are 
affected much more significantly by whether there is a trial on-going or not.’ 62  
 Different approaches were discussed. Some members believed that the jurisdiction 
of the Residual Mechanism should only extend to high-level fugitives.63 This approach 
would have resulted in the so-called ‘3 plus 2’ formula, which means the Residual 
Mechanism's jurisdiction would have been extended to the three high-level fugitives of the 
ICTR and to the two ICTY fugitives remaining at that time.64 The remaining fugitives of 
the ICTR do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Residual Mechanism and have to be tried 
by domestic courts. But other members of the IWGIT did not agree with this approach, 
because they took the view that the Security Council would be sanctioning impunity if the 																																																								
60 The IWIGIT worked confidentially and not in public. Secretary-General’s Report, see note 58, para. 14. 
61 Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2008/47, 19 December 2008. 
62 Ibid., para. 243.  
63 UN Security Council Resolution 1503 (2003), see note 31; UN Security Council Resolution 1534 (2004), see note 59. 
64 Brigitte Benoit Landale and Huw Llewellyn, ‘The International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals: The Beginning of the 
End for the ICTY and ICTR’ Int'l Org. L. Rev 8 (2011) 349, 355. 
	
82	
Statute of the Residual Mechanism did not deal with the lower-level fugitives of the ICTY 
and the ICTR. These members preferred the option where the Residual Mechanism has the 
same jurisdiction over high-level as well as lower-level fugitives as the Tribunals.65 The 
eventual compromise was found where the Residual Mechanism has jurisdiction over all 
fugitives but deals differently with the high-level and the lower-level fugitives. Article 1 of 
the IRMCT Statute distinguishes between the Residual Mechanism's competences over 
high-level fugitives on the one hand and the lower-level fugitives on the other hand. 
Regarding lower-level fugitives, the Residual Mechanism has the power to prosecute only 
after it has exhausted all reasonable efforts to refer those cases to domestic authorities.66 
Consequently, Article 1 of the IRMCT Statute changes the approach from giving the 
Tribunals the authority to refer lower-level cases to requesting that the Residual 
Mechanism exhaust all reasonable efforts to refer cases to national authorities. In order to 
assist the Residual Mechanism in this regard Resolution 1966 (2010) requests all states to 
cooperate as much as possible to be able to receive cases from the Residual Mechanism 
and the Tribunals.67  This approach is appropriate to reduce the workload of the Residual 
Mechanism, which is necessary in order to be able to keep the Residual Mechanism a 
small body. In the cases of the lower-level fugitives it does not result in impunity, because 
the national courts still have the jurisdiction to rule on those fugitives.  
 
b. Lack of Competence to Issue New Indictments 
Both Tribunals issued new indictments and indictments regarding cases of contempt and 
false testimony.68 Article 1 (5) of the IRMCT Statute ensures that the Residual Mechanism 
is not able to extend its jurisdictional competence. The Residual Mechanism does not have 
the competence to issue any new indictments against persons other than those covered by 
Article 1 of the IRMCT Statute. Indictments concerning the high-level fugitives have 
already been issued. Hence, the Residual Mechanism has only the power to bring new 
indictments regarding cases of contempt and false testimony, pursuant to Article 1 (4) of 
the IRMCT Statute. 69 The provision ensures that the work of the ad hoc Tribunals 
continued by the Residual Mechanism will definitely be finished one day. This is due to 																																																								
65 Ibid. 
66 Article 1 (3) of the IRMCT Statute.  
67 Brigitte Benoit Landale and Huw Llewellyn, ‘The International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals: The Beginning of the 
End for the ICTY and ICTR’ Int'l Org. L. Rev 8 (2011) 349, 355- 357. 
68 For example: Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj (Case No. IT-03-67-R77.2-A), Judgment, 19 May 2010; Prosecutor v. Shefqet Kabashi 
(Case No. IT-04-84-R77.1), Judgment, 16 September 2011; Prosecutor v. Zuhdija Tabaković (Case No. IT-98-32/1-R77.1), Sentencing 
Judgment, 18 March 2010; Prosecutor v. GAA (Case No. ICTR-07-90-R77-I), Judgment and Sentence, 4 December 2007. 
69 Article 1 (4) of the IRMCT Statute; Brigitte Benoit Landale and Huw Llewellyn, ’The International Residual Mechanism for Criminal 
Tribunals: The Beginning of the End for the ICTY and ICTR’ Int'l Org. L. Rev. 8 (2011) 349, 355-357; Gabrielle McIntyre, ‘The 
International Residual Mechanism and the Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda’ 
GoJIL (2011) 923, 932. 
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the criticisms of the member states during the adaption of Resolution 1966 (2010) 
regarding the slow progress of the Tribunals’ work. The Security Council wanted to avoid 
mistakes made by the Tribunals when creating the Residual Mechanism. In addition, the 
trial function of the Residual Mechanism was intended to be ‘residual’. This means the 
Residual Mechanism’s task is to complete the work of the Tribunals, and not to commence 
new investigations or prosecutions. But amendments to indictments are possible. This 
would apply in the case when a judge wants to update the indictment because of factual or 
legal findings in other cases.  
 According to Article 17 of the IRMCT Statute, the Residual Mechanism’s duty or 
Single Judge has competence to review indictments. Article 17 of the IRMCT Statute 
mirrors Article 19 of the ICTY Statute and Article 18 of the ICTR Statute. According to 
Article 17 (1), the duty or the Single Judge reviews the indictment, and in the case the 
judge determines that a prima facie case was not established, the judge has to dismiss the 
indictment. Further, Article 17 (1) regulates that ‘upon confirmation of an indictment, the 
judge may, at the request of the Prosecutor, issue such orders and warrants for the arrest, 
detention, surrender or transfer of persons, and any other orders as may be required for the 
conduct of the trial’.70 
 
c. Concurrent Jurisdiction with National Courts 
According to Article 5 (1) of the IRMCT Statute, the Residual Mechanism has concurrent 
jurisdiction with national courts concerning cases regarding persons covered by Article 1 
of the IRMCT Statute. However, the Residual Mechanism has primacy over those courts.71 
This provision is similar to Article 9 of the ICTY Statute and Article 8 of the ICTR Statute. 
The difference is that the Residual Mechanism only has the competence to request national 
courts to defer cases of high-level fugitives. That restriction does not exist in the Tribunals’ 
Statutes. Furthermore, under Article 5 (2) of the IRMCT Statute the Residual Mechanism 
has the power to request national courts to defer the cases of high-level fugitives at any 
stage of the procedure though in that case the Residual Mechanism does not act as an 
independent level of appellate review for the national proceedings. Moreover, the Residual 
Mechanism has to determine whether the conditions for a fair trial in the domestic 
jurisdiction no longer exist.72 
 
																																																								
70 Article 17 (2) of the IRMCT Statute. 
71 Art 5 (2) of the IRMCT Statute.  
72 Prosecutor v. Jean Uwinkindi (Case No. ICTR-2001-75-R11bis), Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of 
Rwanda, 28 June 2011, para. 12. 
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d. Referring Cases to National Jurisdictions 
Article 6 of the IRMCT Statute enables the Residual Mechanism to refer cases to national 
jurisdictions involving lower-level fugitives. The referral process of the Residual 
Mechanism is described in Article 6 (2)-(6) of the IRMCT Statute. Article 6 is derived 
from the Tribunals’ Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Resolution 1503 (2003). Also, 
the Tribunals’ case law regarding referrals helped to shape Article 6 of the IRMCT 
Statute.73 The Tribunals’ referral procedure derives from a rule adopted by the judges 
under Article 14 of the ICTR Statute and Article 15 of the ICTY Statute. These provisions 
provide the judges of the Tribunal with the privilege of adopting Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence ‘for the conduct of the pretrial phase of the proceedings, trials, and appeals, the 
admission of evidence, the protection of witnesses and other appropriate matters.’ The 
statutory authority for this rule in the Tribunals’ Rules of Procedure and Evidence is based 
on Resolution 1534 (2004), which introduced the ‘Completion Strategy’, including the 
possibility of transferring lower-level accused persons to national jurisdictions as an 
indispensable element. 74 The judges of the Tribunals, exercising their discretion, adopted 
the provision regarding referral. 
 Article 6 mirrors Rule 11bis (A) of the ICTY RPE and Rule 11bis (A) of the ICTR 
RPE but includes minor variations. However, the main differences between the provisions 
particularly lies in the fact that the Residual Mechanism is required to undertake every 
effort to refer those cases to national jurisdictions that do not involve high-level fugitives. 
According to Article 6 (2) of the IRMCT Statute, the President may create a Trial Chamber 
that determines whether the case should be referred to the national jurisdiction after an 
indictment was confirmed and prior to the commencement of trial.75 In contrast, Rule 11bis 
of the ICTY RPE creates a discretionary referral. Hence, the Security Council amended the 
provision to the status of a mandatory statutory provision for the Residual Mechanism. 
This is an indication of the Security Council´s vision that referrals should be an important 
part in the functioning of the Residual Mechanism. 76 This approach demonstrates the 
Security Council’s objective to oblige the Residual Mechanism to refer cases when 																																																								
73 Prosecutor v. Gojko Janković (Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR11bis.2), Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, 15 November 2005, paras. 1-3, 45- 
94; Prosecutor v. Paško Ljubičić (Case No: IT-00-41-PT), Decision to Refer the Case to Bosnia and Herzegovina pursuant to Rule 11 
bis, 12 April 2006, paras. 2-3, 37-48; Prosecutor v. Mitar Rašević and Savo Todović (Case No. It-97-25/1-PT), Decision on Referral of 
Casue Under Rule 11bis, 8 July 2005, paras. 2-3, 72, 107-111; Prosecutor v. Željko Mejakić, Momčilo Gruban, Dušan Fuštar, Duško 
Knežević (Case No. Case No. IT-02-65-PT), Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, 30 July 
2005, paras. 36, 64-117; Prosecutor v. Radovan Stanković (Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT), Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, 
17 May 2005, paras. 18-19; Prosecutor v. Fulgence Kayishema (Case No. ICTR-01-67-R11bis), Decision on Prosecutor's Request for 
Referral to The Republic of Rwanda, 22 February 2012, para. 1; Prosecutor v. Michel Bagaragaza (Case No. ICTR-05-86-AR11bis), 
Decision on Rule 11 bis Appeal, 30 August 2006, para. 8. 
74 Gabrielle McIntyre, ‘The International Residual Mechanism and the Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda’ GoJIL (2011) 923, 938. 
75 Rule 11 bis (A) of the ICTY RPE refers to the Trial Chamber as Referral Bench; Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović 
(Case No. MICT-15-96-PT), Decision on Simatović Preliminary Motion and Stanišić Motion For Partial Stay,18 April 2016, para. 14. 
76 Gabrielle McIntyre, ‘The International Residual Mechanism and the Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda’ GoJIL (2011) 923, 937. 
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requirements are met. The decision to impose a mandatory obligation on the Residual 
Mechanism ensures that the Residual Mechanism’s work is as limited as possible.  
 Article 6 (3) of the IRMCT Statute is derived from Rule 11bis (C) of the ICTY 
RPE and determines when the definition ‘most senior leader’ is applicable to a person. 
Article 6 (3) as well as Rule 11bis (C) of the ICTY RPE refer to Resolution 1534 (2004) 
and provide that the Trial Chamber considers consistent with Security Council Resolution 
1534 (2004), ‘the gravity of the crimes charged and the level of responsibility of the 
accused’ when determining whether to refer a specific case. The case may be referred to 
the authorities of a state in which the accused was arrested, in whose territory the crime 
was committed, or to the authorities of a state having jurisdiction and being willing and 
properly prepared to conduct the proceedings.77 When determining whether to refer a case 
Rule 11bis (C) of the ICTR RPE provides that a Trial Chamber has to satisfy itself that the 
accused will receive a fair trial and that the death penalty will not be imposed or carried 
out. This provision is found in Rule 11bis (B) of the ICTY RPE and in Article 6 (4) of the 
IRMCT Statute. Pursuant to Article 6 (4) of the IRMCT Statute, the Trial Chamber can 
order a referral at its own discretion or at the request of the Prosecutor. But before this, the 
Trial Chamber has to allow the Prosecutor and the accused to be heard. After being 
satisfied that the accused will receive a fair trial and that the death penalty will not be 
imposed or carried out, the referral is permitted.  
 Another new approach is the abandonment of discretionary monitoring of cases 
referred to national authorities in favour of a mandatory monitoring in Article 6 (5) of the 
IRMCT Statute, which relies upon the assistance of international and regional 
organisations and bodies. Regarding the question of monitoring Rule 11bis (D) (iv) of the 
ICTY RPE and Rule 11bis (D) (iv) of the ICTR RPE provide that the Prosecution ‘may 
send observers to monitor the proceedings’. In addition, two more variations exist. First, 
according to Rule 11bis, the Prosecutor is responsible for monitoring cases, whereas under 
Article 6 (5) of the IRMCT Statute the Trial Chambers has this obligation. The Residual 
Mechanism monitored three cases referred to Rwanda through monitors from the Kenyan 
Section of the International Commission of Jurists.78 In the cases of Jean Uwinkindi and 
Bernard Munyagishari, the question appeared as to which organ of the Residual 
Mechanism has the competence to clarify or grant relief regarding monitoring modalities 
for cases referred for trial by the ICTR.79 According to Article 1 (1) of the IRMCT Statute, 																																																								
77 Article 6 (2) (i)-(iii) of the IRMCT Statute.  
78 Fourth annual report of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, UN Doc. A/71/262–S/2016/669, 1 August 
2016, para. 82. 
79 Prosecutor v. Jean Uwinkindi (Case No. ICTR-2001-75-R11bis), see note 72, para. 12; Prosecutor v. Bernard Munyagishari (Case 
No. ICTR-2005-89-R11bis), see note 98. 
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the Residual Mechanism continues the material, territorial, temporal, and personal 
jurisdiction of the Tribunals as well as the rights and obligations. Article 6 (5) of the 
IRMCT Statute further provides that the Residual Mechanism monitors cases referred to 
national courts by the Tribunals with the assistance of international and regional 
organisations and bodies. But neither the IRMCT Statute nor the IRMCT RPE explicitly 
provides an answer to the question of which organ of the Residual Mechanism possesses 
the authority to clarify or grant relief concerning the monitoring modalities in place for 
cases referred for trial by the Tribunals. However, the Referral and Appeals Chamber in 
the case of Jean Uwinkindi and the Referral Chamber in the case of Bernard Munyagishari 
have recognised the authority of the ICTR President to resolve problems regarding the 
implementation and operation of the monitoring Residual Mechanism. The President may 
direct the ICTR Registrar to make arrangements regarding the monitoring of the referred 
cases.80 According to Article 31 (A) of the IRMCT RPE, the President has the power to 
direct the Registrar concerning the administration and servicing of the Residual 
Mechanism. The Residual Mechanism takes on the rights and obligations of the 
Tribunals.81 Therefore, it falls within the authority of the Residual Mechanism’s President 
to exercise the same authority regarding the implementation and operation of the 
monitoring Residual Mechanism previously exercised by the ICTR President.82 Further, in 
2013 the Residual Mechanism defined the expectations for trial monitors. The trial 
monitors need to present only ‘objective information’ on possible violations of the right to 
a fair trial and ‘refrain from including in their reports any opinion, assessment, or 
conclusions regarding such violations or impediments unless otherwise directed.’83  Hence, 
the Chamber determines whether the accused receives a fair trial and whether a revocation 
of the referral is required.  
 According to Article 6 (6) of the IRMCT Statute, the Residual Mechanism’s Trial 
Chamber may revoke the order at the request of the Prosecutor or proprio motu but only 
under the premise that the state authorities had the opportunity to be heard. According to 
Rule 11bis (F) of the ICTY RPE, after state authorities have had the opportunity to be 
heard the Prosecutor can make a request to revoke an order. Afterwards, the Trial Chamber 
renders its decision on the request, according to Rule 11 bis (F) of the ICTY and ICTR 																																																								
80 Ibid., p. 59; Prosecutor v. Jean Uwinkindi (Case No. ICTR-2001-75-R11bis), Decision on Uwinkindi's Appeal Against the Referral of 
his Case to Rwanda and Related Motions Case, 16 December 2011, para. 84; Prosecutor v. Jean Uwinkindi (Case No. ICTR-2001-75-
R11bis), Decision on Uwinkindi's Motion for Review or Reconsideration of the Decision on Referral to Rwanda and the Related 
Prosecution Motion, 23 February 2012, para. 16; Prosecutor v. Bernard Munyagishari (Case No. ICTR-2005-89-R11bis), Decision on 
the Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of the Case to the Republic of Rwanda, 6 June 2012, para. 55. 
81 Phénéas Munyarugarama v. Prosecutor (Case No. MICT-12-09-AR14), Decision on Appeal Against the Referral of Phénéas 
Munyarugarama's Case to Rwanda and Prosecution Motion to Strike, October 2012, paras. 5-6. 
82 Prosecutor v. Jean Uwinkindi and Bernard Munyagishari (Case No. MICT-12-25, MICT-12-20), Decision on Registrar’s Submission 
Regarding the Monitoring Residual Mechanism in the Uwinkindi and Munyagishari Cases, 15 November 2013, para. 14. 
83 Ibid., para. 29.  
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RPE. In contrast, Rule 11 bis (F) of the ICTR RPE also provides that the Tribunal may 
revoke the order proprio motu. The order of the Tribunals or the Residual Mechanism can 
be revoked and a deferral can be requested where it is clear that the conditions for referral 
of the case are no longer met and it is in the interests of justice. However, this is only 
possible before the accused has been found guilty or acquitted by a national court. In the 
case of Pheneas Munyarugarama, the Appeals Chamber of the Residual Mechanism stated 
that it would adopt the Tribunals’ standards when reviewing a request to revoke. 84 The 
Appeals Chamber of the Residual Mechanism would only intervene if the decisions were 
based on a discernible error.85 Hence, the judges of the Residual Mechanism attempt to 
continue their jurisdiction in accordance with the Tribunals’ jurisprudence. This is 
necessary to ensure the continuity between the Tribunals and the Residual Mechanism. 
Otherwise, all accused persons in the referred cases would attempt to request a revocation 
of the referral in their cases. That would result in a massive workload for the Residual 
Mechanism, jeopardizing the Security Council’s intention to reduce the work of the 
Residual Mechanism as much as possible.  
 
C. Functions of the Residual Mechanism 
According to Article 2 of the IRMCT Statute, the purpose of the Residual Mechanism is to 
carry on the residual functions of the Tribunals.  
 
a. Tracking and Prosecution of the Remaining Fugitives 
When developing the Completion Strategy, the Security Council was faced with the 
problem of how to handle the cases of the remaining fugitives after the closure of the 
Tribunals. On the one hand, there was a need for justice and the Tribunals’ goal to achieve 
the mandate of ending impunity for the most serious breaches of international law. But on 
the other hand, the Tribunals faced a huge financial burden. The important decision in this 
matter was whether the fugitives ought to be tried by a body of an international character 
or instead be referred to domestic courts. When Resolution 1966 (2010) was adopted, two 
remaining fugitives of the ICTY and nine remaining fugitives of the ICTR were still at 
large.  
 The purpose of creating an institution like the Residual Mechanism was to 
guarantee that the Tribunals’ closure would not result in impunity for those persons who 																																																								
84 Phénéas Munyarugarama v. Prosecutor (Case No. MICT-12-09-AR14), see note 81, para. 19. 
85 In order to show that such error appeared the appellant has to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber: ‘misdirected itself either as to the 
legal principle to be applied or as to the law which is relevant to the exercise of its discretion; gave weight to irrelevant considerations; 
failed to give sufficient weight to relevant considerations; made an error as to the facts upon which it has exercised its discretion; or 
reached a decision that was so unreasonable and plainly unjust that the Appeals Chamber is able to infer that the trial chamber must have 
failed to exercise its discretion properly’. 
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were responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law.86 Otherwise, the 
reasoning of the Security Council for creating the ICTY and ICTR would have been in 
vain. This was consistently confirmed by the Security Council and by its state members at 
the IWGIT when negotiating Resolution 1966 (2010).87 On 1 August 2012, the Prosecutor 
of the ICTR transferred the files regarding the remaining high-level fugitives of the ICTR 
to the Prosecutor of the Residual Mechanism.88 The cases of the other six remaining 
fugitives were referred to national authorities in accordance with Rule 11bis of the ICTR 
RPE. On 9 December 2015 Ladislas Ntaganzwa, one of the nine remaining fugitives 
indicted by the ICTR, was apprehended and subsequently transferred to Rwanda for trial.89  
 Article 18 of the IRMCT Statute regarding the commencement and conduct of trial 
proceedings is similar to Article 19 of the ICTR Statue and Article 20 of the ICTY Statute. 
These provisions regulate the rights of the accused to a ‘fair and expeditious trial and that 
proceedings are conducted in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, with 
full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and 
witnesses’.90 But changes regarding the function of the Single Judge can be found in 
Articles 18 (1), (3), and (4) of the IRMCT Statute. According to these provisions, the 
Single Judge is allowed to take over functions that were exclusively reserved for the Trial 
Chamber in the ICTY Statute and ICTR Statute.91 Besides the functions governed by 
Article 18 (3) of the IRMCT Statute, the Single Judge or a judge of the Trial Chamber 
reads the indictment, ensures that the rights of the accused have been respected, confirms 
that the accused understands the indictment, and instructs the accused to enter a plea. After 
this, the date for trial has to be set.92 Article 18 (4) governs the fundamental procedural 
principle of transparency. The hearings have to be in public with the exception that the 
Single Judge or Trial Chamber can decide to close the proceedings in accordance with the 
IRMCT RPE, for example, because of witness protection.  
 Regarding the ICTY, there are no outstanding fugitives charged with serious 
violations of international humanitarian law, since Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić were 
																																																								
86 UN Security Council Resolution1966 (2010), see note 11, preamble. 
87 Catherine Denis, ’Critical Overview of Residual Functions' of the Residual Mechanisms and its Date of Commencement (including 
Transitional Arrangements)’ JICJ 9 (2011) 819, 822; Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2008/47, 19 
December 2008; Statements at the Security Council Meeting, UN Doc. S/PV6342, 18 June 2010, para. 17- 26; Statements at the Security 
Council Meeting, UN Doc. S/PV6463, 22 December 2010, para. 4; Secretary-General’s Report, see note 58, paras. 14-15, 74; Valerie 
Oosterveld, ‘The International Criminal Court and The Closure of the Time-limited International and Hybrid Criminal Tribunals’ Loy. 
U. Chi. Int'l L. Rev. 8 (2010) 13, 15. 
88 Report on the completion of the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda as at 15 November 2015, UN Doc. 
S/2015/884, 17 November 2015, para. 28. 
89 Assessment and progress report of the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Theodor 
Meron, for the period from 16 November 2015 to 15 May 2016, UN Doc. S/2016/453, 17 May 2016, para. 46. 
90 Article 18 (1) of the IRMCT Statute. 
91 Articles 19 (1), (3) and (4) of the ICTR Statute; Article 20 (1), (3) and (4) of the ICTY Statute. 
92 Article 18 (3) of the IRMCT Statute. 
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arrested in 2011.93 All trials will be completed by the ICTY. But when Resolution 1966 
(2010) was adopted, the last two remaining fugitives were still at large, while Mladić is 
one of the most prominent alleged war criminals of the whole conflict in former 
Yugoslavia. The trial of fugitives is a residual function of great importance and is 
determined in the preamble of Resolution 1966 (2010). This residual function includes the 
combat of impunity and 'the necessity that all persons indicted by the ICTY and ICTR are 
brought to justice'.94 Furthermore, Resolution 1966 (2010) reaffirms the need to establish 
an ad hoc Residual Mechanism to carry out a number of essential functions of the ICTY 
and ICTR, including the trial of high-level fugitives.95 This residual function could persist 
for decades depending on the lifespan of the remaining fugitives and the time they remain 
at large. 
 
b. Retrials 
The Appeals Chamber of the Residual Mechanism will order retrials if a new fact is 
discovered that was unknown to the party it concerns during the proceedings.96 The 
Residual Mechanism took over as of the date of the commencement of the relevant 
branch.97 At the Tribunals, retrials were quite rare. On 29 August 2008, for the first time in 
either Tribunal, the Appeals Chamber ordered the retrial of a person accused by the ICTR 
in the case of Tharcisse Muvunyi.98 Further, a partial retrial was ordered in the ICTY case 
of Haradinaj et al. on 21 July 2010.99 On 9 December 2015, the Appeals Chamber of the 
ICTY issued a judgment in the case of Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović, quashing 
their acquittals and ordering a retrial on all counts.100 Currently, a Trial Chamber of the 
Residual Mechanism at The Hague branch is seized of the case.101  
 
c. Appellate Proceedings 
Regarding the rights of appeal, Article 23 of the IRMCT Statute mirrors Article 24 of the 
ICTR Statute and Article 25 of the ICTY Statute and defines the cases where appeals from 																																																								
93 Assessment and report of Judge Carmel Agius, President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, provided to the 
Security Council pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1534 (2004) covering the period from 17 November 2015 to 17 
May 2016, UN Doc. S/2016/454, 17 May 2016, para. 5. 
94 UN Security Council Resolution1966 (2010), see note 11, preamble. 
95 Ibid., para. 6. 
96 Catherine Denis, ’Critical Overview of Residual Functions' of the Residual Mechanisms and its Date of Commencement (including 
Transitional Arrangements)’ JICJ 9 (2011) 819, 824. 
97 Article 1 (2) of the Transitional Arrangements. 
98 Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi (Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-A), Judgement, 1 April 2011. 
99 Ibid.  
100 Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović (Case No. IT-03-69-A), Judgement, 9 December 2015, para. 131; Assessment 
and progress report of the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Theodor Meron, for the 
period from 16 November 2015 to 15 May 2016, UN Doc. S/2016/453, 17 May 2016, paras. 30, 11. 
101 Assessment and progress report of the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Theodor 
Meron, for the period from 16 November 2015 to 15 May 2016, UN Doc. S/2016/453, 17 May 2016, paras. 30, 9; Assessment and 
progress report of the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Theodor Meron, for the period 
from 16 May to 15 November 2016, UN Doc. S/2016/975, 17 November 2016, para. 34. 
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convicted persons or from the Prosecutor have to be heard by the Appeals Chamber. An 
appeal has to be heard when an error or question of law invalidates a decision. In addition, 
an appeal has to be heard if an error of fact has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.102 
Similar to Article 25 (2) of the ICTY Statute and Article 24 (2) of the ICTR Statute, 
Article 23 (2) of the IRMCT Statute empowers the Trial Chamber to affirm, reverse, or 
revise the decisions taken by the Single Judge or the Trial Chamber. The only difference is 
that Article 23 (2) of the IRMCT Statute also applies this competence to decisions taken by 
the Single Judge. 
 On 5 October 2012, the Appeals Chamber of the Residual Mechanism delivered its 
first decision regarding a challenge brought against a decision of the Trial Chamber of the 
ICTR. The Trial Chamber transferred the case of Phénéas Munyarugarama for trial 
proceedings to Rwanda pursuant to Rule 11bis of the ICTR RPE. 103 The Appeals Chamber 
upheld the decision of the ICTR, finding that the counsel of Phénéas Munyarugarama 
failed to disprove the assumption that the judiciary of Rwanda is impartial.104 In reaching 
its decision, the Appeals Chamber determined that the Residual Mechanism is bound to 
interpret its Statute and the IMRCT RPE in a manner consistent with the jurisprudence of 
the Tribunals. Because the Residual Mechanism’s mandate is to continue the jurisdiction, 
obligations, rights, and essential functions of the Tribunals, the IRMCT Statute and the 
IRMCT RPE reflect normative continuity with the Tribunal´s Statute and Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence. According to the Appeals Chambers decision, ‘[t]hese parallels 
are not simply a matter of convenience or efficiency but serve to uphold principles of due 
process and fundamental fairness, which are the cornerstones of international justice.’105 
 On 18 December 2014, the Appeals Chamber issued the first and so far only appeal 
judgement in the case of Augustin Ngirabatware.106 The Appeals Chamber unanimously 
affirmed Ngirabatware’s conviction for direct and public incitement to commit genocide. 
But it held that the Trial Chamber erred in convicting Ngirabatware for rape as a crime 
against humanity pursuing to the extended form of Joint Criminal Enterprise. Therefore, 
the Appeals Chamber reduced Ngirabatware's sentence of 35 years of imprisonment to 30 
years of imprisonment.107 Regarding the ICTR branch of the Residual Mechanism, the 
Appeals Chamber will conduct any appeals that may arise in the cases of the outstanding 
fugitives. 
																																																								
102 Article 23 (1) (a), (b) of the IRMCT Statute; Article 25 (1) (a), (b) of the ICTY Statute; Article 24 (1) (a), (b) of the ICTR Statute. 
103 Phénéas Munyarugarama v. Prosecutor (Case No. MICT-12-09-ARI4), see note 81. 
104 Ibid., para. 24. 
105 Ibid., paras. 4-6. 
106 Augustin Ngirabatware v Prosecutor (Case No. MICT-12-29-A), Appeals Judgement, 18. December 2014. 
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 On 24 March 2016, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY issued its judgment in the case 
of Radovan Karadžić, finding him guilty of genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
violations of the laws or customs of war and sentencing him to 40 years of 
imprisonment.108 Further, on 31 March 2016, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY issued its 
judgment in the case of Vojislav Šešelj, finding him not guilty on all counts. But on 2 May 
2016, the Prosecution filed its notice of appeal with the argument that the Trial Chamber 
erred in law by failing to deliver a reasoned judgment and that it erred in fact by acquitting 
Vojislav Šešelj.109 Therefore, the Prosecution requested that the Appeals Chamber revise 
the trial judgment.110 The translation of the trial judgment together with the related judicial 
opinions is expected by the end of September 2016, sooner than originally envisaged, 
which may have a positive impact on the initial projections for completion of the appeal.111 
Regarding the ICTR branch, Jean Uwinkindi appealed against the decision of the Residual 
Mechanism’s Trial Chamber dismissing his request for revocation of the referral of his 
case to Rwanda on 20 November 2015.112 In March 2016, the briefing concerning the 
substance of his appeal was completed. However, Jean Uwinkindi filed several requests for 
admission of additional evidence regarding the pending briefing. According to the report, it 
is estimated that this matter will be concluded during the next reporting period.113 
 
d. Review Proceedings 
Article 24 of the IRMCT Statute regulates review proceedings and mirrors Article 25 of 
the ICTR Statute and Article 26 of the ICTY Statute. Article 24 provides following:  
‘Where a new fact has been discovered which was not known at the time of the 
proceedings before the Single Judge, Trial Chamber, or Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, the 
ICTR, or the Residual Mechanism and which could have been a decisive factor in reaching 
the decision, the convicted person may submit to the Residual Mechanism an application 
for review of the judgement.’  
Besides the fact that this provision now also includes proceedings before a Single Judge, 
Article 24 of the IRMCT Statute outlines further development regarding the review 
proceedings that are not found in the Statutes of the Tribunals. The first development is 
that the Prosecutor is allowed to submit an application for review of the judgement within 
one year from the day when the final judgement was pronounced. The second development 																																																								
108 Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić (Case No. IT-95-5/18-T), Judgment, 24 March 2016; Assessment and progress report of the 
President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Theodor Meron, for the period from 16 November 
2015 to 15 May 2016, UN Doc. S/2016/453, 17 May 2016, para. 31. 
109 Assessment and progress report of the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Theodor 
Meron, for the period from 16 November 2015 to 15 May 2016, UN Doc. S/2016/453, 17 May 2016, para. 31. 
110 Ibid., para. 32. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid., para. 33. 
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is that the Chamber only reviews the judgement after the majority of judges approve in a 
preliminary examination that the new fact could have been a decisive factor in reaching the 
decision, according to Article 24 of the IRMCT Statute. These two provisions are based 
upon Rules 119 of the ICTY RPE and 120 of the ICTR RPE. According to 119 (A) of the 
ICTY RPE, the Prosecutor can make a motion to the Chamber for review of the judgement, 
if a ‘new fact has been discovered which was not known to the moving party at the time of 
the proceedings before a Trial Chamber or the Appeals Chamber, and could not have been 
discovered through the exercise of due diligence, the defence or, within one year after the 
final judgement has been pronounced.’ It is noticeable that Article 24 of the IRMCT 
Statute is very similar to Article 84 of the Rome Statute. The Security Council intends to 
ensure the integrity of the court on the one hand but also to guarantee the rights of the 
accused on the other hand. 
 Article 24 of the IRMCT Statute differs from the Tribunals’ provisions in the aspect 
that Article 24 does not require the review to be carried out by the same bench that dealt 
with the case in the first instance.114 This requirement would be practically impossible for 
the cases where the Residual Mechanism has to review judgements of the Tribunals. In 
such cases, it is impossible for the same bench to carry out the review, because the bench 
of the Tribunal no longer exists. The Appeals Chamber of the Residual Mechanism was 
faced with decisions or orders on six applications for review or related requests for 
assignment of counsel.115 Further, it is currently seized of an additional application for 
review arising out of an Arusha branch case.116 The President has presided over each case 
and prepared the case for deliberations. At the same time, non-double-hatted judges have 
worked remotely.117  
 
e. Jurisdiction over Contempt Cases 
A new statutory development is found in Article 1 (4) (a) and (b) of the IRMCT Statute, 
which provides the Residual Mechanism with the competence to prosecute crimes of 
contempt and false testimony. Article 1 (4) covers any person who knowingly and wilfully 
interferes or has interfered with the administration of justice of the Residual Mechanism or 
the Tribunals. In the case of the ad hoc Tribunals, the prosecution of such cases was 
governed by the Rules of Procedure and Evidence rather than by the Statutes, which are 
silent on the subject.118 The wording of Article 1 (4) mirrors Rules 77 of the ICTY RPE 																																																								
114 Rule 119 (A) of the ICTY RPE; Rule 120 (A) of the ICTR RPE.  
115 Four for Arusha branch and two for The Hague branch; Report of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals on 
the progress of its work in the initial period, UN Doc. S/2015/896, 20 November 2015, para. 18. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Article 77 of the ICTY RPE, Article 77 of the ICTR RPE. 
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and 91 of the ICTR RPE regarding contempt of the Tribunals and false testimony. While 
the Statutes of the Tribunals did not provide such competence, the judges decided to 
incorporate this power when adopting the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. According to 
the Secretary-General’s report, this function determines an ad hoc function which occurs, 
for example, ‘where a witness before a Chamber wilfully refuses to answer a question or a 
person threatens, intimidates, offers a bribe to, or otherwise interferes with a witness who 
is giving, has given, or is about to give evidence before the Tribunal.’119 An effective 
guarantee of justice requires a judicial capacity to sanction any violation of the Tribunals’ 
orders. One important part of contempt cases consists of proceedings regarding the 
punishment of wilful disclosure of the identity of protected witnesses. This function was 
considered an essential function of the Tribunals that needs to be continued in order to 
guarantee the protection of victims and witnesses and at the same time to ensure the 
integrity of the proceedings of both Tribunals.120 Therefore, although the exercise of 
jurisdiction concerning those offences is not laid out in the Statutes of the Tribunals, it is a 
crucial right of a court to protect the integrity of its own proceedings. Hence, this provision 
is also necessary for the Residual Mechanism to be able to protect the integrity of the 
Tribunals and, therefore, their legacies as well. 
 In contrast to the Tribunals’ Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Statute of the 
Residual Mechanism requires consideration of whether to refer the case to national 
jurisdiction in accordance with Article 6 (1) of the IRMCT Statute, after taking into 
account the interests of justice and expediency, but before hearing the matter itself. This 
amendment appears to be the consequence for the Tribunals’ practice of not referring 
contempt cases to national jurisdictions, despite having the power to do so.121 Transferring 
cases of contempt could have reduced the Tribunals’ workload. Therefore, Article 1 (4) 
obliges the Residual Mechanism to transfer contempt cases to national jurisdictions when 
the requirements are met in order to prevent the Residual Mechanism from taking over the 
Tribunals’ practice.  
 According to the report ‘on the completion of the mandate of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda as at 15 November 2015’, the Tribunal heard claims 
regarding contempt of the Tribunal and false testimony, but these allegations have only led 																																																								
119 Secretary-General’s Report, see note 58, para. 21; H. Brady and J. C. Nemitz, ‘The Offence of Perjury under International Law: The 
False testimony of Witness L’ Humanitäres Völkerrecht (1998) 162, 163; Göran Sluiter, ‘The ICTY and Offences against the 
Administration of Justice’ JICJ 2 (2004) 631, 632. 
120 Secretary-General’s Report, see note 58, para. 23; Guido Acquaviva, ’Best Before the Date Indicated: Residual Mechanisms at the 
ICTY’ in Albertus Henricus Joannes Swart, Alexander Zahar, Göran Sluiter (eds.) The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011), p. 9; Catherine Denis, ’Critical Overview of Residual Functions' of the 
Residual Mechanisms and its Date of Commencement (including Transitional Arrangements)’ JICJ 9 (2011) 819, p. 826. 
121 Prosecutor v. Blagoje Šimić et al. (Case No. IT-95-9-R77), Judgment in the Matter of Contempt Allegations against an Accused and 
his Counsel, 30 June 2000; Prosecutor v. Domagoj Margetić (Case No. IT-95-14-R77.6), Judgement on all Allegations of Contempt, 7 
February 2007; Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski (Case No. It-95-14/1-AR77), Judgement on Appeal by Anto Nobilo against Finding of 
Contempt, 30 May 2001. 
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to a few convictions.122 The ICTY concluded contempt proceedings against 25 persons.123 
According to the report of the Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals on the progress 
of its work in the initial period, the Residual Mechanism has not conducted any trial 
proceedings in cases regarding contempt of court or false testimony allegations. But Single 
Judges have disposed of seven applications for the commencement of such proceedings.124 
Pursuant to the Residual Mechanism’s Statute, a Single Judge is responsible for conducting 
cases regarding contempt of court or false testimony related to cases before the Tribunals 
or the Residual Mechanism. A three-judge bench of the Appeals Chamber of the Residual 
Mechanism will deal with any appeals from such trials, according to Rule 108 of the 
IRMCT RPE. 
 
f. Progress of the Residual Mechanism regarding Judicial Activities 
The Hague branch has commenced its first trial and appeals proceedings arising out of 
cases transferred from the ICTY. One retrial in the case of Jovica Stanišić and Franko 
Simatović is taking place in The Hague. In the case of Jovica Stanišić and Franko 
Simatović, the defence argued before the Residual Mechanism that the Prosecution intends 
to present evidence concerning allegations that should be excluded from the scope of the 
retrial because of the res judicata and non his in idem principles. But these arguments were 
unsuccessful. However, the Trial Chamber concluded that the presentation of new 
evidence at the retrial would prolong the proceedings. According to Article 19 (4) (c) 
IRMCT Statute, the accused has the right to be tried without undue delay. Therefore, the 
Trial Chamber pointed out that the Prosecution could only present evidence at the retrial 
that was already presented during the trial. In addition, the Trial Chamber noted that in 
exceptional circumstances the Prosecution is allowed to present new evidence where it is 
deemed to be in the interests of justice. 125 Further, at The Hague two appeals in the cases 
of Radovan Karadžić and Vojislav Šešelj are taking place. The Office of the Prosecutor 
will conduct appeal proceedings in the cases of Mladić and Hadžić.126 It is anticipated that 
the cases of Karadžić and Šešelj will take approximately three years to complete from the 																																																								
122 Report on the completion of the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda as at 15 November 2015, UN Doc. 
S/2015/884, 17 November 2015, para. 35. 
123 Assessment and report of Judge Carmel Agius, President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, provided to the 
Security Council pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1534 (2004) covering the period from 17 November 2015 to 17 
May 2016, Un Doc. S/2016/454, 17 May 2016, para. 4. 
124 Report of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals on the progress of its work in the initial period, UN Doc. 
S/2015/896, 20 November 2015, para. 25; Assessment and progress report of the President of the International Residual Mechanism for 
Criminal Tribunals, Judge Theodor Meron, for the period from 16 November 2015 to 15 May 2016, UN Doc. S/2016/453, 17 May 2016, 
para. 36. 
125 Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović (Case No. MICT-15-96), Decision on Stanišić’s Request for Stay of Proceedings, 
2 February 2017, paras. 21- 23. 
126 Assessment and progress report of the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Theodor 
Meron, for the period from 16 November 2015 to 15 May 2016, UN Doc. S/2016/453, 17 May 2016, para. 9; Assessment and progress 
report of the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Theodor Meron, for the period from 16 
May to 15 November 2016, UN Doc. S/2016/975, 17 November 2016, para. 34-36. 
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issuance of the trial judgement.127 Regarding the cases of Hadžić and Mladić, it is 
anticipated that it will take two years and two-and-a-half to three years from the issuance 
of the trial judgements to the issuance of the appeal judgements, respectively. The 
timeframe foresees that in each case, approximately two thirds of the projected time for 
completion will be required for the preparation of the case for the appeals hearing. That 
will include adjudication of pre-appeal matters like requests for admission of additional 
evidence. It is anticipated that during that preparatory phase only the presiding judge will 
be required at one of the seats of the Residual Mechanism’s branch to supervise the work 
in the case. The presiding judge is usually the President who also acts as the pre-appeal 
judge. However, the other judges on the bench will work remotely. When the case is ready 
for hearing, the judges will be called to hear the parties and then conduct deliberations. 128 
Augustin Ngirabatware filed a request for review of his judgment in July 2016.129 
However, issues appeared because Judge Aydin Sefa Akay, who is a member of the 
Chamber considering the conviction of Augustin Ngirabatware, had been arrested in 
Turkey. The arrest of Judge Akay in September 2016 is connected to the failed coup in 
July 2016. Although he is entitled to diplomatic immunity, Judge Akay was sentenced to 
seven and a half years’ imprisonment. Therefore, the proceedings in the case of Augustin 
Ngirabatware have remained at a standstill. The Residual Mechanism has referred the 
matter to the Security Council, because it held that Turkey failed to provide cooperation in 
accordance with Article 28 of the IRMCT Statute. But the Security Council has thus far 
refused to intervene in the matter, and Augustin Ngirabatware’s application for temporary 
provisional release failed. The Pre-Review Judge held that he lacks the competence to 
consider the request. 130 In the case of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, the Single Judge ordered 
the appointment of an amicus curiae to investigate allegations of false testimony. And in 
the case of Jean-Paul Akayesu, the Single Judge terminated the proceedings in order to 
investigate possible contempt.131 However, this ad hoc judicial activity is temporary in 
nature. 
 According to the ‘Report of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal 
Tribunals on the progress of its work in the initial period’, the Residual Mechanism is 
planning for the possibility of at least two fugitive trials at the Arusha branch and has 																																																								
127 Assessment and progress report of the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Theodor 
Meron, for the period from 16 November 2015 to 15 May 2016, UN Doc. S/2016/453, 17 May 2016, paras. 3, 31- 32. 
128 Report of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals on the progress of its work in the initial period, UN Doc. 
S/2015/896, 20 November 2015, para. 15. 
129 Assessment and progress report of the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Theodor 
Meron, for the period from 16 May to 15 November 2016, UN Doc. S/2016/975, 17 November 2016, paras. 34-38. 
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budgeted for them.132 Further, the Residual Mechanism continues to ensure that it is 
prepared to conduct appeals when any on-going proceedings at the ICTY result in an 
appeal or retrial.133 According to ‘Assessment and progress report of the President of the 
International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Theodor Meron, for the 
period from 16 November 2015 to 15 May 2016’, because of past experience of trials at 
the Tribunals and the complexity of these cases, it is estimated that each trial may last two-
and-a-half years from arrest until the delivery of the trial judgement.134 Of these two-and-
a-half years, approximately one year would be devoted to pretrial activity, which is mainly 
managed by a pretrial judge. Thus, there will only be the need for involvement of the full 
bench regarding certain key decisions during this phase of the pretrial proceedings. Unlike 
the pretrial or presiding judge, other members of the trial bench, will perform their 
functions remotely for each particular assignment. According to the ‘Report of the 
International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals on the progress of its work in the 
initial period’, the trial, deliberations, and judgement-drafting phase of a case where the 
involvement of the full bench is required could last approximately one-and-a-half years. 
Further, it is estimated that any resulting appeal from judgement would take two more 
years from the filing of the trial judgement to the delivery of the appeal judgement. 
According to the report, it is estimated that one month of pretrial activity and one month of 
trial activity at the Residual Mechanism will generate savings in judicial expenses of 
approximately one third of the cost at the Tribunal. 135  According to the Residual 
Mechanism’s report ‘on the progress of its work in the initial period’, it is estimated that 
the Residual Mechanism would receive six requests for review per biennium. However, if 
a review is authorised, it is estimated that the proceedings will last one year from the filing 
of the initial request for review to the issuance of the review judgement.136 Retrials ordered 
by the Appeals Chambers of the Residual Mechanism or by the Tribunals will require less 
time than full-scale trial proceedings. The reason is that the scope of a retrial is defined on 
a case-by-case basis and is usually limited to certain specific allegations or issues to be 
adjudicated at first instance.137  
 In accordance with Resolution 1966 (2010), the responsibility for tracking the 
remaining fugitives indicted by the ICTR was transferred to the Residual Mechanism on 1 
July 2012. The Security Council required all states, especially those where fugitives are 																																																								
132 Report of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals on the progress of its work in the initial period, UN Doc. 
S/2015/896, 20 November 2015, para. 20. 
133 Assessment and progress report of the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Theodor 
Meron, for the period from 16 November 2015 to 15 May 2016, UN Doc. S/2016/453, 17 May 2016, para. 47. 
134 Ibid.  
135 Report of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals on the progress of its work in the initial period, UN Doc. 
S/2015/896, 20 November 2015, para. 20. 
136 Ibid., para. 18. 
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suspected to be at large, to enhance cooperation with and render all necessary assistance to 
the Residual Mechanism in order to aid in the arrest and surrender of all remaining 
fugitives.138 On 9 December 2015, Ladislas Ntaganzwa, one of the remaining fugitives 
indicted by the ICTR, was apprehended by authorities of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo acting on an international arrest warrant issued by the Residual Mechanism.139 On 
20 March, officials of the Residual Mechanism’s Registry facilitated the transfer of 
Ladislas Ntaganzwa to the custody of Rwanda, according to Rule 59 (B) of the IRMCT 
RPE, because the case of the fugitive was referred to Rwanda pursuant to Rule 11bis of the 
ICTR RPE. 140  In his report the Prosecutor points out the positive assistance and 
cooperation provided by the Democratic Republic of the Congo.141 Three of the remaining 
fugitives fall within the jurisdiction of the Residual Mechanism: Félicien Kabuga, 
Augustin Bizimana, and Protais Mpiranya. However, the Office of the Prosecutor 
continues to search for information on the whereabouts of the other ICTR fugitives as 
well.142 The cases of the other five fugitives have been referred to Rwanda. The assessment 
and progress report of the President of the Residual Mechanism, Judge Theodor Meron, for 
the period from 16 November 2015 to 15 May 2016 points out that the arrest and 
prosecution of those remaining fugitives is a top priority for the Residual Mechanism.143 
The Office of the Prosecutor of the Residual Mechanism is working on reviewing existing 
leads regarding the whereabouts of the remaining fugitives to determine whether they 
should be further pursued or closed.144 The Prosecutor notes that state cooperation is 
essential to successfully track and arrest the remaining fugitives.145 In particular, the Office 
of the Prosecutor depends on the cooperation of state authorities to conduct arrest 
operations. In the second half of 2016, the Prosecutor and staff visited relevant African and 
European states in order to discuss further support for the Office’s efforts to track fugitives 
and strengthen cooperation in conducting arrests. But the Office of the Prosecutor points 
out that incentives as well as potential sanctions are important in order to ensure 
cooperation. 146 Therefore, the Office of the Prosecutor also relies on the international 
community to provide incentives for states to cooperate. 
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g. Protection of Victims and Witnesses 
The residual function regarding the continued protection of victims and witnesses is very 
important. Article 20 of the IRMCT Statute governs the protection of victims and 
witnesses and is a reproduction of Article 22 of the ICTY Statute and Article 21 of the 
ICTR Statute. According to this provision, since the Commencement Date of each branch, 
the Residual Mechanism has to provide protection for victims and witnesses of the 
Tribunals as well as the Residual Mechanism. The protective measures include 
pseudonyms, facial and voice distortion of their recorded testimony, private and closed 
court sessions, as well as relocation of the most at-risk witnesses, sometimes even to third 
countries. In addition, the implementation of protective orders involves ‘keeping track of 
protected witnesses and informing them, where necessary, of the release of convicted 
persons in whose cases they have testified; providing a contact point for protected 
witnesses who wish to have their protective measures amended or who need additional 
support; and maintaining cooperation with States where protected witnesses have been 
relocated.’147 The Office of the Prosecutor is also able to implement protective measures in 
order to support the investigations and the prosecution at trial.148  
 The protective measures ordered in proceedings before the Tribunals continue to 
have effect in any other proceedings before the Residual Mechanism or another 
jurisdiction unless the measures are rescinded, varied, or augmented.149 For instance, if an 
accused person in other proceedings needs access to relevant information for his or her 
defence, it will be necessary to vary the protective order. This also applies when a party 
needs access to information relevant to its case in national proceedings or national 
immigration authorities need access to information that are relevant to asylum or 
immigration requests of a protected witness. According to Rule 86 (H) of the IRMCT RPE, 
victims, witnesses, and judges in other jurisdictions can directly petition the Residual 
Mechanism for variation of protective measures ordered by the Tribunals or the Residual 
Mechanism.
 
But an important aspect of this procedure is that the rescission, variation, or 
augmentation of protective measures can only be ordered when the victim or witness gives 
his or her consent.150 That provision is similar to Rule 75 (H) of the ICTY RPE and Rule 
75 (H) of the ICTR RPE and is essential for the Residual Mechanism to allow national 
authorities to continue using confidential documents under the control of an international 
institution. After the closing of the Tribunals this activity requires at least some judicial 																																																								
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authority for the case that protective measures need to be varied. The Residual Mechanism 
is necessary to keep track of the various protective measures ordered by the Tribunals. 
 The Tribunals made the necessary arrangements to ensure a transition of victims 
and witness protection functions to the Residual Mechanism for all completed cases of the 
Tribunals.151 In the case of a trial or referral proceeding that has to be completed by one of 
the Tribunals in accordance with Article 1 of the Transitional Arrangements, the Tribunal 
remains competent to provide for the protection of victims and witnesses connected to that 
case until its completion. 152  According to the report of the Residual Mechanism’s 
President, the Witness Support and Protection Unit have been fully operational since the 
Commencement Date of each branch. It offers protection for thousands of witnesses who 
testified before the Tribunals. The great majority of the Tribunals’ witnesses enjoy 
protection.153 According to the report, the Unit ensures that the witnesses receive the same 
standards of protection that were previously offered by the Tribunals.154 At the Arusha 
branch, the Residual Mechanism also provides medical and psychosocial care to victims 
and witnesses residing in Rwanda, including specialised care for witnesses who were 
victims of sexual violence during the Rwandan genocide.155 Both branches are working on 
the implementation of a pilot study on the long-term impact that testifying before the 
Tribunals may have on witnesses.156 Additionally, the Residual Mechanism is establishing 
a common information technology platform for their respective witness databases as part 
of the maintenance of records connected to witnesses received from the Tribunals.157  
 According to the ‘Report of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal 
Tribunals on the progress of its work in the initial period’ dated 20 November 2015, it is 
expected that victim and witness protection will continue to be required in the future, 
because many judicial protection orders will remain in force unless rescinded or waived.158 
Therefore, the issuance of witness protection orders by a Chamber constitutes an ad hoc 
judicial function, but the implementation of witness protection is an on-going 
administrative function for the Registry. 159  The great majority of the Tribunals’ witnesses 
enjoy protection. By May 2009, more than 1,400 ICTY witnesses and 2,300 ICTR 
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witnesses were subject to protective orders. 160  The Tribunals have highlighted that 
adequate monitoring and protection of victims and witnesses is essential to ensure their 
continued participation in future proceedings of the Tribunals and the Residual 
Mechanism. Moreover, the urgency of this task stems from the fact that witness and victim 
protection is crucial for maintaining public confidence in the international criminal justice 
system.161 
 
h. Sentence Enforcement 
Article 25 of the IRMCT Statute regulates sentence enforcement and provides that 
imprisonment has to be served in a state designated by the Residual Mechanism from a list 
of states with which the UN has agreements for this purpose. In addition, the imprisonment 
must be in accordance with the applicable law of the state concerned and furthermore 
subject to the supervision of the Residual Mechanism.162 The process of enforcement 
remains the same as under the Tribunals Statutes. Hence, Article 25 (1) of the IRMCT 
Statute mirrors Articles 27 of the ICTY Statute and 26 of the ICTR Statute, respectively. 
However, Article 25 (2) of the IRMCT Statute is different in two aspects. First, Article 25 
(2) of the IRMCT Statute determines a new provision that empowers the Residual 
Mechanism with supervision over the enforcement of sentences pronounced by the ICTY, 
the ICTR, or the Residual Mechanism. Hence, it allows the Residual Mechanism to 
supervise the enforcement of sentences pronounced by the Residual Mechanism and by the 
Tribunals. In several cases the question appeared of whether persons convicted and 
sentenced by the Tribunals should be considered ‘similarly-situated’ to persons convicted 
and sentenced by the Residual Mechanism for purposes of early release determinations.163 
It was ruled that all prisoners supervised by the Residual Mechanism should be treated 
equally.164 Therefore, in the interests of equal treatment of all convicts supervised by the 																																																								
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Residual Mechanism, the relevant practice of the Tribunals needs to be uniformly applied 
to all prisoners supervised by the Residual Mechanism. Second, it gives the Residual 
Mechanism the authority to supervise ‘implementation of sentence enforcement 
agreements earlier entered into by the United Nations with Member States and other 
agreements with international and regional organisations and other appropriate 
organisations and bodies’. 165  
 Article 26 of the IRMCT Statute governs the pardon or commutation of sentences 
and mirrors the Articles 28 of the ICTY Statute and 27 of the ICTR Statute. According to 
this provision, a person convicted by the Tribunals or the Residual Mechanism is eligible 
for a pardon or commutation of the sentence if the applicable law of the state, in which the 
person is imprisoned, allows it. But the concerned state has to notify the Residual 
Mechanism immediately. However, there may only be pardon or commutation of sentence 
if the President of the Residual Mechanism agrees to it based on the interests of justice and 
the general principles of law. Compared to Articles 28 of the ICTY Statute and 27 of the 
ICTR Statute, there are two minor differences: pursuant to Article 26 of the IRMCT 
Statute, the states have to notify the Residual Mechanism instead of the Tribunals in the 
case that a convicted person is eligible for pardon or commutation of sentence; and second, 
whereas pursuant to the Tribunals’ Statutes the President determines the case in 
consultation with the judges, under the Statute of the Residual Mechanism the President 
decides the case alone. Rule 149 of the IRMCT RPE echoes Article 26 of the IRMCT 
Statute and provides that the enforcing state shall notify the Residual Mechanism in the 
case of a convicted person's eligibility under the enforcing state's laws ‘for pardon, 
commutation of sentence, or early release’. Rule 150 of the IRMCT RPE provides that 
upon such notice the President of the Residual Mechanism determines, after consulting any 
judge of the sentencing chamber, whether pardon, commutation of sentence, or early 
release is appropriate. Rule 151 of the IRMCT RPE provides that in making a 
determination on pardon, commutation of sentence, or early release, the President of the 
Residual Mechanism needs to consider, for example, the gravity of the crime for which the 
prisoner was convicted, the prisoner's demonstration of rehabilitation, the past treatment of 
similarly-situated prisoners, and any cooperation with the Prosecution.166 For example, in 
the case of Oded Ruzindana it was considered that upon the completion of two-thirds of 																																																																																																																																																																							
13-60-ES), Decsion of the President on Sentence Permission of Milomir Stakić Public Redacted Version, 17 March 2014, paras. 17-18; 
Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić (Case No. MICT-14-83-ES), Public Redacted Decision of the President on the Early Release of Stanilsav 
Galić, 18 January 2017, paras. 19- 23. 
165 Article 25 (2) of the IRMCT Statute. 
166 Prosecutor v. Paul Bisengimana (Case No. MICT-12-07), see note 163, para. 10; Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir (Case No. MICT-15-
95-ES), Public Redacted Version of the ‘Decision on Motion for Provisional Release Filed’ on 28 January 2016, 23 February 2016, para. 
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the sentence, all convicted persons supervised by the Residual Mechanism are eligible for 
early release.167 The two-thirds practice was implemented by the ICTY but applies to all 
prisoners within the jurisdiction of the Residual Mechanism because of the need for equal 
treatment. However, the convicted person is merely eligible to apply for early release and 
is not entitled to. The President of the Residual Mechanism decides on such cases as a 
matter of discretion after considering the totality of the circumstances.168 
 When an accused person seems not to be eligible for release during the pretrial 
phase, trial, and appellate proceedings, the accused will be kept in the custody of the 
Residual Mechanism. However, once the final judgement is delivered, the convicted 
person will be transferred to a state chosen from a list of states that accept convicted 
persons.169 The list consists of states that have concluded agreements to this effect or have 
indicated their willingness to accept convicted persons. Thus, persons convicted by the 
Residual Mechanism do not serve their sentences in the detention facilities of the Residual 
Mechanism but in one of the countries that has signed an agreement on enforcement of 
sentences. 170  The Residual Mechanism relies on the cooperation of states for the 
enforcement of sentences. The sentences are served within the territory of member states 
of the UN, which concluded enforcement-of-sentence agreements or were willing to accept 
convicted persons under any other arrangement. The agreements concluded by the UN for 
the two Tribunals remain in force for the Residual Mechanism. A new agreement between 
the UN and the Government of Mali was signed on 13 May 2016, providing for the 
enforcement of sentences pronounced by either the Residual Mechanism or the ICTR. 
However, this agreement was the first agreement entered into force since the 
commencement of the Residual Mechanism. The Residual Mechanism continues its efforts 
to secure additional agreements to increase its enforcement capacity for both branches.171  
 As of 1 July 2012 for ICTR cases and 1 July 2013 for ICTY cases, the Residual 
Mechanism has the jurisdiction to designate enforcement states, including for persons who 
have been convicted thereafter by the two Tribunals. Since the transfer of this function on 
1 October 2015, the Residual Mechanism has managed and operated the UN Detention 
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Facility in Arusha.172 The Arusha branch is supervising the enforcement of 23 sentences 
either in Benin (10) or Mali (13).173 Further, ten convicted individuals are at the UN 
Detention Facility in Arusha awaiting transfer to an enforcement state. Regarding The 
Hague branch, the Residual Mechanism relies on the provision of detention services by the 
ICTY at the UN Detention Unit.174 The Hague branch is supervising the enforcement of 17 
convicted persons in nine states. The sentences are being served in Denmark (1), Estonia 
(3), Finland (2), France (1), Germany (5), Italy (1), Norway (1), Poland (2) and Sweden 
(1). 175  The Registry of the Residual Mechanism continues to implement existing 
enforcement agreements, and amends the agreements if necessary.  
 The Residual Mechanism engaged the services of an independent expert in prison 
management in November 2012 to assess the needs of the prisons in Benin and Mali that 
are enforcing sentences of the ICTR and to develop context-based recommendations. The 
Residual Mechanism continues to make steady progress in Mali on implementing the 
recommendations of the independent prison management expert.176 According to the first 
annual report, the Residual Mechanism has regularly asked for advice from the Department 
of Safety and Security and the designated official in Mali relating the security situation in 
Mali.177  
 
i. Cooperation and Judicial Assistance 
Article 28 (1) of the IRMCT Statute governs the judicial assistance and cooperation of 
states and provides that states have to work with the Residual Mechanism in the 
investigation and prosecution of persons covered by Article 1 of the IRMCT Statute. 
Hence, in contrast to the Tribunals’ Statutes, Article 1 (4) of the IRMCT Statute includes 
the crimes of contempt and false testimony, which were not previously the subject of 
mandatory cooperation.178 Further, states have to cooperate with the Residual Mechanism 
without undue delay regarding any request for assistance or an order issued by a Single 
Judge or Trial Chamber. Assistance includes but is not limited to identifying and locating 
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persons, taking testimony and producing evidence, the service of documents, arresting of 
persons, and the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the Residual Mechanism.179 
 A further development is outlined in Article 28 (3) of the IRMCT Statute, which 
includes an on-going residual function. Article 28 (3) obliges the Residual Mechanism to 
respond to requests for assistance from national authorities regarding the prosecution and 
trial of those responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law in the 
affected areas. This includes providing assistance in tracking fugitives whose cases have 
been referred to national authorities by the Tribunals or the Residual Mechanism. Article 
28 (3) of the IRMCT Statute provides an example of the codification of Tribunal practice. 
It is an obligation on the Residual Mechanism to work with the national authorities. In 
contrast, the Tribunals’ Statutes do not contain such provisions, but it has been the practice 
of the Tribunals and the Prosecutor to respond requests from national authorities.180 Before 
the amendments to the ICTY RPE, when assistance was requested, the Prosecutor would 
petition the Chamber for access on behalf of the relevant national authority.181 As part of 
the Completion Strategy and because of the transfer of the cases to national jurisdiction, 
pursuant to Rule 11bis of the ICTY RPE the judges of the ICTY initiated amendments to 
the ICTY RPE, which provided national jurisdictions with the following: first, to request 
assistance from the Tribunal in obtaining testimony from persons in the custody of the 
Tribunal in accordance with Rule 75bis of the ICTY RPE, and second, to request the 
transfer of individuals in order to give evidence in other jurisdictions according to Rule 
75ter of the ICTY RPE. However, although these Rules have no basis in the ICTY Statute, 
they were created according to the mandate conferred by the Security Council upon the 
ICTY, through Resolution 1503 (2003) and Resolution 1534 (2004), in order to help the 
national jurisdiction build its capacity.182 This obligates the Residual Mechanism to 
provide judicial assistance to states in criminal matters. It ‘essentially mirrors typical 
bilateral or multilateral arrangements on judicial assistance between States’.183  
 Assisting national authorities was an important element of the Tribunals’ work. 
Each Office of the Prosecutor responded regularly to requests for assistance from national 
prosecutors, national immigration authorities, and UN agencies, as the Tribunals moved 																																																								
179 Article 28 (2) of the IRMCT Statute. 
180 Report on the Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 2011, UN Doc. S/2011/316, 
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181 Gabrielle McIntyre, ‘The International Residual Mechanism and the Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda’ GoJIL (2011) 923, 943. 
182 UN Security Council Resolution 1503 (2003), see note 31, para. 1; UN Security Council Resolution 1534 (2004), see note 59, para 9. 
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Yugoslavia and Rwanda’ GoJIL (2011) 923, 944. 
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105	
towards completion.184 The Residual Mechanism receives requests regarding domestic 
proceedings concerning individuals allegedly implicated in the genocide in Rwanda or the 
conflicts in former Yugoslavia. The requests include the decision of the Office of the 
Prosecutor as to whether confidential documents may be disclosed.185 Article 28 (3) of the 
IRMCT Statute specifies that the Residual Mechanism shall provide ‘assistance in tracking 
fugitives whose cases have been referred to national authorities by the ICTY, the ICTR, or 
the Residual Mechanism.’ This function will involve an important workload for the Office 
of the Prosecutor because there are still suspects who potentially could be prosecuted 
before national jurisdictions as well as fugitives of the ICTR.  
 Comprehensive information and guidance for those who wish to request assistance 
are available on the Residual Mechanism’s website.186 Thanks to their investigative 
activities, the Office of the Prosecutor of each Tribunal has not only gathered a large 
amount of evidentiary material, but has provided material and know-how to national 
authorities.187 According to the Secretary-General’s report, the Tribunals considered this 
on-going function essential to ensure the ability of the national jurisdictions to conduct the 
trials of persons who were not subject to proceedings before the Tribunals.188 Since 1 July 
2012 for requests to the ICTR and 1 July 2013 for requests to the ICTY, the Residual 
Mechanism has responded to requests for assistance from national authorities regarding 
national investigations, prosecutions, and trials.189 But the Residual Mechanism not only 
responds to requests for assistance from Rwanda and former Yugoslavia. This residual 
function comprises the provision of assistance to national jurisdictions trying related 
proceedings. This includes responding to requests for evidence, transferring dossiers, 
sending requests to question detained persons, and ordering the variation or rescission of 
protective measures for victims and witnesses.  
 The Tribunals have collected more than 10 million pages of documents and 
statements, as well as thousands of audio recordings, video recordings, electronic records 
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and artefacts.190 This collection of records contains evidence of many crimes that were not 
prosecuted by the Tribunals and is of unique importance to national and international 
authorities. Between 1 July 2012 and October 2015, the Office of the Prosecutor dealt with 
over 850 requests for assistance from 15 countries and international organisations.191 
Hence, due to the high number of requests for assistance, The Hague branch continued to 
employ staff members on a temporary contract to assist in responding to requests for 
assistance.192 According to the President’s report, although some national authorities have 
online access to parts of the records and the Office of the Prosecutor has streamlined the 
processing of requests for assistance, the handling of such requests remains work 
intensive.193 However, the Office of the Prosecutor also provides other forms of assistance, 
such as facilitating access to prosecution witnesses in order to get their consent for the 
variation of protective measures. But the Registry also has received and responded to over 
250 requests for assistance by national authorities or parties to national proceedings related 
to the genocide in Rwanda or the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.194  
 In comparison with other functions, this type of activity seems to have a relatively 
short time frame and will eventually merge with the management of the archives that is 
discussed below. It is expected that these activities will continue for a considerable time. 
More recently, the Office has received other kinds of requests for assistance, such as 
requests to monitor proceedings in Rwanda with regard to genocide-related cases in which 
the accused have been extradited to Rwanda from other countries. 195While the Office 
cannot provide such assistance outside its mandate, this example nevertheless indicates the 
increasing number and variety of requests for assistance that it is called upon to provide. 
Therefore, the Residual Mechanism has the important task of monitoring the referred cases 
but also provides information regarding other related proceedings without risking the 
safety of victims and witnesses. Although the national authorities’ need for help in the 
affected countries will decrease over the time, the Residual Mechanism will be able to give 
advice regarding future proceedings related to war crimes and the violation of human 
rights.  
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D. Rights of the Accused 
All of the fair trial rights accorded to accused persons under the IRMCT Statute are 
derived from the Statutes of the Tribunals. Analogous to Article 9 of the ICTR Statute and 
Article 10 of the ICTY Statute, the legal principle non bis in idem is found in Article 7 of 
the IRMCT Statute. This principle provides that if a person has already been tried before 
the Tribunals or the Residual Mechanism for acts constituting serious violations of 
international humanitarian law, they shall not be tried before a national court for the same 
act. Paragraph (2) regulates the exception to this. Pursuant to Article 7 (2) of the IRMCT 
Statute, an individual covered by Article 1 of the IRMCT Statute who was tried before a 
national court for acts regarding serious violations of international humanitarian law can 
still be tried by the Residual Mechanism in that case the act for which the individual was 
tried, was characterised as an ordinary crime or ‘the national court proceedings were not 
impartial or independent, were designed to shield the accused from international criminal 
responsibility, or the case was not diligently prosecuted’.196 But when deciding on the 
penalty for a crime under the IRMCT Statute, the Residual Mechanism has to take into 
consideration any penalty already imposed by a national court on the same individual for 
the same act.197 In the case of Jean Uwinkindi, the Appeals Chamber made clear that 
Article 7 (1) of the IRMCT Statute expressly refers to acts on the basis of which the person 
was tried. A final judgment needs to be rendered. Therefore, Article 7 (1) does not prohibit 
subsequent prosecutions in national jurisdictions where the final judgement was not 
rendered.198 
 Article 19 of the IRMCT Statute covers the fair trial rights that are guaranteed to 
accused persons and is a copy of the Article 21 of the ICTY Statute and Article 20 of the 
ICTR Statute.199 The only difference is the gender-neutral language in the IRMCT Statute. 
According to Article 19 (1) of the IRMCT Statute, all persons shall be treated equally by 
the Residual Mechanism. The accused is entitled to a fair and public hearing before 
charges are determined.200 The principle of the presumption of innocence is set forth in 
Article 19 (3) of the IRMCT Statute. Further, Article 19 (4) of the IRMCT Statute 
enumerates the minimum guarantees to which the accused is entitled and which are granted 
in full equality:201 
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(a) The accused has to be informed immediately in detail in a language, which he 
understands, of the nature and cause of the charges against him. 
(b) The accused must have sufficient time and facilities to prepare his defence and he has to 
be able to communicate with the counsel of his own choice.  
(c) The accused has to be tried without undue delay. 
(d) The accused has to be tried in his or her presence and has to be allowed to defend 
himself in person or through a legal assistance of his own choice. The accused must be 
informed in the case he does not have legal assistance. Also the accused has the right to 
have legal assistance assigned to him, in the case where the interests of justice require it 
and without payment by him or her in such case if he or her is not able to afford the 
legal assistance.  
(e) The accused has the right to examine the witnesses against him and to obtain the 
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as 
witnesses against him. 
(f) The accused shall have a free assistance of an interpreter if he does not understand or 
speak the language used in the IRMCT. 
(g) The accused cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself or to confess guilt.  
 In her case, Florence Hartmann requested legal aid regarding the remuneration of 
her counsel. The counsel is to provide assistance concerning her arrest and detention.202 
According to Article 19 (4) (d) of the IRMCT Statute, the accused is entitled to have legal 
assistance even if they are unable to pay for it.  
But in the case of Florence Hartmann the question appeared, as to whether the Residual 
Mechanism is required to provide legal aid in cases where a final judgement has already 
been issued. The Appeals Chamber of the Residual Mechanism held that only in 
exceptional circumstances is a convicted person entitled to legal assistance at the expense 
of the Residual Mechanism after a final judgement has been rendered.203 The Residual 
Mechanism is not obliged to assist with any new investigation the accused person would 
like to conduct or any new motion he or she may wish to bring by assigning the accused 
legal assistance at the expense of the Residual Mechanism.204 The Statutes of the Tribunals 
and the IRMCT Statute do not provide for assignment of counsel to convicted persons 
following the issuance of final judgements against them. Article 19 of the IRMCT Statute 
concerns accused persons, and Hartmann is no longer an accused person because the 																																																								
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appeal judgement was already issued. Hartman’s argument that general human rights law 
guarantees a right of paid representation regardless of the stage of the proceedings 
concerned was held as ill founded.205 Further, Hartmann argued that the absence of a clear 
legal system regarding legal aid in post-conviction situations means that there is no 
adequate legal certainty. This would constitute a serious interference with the rights 
guaranteed under the IRMCT Statute.206 That argument was held as unpersuasive, because 
Article 19 of the IRMCT Statute concerns accused persons.207 However, in the case of 
Florence Hartmann, exceptional circumstances existed warranting a limited grant of legal 
assistance in the interests of justice. The exceptional circumstances applied in that case 
because of the urgent and unusual nature of the proceeding, including the length of 
Hartmann's sentence, and her request for early release.208 As the Residual Mechanism 
needs to be cost efficient, it is necessary to examine whether legal aid is required in each 
particular case. But in any event, the convicted person needs to be able to make effective 
use of further available remedies. Otherwise, the rights of the convicted person would be 
jeopardized. However, the possibility to grant legal aid in the interests of justice in cases 
where exceptional circumstances exist is adequate to ensure the rights of convicted 
persons.  
 
E. Penalty 
Besides the Trial Chamber, according to Article 21 (1) of the IRMCT Statute, the Single 
Judge is allowed to pronounce the judgement and impose the sentence and penalty on a 
person covered by Article 1 of the IRMCT Statute, who is convicted by the Residual 
Mechanism.209 In addition, all the judgements have to be delivered in public and have to be 
accompanied by a reasoned opinion in writing. Similar to the Tribunals’ Statutes, the 
judgement by a Chamber has to be rendered by a majority of the judges, to which separate 
or dissenting opinions may be appended.210  
 Article 22 of the IRMCT Statute limits penalties to imprisonment for persons 
covered by Article 1 (2) and (3) of the IRMCT Statute. Further, the penalty imposed on 
persons who are convicted for crimes of contempt or false testimony should not exceed 
seven years. However, the maximum penalty for contempt under Article 77 (G) of the 
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ICTY RPE is seven years’ imprisonment or a 10 000 EUR fine or both, and under Article 
77 (G) of the ICTR RPE is five years or 10 000 USD fine or both.  
 
F. Administrative Provisions 
Article 29 of the IRMCT Statute covers the privileges, status, and immunities of the 
Residual Mechanism. The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN of 13 
February 1946 applies to the Residual Mechanism, the archives of the Residual 
Mechanism and the Tribunals, the judges, the Prosecutor and the Registrar, and their staff. 
According to Article 29 (2) of the IRMCT Statute, the Prosecutor, the President, and the 
Registrar have the same immunities, privileges, exemptions, and facilities as diplomatic 
envoys. And the Residual Mechanism’s judges enjoy the same immunities, privileges, 
exemptions, and facilities when working for the Residual Mechanism. Although the judges 
do not serve full-time, they enjoy the same privileges, immunities, exemptions, and 
facilities when they are engaged in the business of the Residual Mechanism.211 In addition, 
the staff of the Registrar and the Prosecutor have the same immunities and privileges 
accorded to officials of the UN, according to Articles V and VII of the Convention referred 
to in Article 29 (1) of the IRMCT Statute.212 Article 29 (4) of the IRMCT Statute 
determines the privileges and immunities applicable to the defence counsel. He or she 
enjoys the same immunities and privileges as are accorded to experts on mission for the 
UN, pursuant to Article VI, Section 22, paragraphs (a) to (c), and Section 23 of the 
Convention referred to in Article 29 (1) of the IRMCT Statute. This applies when the 
Defence counsel holds a certificate certifying that the Residual Mechanism has admitted 
him or her as counsel. The defence counsel has the duty to respect the regulations and laws 
of the receiving state. Finally, according to paragraph 5, other persons required at the seats 
of the Residual Mechanism also have to be accorded such treatment, as this is necessary 
for the Residual Mechanism to work properly.  
 Regarding the expenses of the Residual Mechanism, Article 30 of the IRMCT 
Statute provides that the expenses are expenses of the organisation in accordance with 
Article 17 of the UN Charter. According to Article 31 of the IRMCT Statute and Rule 2 
(A) of the IRMCT RPE, the working languages of the Residual Mechanism are English 
and French. Article 30 and Article 31 of the IRMCT Statute are equivalent with the 
Tribunals’ provisions.213 
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 Finally, pursuant to Article 32 of the Residual Mechanism, the President of the 
Residual Mechanism must submit an annual report on the Residual Mechanism to the 
Security Council and the General Assembly. In addition, the President and Prosecutor of 
the Residual Mechanism have a semi-annual reporting obligation to the Security Council, 
which was not previously set forth in the ICTY or ICTR Statutes. However, the Tribunals 
have the obligations to submit an annual report, and a semi-annual completion strategy 
report to the Security Council pursuant to Resolution 1534 (2004).214  
 
3. Transitional Arrangements – Annex 2 
According to the operative clauses of Resolution 1966, the provisions of the IRMCT 
Statute, the ICTY Statute and ICTR Statute are subject to the Transitional Arrangements 
set out in Annex 2 to Resolution 1966.215 The aim of the Transitional Arrangements is to 
ensure a smooth transition of main functions from the Tribunals to the Residual 
Mechanism.216 Decisions made by a Trial or Appeals Chamber of the Tribunals while 
properly seized of the matter and prior to the Commencement Date retain their validity 
before the Residual Mechanism.217 
 
A. Trial Proceedings 
Article 1 (1) of the Transitional Arrangements provides that as of the Commencement Date 
of each branch of the Residual Mechanism, the Tribunals have the competence to complete 
all trial or referral proceedings pending before them. In addition, the Tribunals have the 
power to conduct and complete trial proceedings or to refer the case to the national 
jurisdiction as appropriate ‘if the fugitive is arrested more than 12 months, or if a retrial is 
ordered by the Appeals Chamber more than 6 months prior to the start of the Residual 
Mechanism’.218 If a person indicted by the Tribunals is arrested 12 months or less prior to 
the start, or if a retrial is ordered 6 months or less prior to the commencement of the 
respective branch of the Residual Mechanism, the Tribunals only have the power to 
prepare the trial or to refer the case to national authorities.219 Although the function of 
post-closure trials is the most complex for the Residual Mechanism to manage, it is of 																																																								
214 UN Security Council Resolution 1534 (2004), see note 59, para. 6; Fourth annual report of the International Residual Mechanism for 
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Criminal Tribunals, UN Doc. A/70/225 S/2015/586, 31 July 2015; Second annual report of the International Residual Mechanism for 
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crucial importance. The function of trial involves all organs, including the Chambers, the 
Registry, the Office of the Prosecutor, and the Defence Counsel. It also involves 
cooperation with states in order to ensure access to witnesses and evidence.220 
 The Residual Mechanism has the competence to try any person accused by the 
ICTY arrested on or after 1 July 2013 and any person accused by the ICTR arrested on or 
after 1 July 2012.221 The jurisdictional competence of the Residual Mechanism depends on 
the date by which the accused is arrested. Because the arrests of the ICTY’s last remaining 
fugitives Goran Hadžić, arrested on 20 July 2011, and Ratko Mladić, arrested on 26 May 
2011, took place more than 12 months prior to the start of the Residual Mechanism, the 
ICTY still has the competence to conduct and complete the trials.222 Therefore, the 
President of the Residual Mechanism decided in the case of Ratko Mladić that according to 
Article 1 (1) of the Transitional Arrangements the ICTY has the power to complete all trial 
and referral proceedings pending before the ICTY. That also includes corollary 
interlocutory matters that arise during and are related to those proceedings, as in the case 
of Ratko Mladić with the disqualification of an ICTY judge.223 
 According to Article 1 (3) of the Transitional Arrangements, in the case a fugitive 
indicted by the Tribunals is arrested 12 months or less prior to the Commencement Date of 
the respective branch, the Tribunals only have the power to prepare the trial of such an 
individual, and the Residual Mechanism will then conduct and complete the trial of such a 
person. This provision was criticised in the literature, because it could risk the right of the 
accused person to be tried without undue delay.224 For example, if Félicien Kabuga, a 
ICTR high-level accused person of the ICTR, were arrested on 2 July 2011, the ICTR 
would have had only the competence to hold Kabuga’s initial appearance, to order any pre-
trial measures, and to decide on any other preliminary matters. But Félicien Kabuga would 
then have had to wait until 1 July 2012 for his trial to begin.225 This example shows the 
issues that could have arisen from Article 1 (3). Issues could have appeared regarding the 
rights of the accused based on the fairness of the proceedings and especially the right of 
the accused to be tried without undue delay. However, according to the Tribunals’ 
jurisprudence and also the ‘jurisprudence of international bodies on human rights the 
reasonableness of the period of the proceedings cannot be translated into a fixed number of 																																																								
220 Assessment and progress report of the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Theodor 
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days, months or years.’226 Moreover, it has to be analysed on a case-by-case basis with 
respect to different aspects such as the complexity of the trial, the conduct of the accused, 
and the complexity of the charges, as well as the conduct of the organs of the Tribunal.227 
However, in the mentioned example the delay would not have resulted from those aspects, 
which would have been reasonably justified by the length of some proceedings. Moreover, 
the delay would have only resulted from the existence of the Residual Mechanism and the 
associated Commencement Dates, which were determined by the Security Council. 
However, the Transitional Arrangements were unavoidable in order to guarantee that the 
Tribunals properly end their work by the closing date, as requested by some members of 
the Security Council.228 In the end, the issue did not arise as none of the high-level ICTR 
fugitives was arrested.  
 Because all ICTY fugitives were arrested, Article 1 (4) is only applicable 
concerning the ICTY branch in the case of an order for retrial by the Appeals Chamber. 
The ICTY branch of the Residual Mechanism cannot conduct any trials regarding 
individuals indicted for substantive crimes.229 On 9 December 2015, the Appeals Chamber 
of the ICTY issued the judgment in the case of Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović.230 
Hence, a Trial Chamber of the Residual Mechanism at The Hague branch is seized of the 
case. But in the case of the ICTR, several fugitives remain at large. Therefore, it is possible 
that the Residual Mechanism will conduct a trial for substantive crimes. The Residual 
Mechanism currently has jurisdiction only over Félicien Kabuga, Augustin Bizimana, and 
Protais Mpiranya, because the cases of the other fugitives were referred to Rwanda.231  
 
B. Appeals Proceedings 
The Transitional Arrangements provide in Article 2 (1) that the Tribunals have the power 
to conduct all appeals ‘for which the notice of appeal against the judgment or sentence is 
filed prior to the commencement date’ of the respective branch of the Residual 
Mechanism, and that all other appellate proceedings will be dealt with by the Residual 																																																								
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Mechanism.232 Hence, the Residual Mechanism has the power to conduct all appellate 
proceedings of the ICTY judgements or sentences that commence on or after 1 July 2013 
as well as all appellate proceedings of the ICTR judgements that commence on or after 1 
July 2012. Appeals in the cases of the three remaining fugitives of the ICTR are possible. 
The ICTY branch anticipates receiving appeals in the case of Ratko Mladić. In the case of 
Vojislav Šešelj, the Prosecution filed its notice of appeal against the Trial Judgement on 2 
May 2016.233 In the case of Radovan Karadžić, both parties filed their notices of appeal on 
22 July 2016.234 However, according to these appeals, the notice of appeal against the 
judgment or sentence was filed far after the Commencement Dates, so there was no doubt 
about the competence regarding the appeal proceedings of the Residual Mechanism.  
 
C. Concurrent Jurisdiction between the Residual Mechanism and the Tribunals 
Article 2 (2) of the Transitional Arrangements was the subject of judicial review in the 
case of Radovan Karadžić.235 The Transitional Arrangements are silent about the question 
of whether the Tribunals and the Residual Mechanism can have jurisdiction in the same 
case at the same time. This was also problematic in the case of Radovan Karadžić, who 
requested that the Registrar of the Residual Mechanism assign a defence counsel and legal 
aid for appeal proceedings before the Residual Mechanism prior the issuance of the trial 
judgement. 236  After the Registrar denied the request, the President of the Residual 
Mechanism was seized of the motion for review of decision on assignment of counsel on 
appeal. But it was questionable whether the President of the Residual Mechanism lacked 
jurisdiction because, according to Article 2 (2) Transnational Agreements, the Residual 
Mechanism ‘shall have competence to conduct, and complete, all appellate proceedings for 
which the notice of appeal against the judgment or sentence is filed on or after the 
commencement date of the respective branch of the Residual Mechanism’. However, in 
that case, the notice of appeal was not filed, because the trial judgement was not rendered 
at the time of the motion. Article 1 (1) of the Transitional Agreements provides, that the 
ICTY has the competence to complete all trial proceedings which are pending with it as of 
the date of commencement of the respective branch of the Residual Mechanism. At the 
time of the motion the case of Radovan Karadžić was pending before the ICTY. The 																																																								
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Registrar then argued, referring to the case of Innocent Sagahutu,237 that the ICTY and the 
Residual Mechanism cannot have jurisdiction in the same case at the same time.238 
 The President noted that future appeal proceedings would be conducted and 
completed before the Residual Mechanism. He further stated that ‘procedural and 
collateral matters raised in direct anticipation or in necessary furtherance of instituting or 
advancing such appeal proceedings, including Karadzić's request for review of the 
Registrar's decision to deny him the assignment of counsel and legal aid on appeal, 
appropriately fall within the competence of the Residual Mechanism.’239 Otherwise, 
Karadzić would not have any venue before which he could file a request for review of the 
Registrar’s decision. In that case ‘a lacuna in the Residual Mechanism's competence’ 
would be opened ‘that would be inconsistent with the overall scheme of the Residual 
Mechanism's Statute and Transitional Arrangements and with the interests of justice 
generally.’240 Further, the President argued that the case of Innocent Sagahutu does not 
deal with the question of whether the ICTY and the Residual Mechanism can have 
jurisdiction over the same case at the same time. The decision in the case of Innocent 
Sagahutu instead clarified the appropriate procedural measures for requesting release from 
detention, where the Appeals Chamber of the ICTR remained seized of the case.241 
 Because the Transitional Arrangements remain silent about this question, it is not 
expressly prohibited for the Tribunals and the Residual Mechanism to have jurisdiction in 
the same case at the same time. The aim of Resolution 1966 (2010) is to transfer the 
functions of the Tribunals to the Residual Mechanism as soon as possible in order to allow 
the Tribunals to complete their work expeditiously. Uncertainties regarding jurisdiction 
would result in legal insecurity. In order to avoid that situation, the Transitional 
Arrangements refer to the Commencement Dates as the connecting factor to decide 
whether the Tribunals or the Residual Mechanism are competent. But in a case where it is 
evident that appellate proceedings will take place before the Residual Mechanism, it is 
reasonable that matters concerning such appeals need to fall within the competence of the 
Residual Mechanism. That approach would only be logical, because a decision concerning 
future appellate proceedings before the Residual Mechanism do affect directly the Residual 
Mechanism and not the Tribunals anymore. This leads to the conclusion that the Tribunals 
and the Residual Mechanism under certain circumstances can have jurisdiction in the same 
case at the same time. 																																																								
237 Augustin Ndindiliyimana et al. v. Prosecutor (Case No. MICT-13-43), Decision on Innocent Sagahutu's Notice of Eligibility for Early 
Release and the Prosecution's Objection Thereto, 16 September 2013. 
238 Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić (Case No. MICT-13-55), see note 235, para. 9. 
239 Ibid., para. 11. 
240 Ibid. 
241 Augustin Ndindiliyimana et al. v. Prosecutor (Case No. MICT-13-43), see note 237, para. 3.  
	
116	
D. Review Proceedings, Contempt of Court and False Testimony 
Article 3 and Article 4 of the Transnational Arrangements regulate competence regarding 
review proceedings and contempt or false testimony proceedings. The provisions are 
similar and provide that the Tribunals shall complete review proceedings and contempt or 
false testimony proceedings ‘for which the request for review is filed or indictment 
confirmed prior to the Commencement Date of the respective branch of the Residual 
Mechanism’. Thus, the Residual Mechanism shall have the competence to conduct those 
proceedings that take on any requests for review filed or indictments confirmed on or after 
the Commencement Date of the respective branch of the Residual Mechanism. But Article 
4 (2) of the Transitional Agreement was subject to judicial review in the cases of Radovan 
Karadžić,242 Deogritias Sebureze, and Maximilien Turinabo.243 
 
a. Are the Tribunals’ Judicial Decisions Binding to the Residual Mechanism? 
Persons who are subject to the jurisdiction of the Residual Mechanism should be treated as 
they would have been before the Tribunals. This provision is important in order to preserve 
the substantive and procedural legacy of the ICTY and ICTR. However, according to 
McIntyre, the Security Council did not give adequate guidance regarding the application of 
the substantive and procedural jurisprudence of the Tribunals by the Residual Mechanism. 
That is a critical point to the preservation of the Tribunals’ legacies.244 Therefore, it is 
questionable whether the Tribunals’ judicial decisions are binding to the Residual 
Mechanism. McIntyre points out that a main problem could be the possibility that the 
Residual Mechanism could depart from the jurisdiction of the Tribunals when convicting 
persons. This could result in a negative impact on the rights of the accused because the 
Tribunals’ previous decisions could be called into question. According to the Secretary-
General’s report, it should not be possible to call previous convictions of the Tribunals into 
question. 245 It is important to ensure that the validity of the Tribunals’ judgements and 
indictments continues. According to McIntyre, the Security Council did not automatically 
secure the legacy of the Tribunals when creating the Residual Mechanism, because some 
provisions regarding the internal doctrine of precedent are missing. Instead, the Security 																																																								
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Council established a situation where departures from Tribunal decisions are possible, 
which could lead to unfairness to those whose proceedings were transferred to the Residual 
Mechanism. In principle, judicial decisions are not a source of law in international law, and 
therefore, they do not have a binding effect as precedents. The sources of law in 
international law are considered to be customary law and are settled in Article 38 (1) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, including custom, treaties, and general 
principles of law.246 Hence, judges do not make law by themselves; they rather describe 
what the law is as dictated by the state and covered in Article 38 (1).247 Therefore, judicial 
decisions are not a source of law, because the judges are not legislators.248 Pursuant to 
Article 38 (1) (d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Judges are ‘subsidiary 
means for the determination of international rules of law’ and are therefore only an 
evidence of the law but not the law as such.249 Hence, it was not possible for the Security 
Council to confer the status of binding authority upon the Tribunals’ judicial decisions for 
the Residual Mechanism, because this would have been contrary to Article 38 (1) and 
would result in the impression that the judges of the ICTY and ICTR have been elevated to 
legislators.250 Furthermore, the Tribunals also treat each other’s decisions as persuasive but 
not as binding authority. However, the common Appeals Chamber ensures the consistency 
between the ICTY and the ICTR and that decisions are binding. 251  
 There is no hierarchy in international law between different international judicial 
entities. According to McIntyre, international Tribunals are equals, and therefore they are 
not obligated ‘to take account of either their own previous decisions or those of other 
judicial bodies, even if they relate to the same subject matter.’ 252 Hence, it does not 
correspond to the ‘current understanding of the relationship between international courts 
and tribunals to bind the Residual Mechanism to the previous decisions of the 
Tribunals.’253 That approach could result in a situation where the Residual Mechanism is 
bound to the decisions of the Tribunals, which no longer exist. In addition, the Security 																																																								
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Council would interfere in judicial discretion when including a directive to the judges of 
the Residual Mechanism that would bind the judges to previous decisions issued by the 
Tribunals. 
 Traditionally common law jurisdictions have recognised the principle of stare 
decisis, or binding precedent, by which courts are bound by their previous decisions.254 
Thus, the use of precedents manly exists in common law systems but also occurs in civil 
law systems. Although the civil law jurisdictions do not recognise the principle of binding 
precedent, as a matter of practice their highest courts will generally follow their previous 
decisions.255 However, the principle of stare decisis, or binding precedent, is not a general 
principle of law. International humanitarian law is part of customary law and can be 
applied by the international tribunals. But the report of the Secretary-General does not 
mention precedent as a source of law. While the doctrine of precedent does not operate as a 
matter of general practice and practical necessity in the ECHR, the Commission regards 
the court’s binding judgments as the final authority on the interpretation of the 
Convention.256 For instance, in the Cossey Case257 the court stated that, even if it were not 
strictly bound to its previous judgements, it would usually follow its previous decisions if 
there were in the interests of legal certainty.  
 In international law the lack of precedent and the horizontal link between 
international courts are basic principles. Courts dealing with inter-state legal disputes have 
primarily developed these principles. In contrast, the Tribunals and the Residual 
Mechanism are Chapter VII measures that have the objective of prosecuting persons 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law.258 The Tribunals’ 
proceedings have normative force and are binding for all states.259 There is no provision in 
the ICTY Statute that deals expressly with the question of the binding force of decisions of 
the ICTY. But the lack of such a provision does not mean in general that the ICTY Statute 
does not resolve the issue. The aim of the ICTY is to prosecute persons who are 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law.260 Especially as they 
are criminal courts, particularly important values of the Tribunals include fairness, 
certainty, and predictability where the liberty of the individual is implicated. Therefore, 
diverging from basic international law the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY decided to create 
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an internal doctrine of precedent at the Tribunal due to these important values.261 In this 
sense, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY noted in the Aleksovski judgment that the ICTY 
Statute, ‘taking account of its text and purpose, yields the conclusion that in the interests of 
certainty and predictability, the Appeals Chamber should follow its previous decisions, but 
should be free to depart from them for cogent reasons in the interest of justice.’262 The 
Appeals Chamber noted that the right of appeal, which is an important principle of 
customary international law, ‘gives rise to the right of the accused to have like cases 
treated alike’. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber should follow its previous decisions in 
order to ensure a fair trial, but has to be able at the same time ‘to depart from them for 
cogent reasons in the interest of justice.’ 263 On the contrary, in the case of Laurent 
Semanza, Judge Shahabuddeen expressed a different viewpoint where he questioned the 
legal status of the Aleksovski judgment, observing that the Tribunals’ Statute does not 
expressly mention an obligation of the Appeals Chamber to follow its previous 
decisions.264 However, after years of judicial practice of the Tribunals, the applicable 
procedures and law are a substantial ground for the Tribunals’ judgments and decisions.  
 As an aspect of the principle of law as well as the right of the accused to a fair trial, 
the certainty and predictability of the law is very important. This principle is based on the 
idea that law needs to be knowable and foreseeable for the accused individual. It is 
necessary that the accused can expect that the case will be treated the same as similar cases 
in the past. Hence, the Appeals Chamber in the Aleksovski judgement argued that a part of 
the fair trial principle is the right of an accused individual to have like cases treated alike. 
They argue that similar cases have to be treated in the same way and decided if possible 
with the same reasoning.265  
 According to McIntyre, the Security Council followed the approach of the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber in the Aleksovski judgement and created a doctrine of precedent for the 
Residual Mechanism concerning applicable previous decisions of the ICTY and ICTR 
while allowing departures from it for cogent reasons in the interests of justice. McIntyre 
argues that the Security Council should have the competence to create such doctrine acting 
under Chapter VII. Other international and hybrid courts, like the ICC, the SCSL, and the 
Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia have adopted a doctrine of 
precedent.266 These courts and tribunals rely on the previous decisions and see them as 																																																								
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correctly stating the law. According to Article 20 (3) of the SCSL Statute, the ICTR and 
the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s decisions guide the judges.267 This also applies to the 
relationship between the Tribunals. 
 But it could also be argued that the Security Council did not consider it necessary to 
implement a regulation within the IRMCT Statute binding the Residual Mechanism to the 
previous jurisprudence of the ICTY and the ICTR. Properly interpreting the Statute 
requires the Residual Mechanism to consider itself bound. In the case the Residual 
Mechanism interprets its Statute in the same way the Tribunals interpreted their Statutes, 
that is, according to the rules for interpreting treaties explained in Articles 31-33 of the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Residual Mechanism has to consider 
itself as bound to the Tribunals’ previous decisions.268 The IRMCT Statute, including the 
text and purpose, makes clear that the Residual Mechanism completes the Tribunals’ work 
and continues the residual functions.269 The Residual Mechanism is the legal successor to 
the ICTY and ICTR, which is residual in nature and has the purpose of finishing the 
Tribunals’ work. However, the Residual Mechanism is a scaled-down version of the 
Tribunals, whose Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence are based on the Tribunals’ 
Statutes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Therefore, the Security Council’s statement 
was meant to guarantee that the Residual Mechanism respects the rights of accused, 
meaning like cases have to be treated alike. In the case of Phineas Munyarugarama, the 
Appeals Chamber pointed out that the Residual Mechanism is bound to interpret the 
IRMCT Statute and the IMRCT RPE in a manner consistent with the jurisprudence of the 
Tribunals, because the Residual Mechanism's mandate is to continue the Tribunals’ 
work.270 Otherwise the completion by the Residual Mechanism could take on a completely 
different character.  
 
b. Are Decisions and Orders Legally Binding for the Residual Mechanism when taken 
by the Tribunals after the Commencement Date? 
In the case of Deogritias Sebureze and Maximilien Turinabo, the question appeared as to 
whether the contempt decision and order issued by the ICTR Trial Chamber was legally 
binding for the Residual Mechanism when taken after the Commencement Date of the 
branch.271 Article 4 (2) states: ‘The Residual Mechanism shall have competence to 
conduct, and complete, all proceedings for contempt of court and false testimony for which 																																																								
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the indictment is confirmed on or after the commencement date of the respective branch of 
the Residual Mechanism.’ Further, Articles 1 (2) and (3) of the IRMCT Statute refer to the 
‘power to prosecute, in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute, the persons 
indicted by the ICTR and ICTY’ for substantive crimes. However, Article 1 (4) of the 
IRMCT Statute does not apply the language ‘persons indicted by the ICTY or ICTR’. 
Article 1 (4) refers to the ability of the Residual Mechanism to prosecute persons for 
contempt and false testimony concerning the Residual Mechanism or the Tribunals. 
According to the Single Judge, the wording in Article 1 of the IRMCT Statute supports the 
view that Article 4 (2) of the Transitional Arrangements must be understood in this way, 
and that the exclusive power to decide whether to indict ICTR contempt cases was 
transferred to the Residual Mechanism for cases where the indictment was not confirmed 
before 1 July 2012. This leads to the conclusion that the Residual Mechanism has the 
exclusive power to determine whether to indict persons suspected of contempt or false 
testimony before the Tribunals or the Residual Mechanism after the Commencement Date 
of the branch.272 The Residual Mechanism would be competent even in the instance that 
the Trial Chamber of the Tribunal was seized of the matter before the Commencement 
Date of the branch.  
 The decision in the case of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko273 stated that a Trial Chamber 
remains competent after the judgement has been pronounced regarding ‘ancillary matters 
of which it is properly seized and that issues relating to possible contempt are independent 
of the proceedings out of which they arise’.274 But this ruling was inapposite in the case of 
Deogritias Sebureze and Maximilien Turinabo because it does not address the transitional 
issue, which is a result of the Resolution 1966 (2010) transferring competence from the 
Tribunals to the Residual Mechanism. 275  In the case of Deogritias Sebureze and 
Maximilien Turinabo, the ICTR Trial Chamber decided pursuant to Rule 77 (C) of the 
ICTR RPE that there was reason to believe that a person might be in contempt of the 
Tribunal and directed that an amicus curiae be appointed to investigate the matter and 
report back to the Chamber as to whether there were sufficient grounds to instigate 
contempt proceedings. The steps taken are equivalent to the steps to be taken pursuant to 
Rule 90 (C) of the IRMCT RPE. Although the amicus curiae filed his report on 29 
November 2010, the steps taken in line with Rule 77 (D) of the ICTR RPE, namely the 
decision to order prosecution for contempt and issuance of an order in lieu of an indictment 																																																								
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by the ICTR Trial Chamber, were taken long after 1 July 2012. If the ICTR Trial Chamber 
did take the step while properly seized of the matter the decision would have retained its 
validity in relation to Rule 90 (C) of the IRMCT RPE. According to the Single Judge, as a 
result of Article 4 (2) of the IRMCT Statute and the general spirit of the Transitional 
Arrangements, it can only be the responsibility of the Residual Mechanism to complete the 
contempt proceedings. Because in the case of Deogritias Sebureze and Maximilien 
Turinabo the ICTR Trial Chamber took the steps after the Commencement Date of the 
ICTR, the decision of the Trial Chamber has no legal effect before the Residual 
Mechanism. 276 There followed a motion by the ICTR Prosecutor for reconsideration of the 
Single Judge’s decision in the case of Deogritias Sebureze and Maximilien Turinabo.277 
The Prosecutor argued that the interpretation of the relevant provisions established in the 
Single Judge’s decision would lead to an abrupt cut-off of still pending ICTR proceedings. 
In addition, it would duplicate the work already done at the ICTR, if the Residual 
Mechanism had to familiarise itself with the record, review the amicus curiae report, and 
deliberate on the decision.278 The interpretation of the Single Judge would hinder a smooth 
transition of jurisdiction. The cut-off of ICTR contempt jurisdiction as of 1 July 2012 
would lead to absurd results where the underlying trial goes beyond the Commencement 
Date. Further, the Prosecutor pointed out that proceedings regarding contempt are 
‘ancillary to the underlying criminal matter and can proceed on a separate track from the 
merits judgement.’ The Single Judge responded by pointing out that the ICTR Trial 
Chamber had sufficient time to take steps in line with Rule 77 (D) of the ICTR RPE before 
the Commencement Date. Therefore, the abrupt cut-off and the duplication of work is not 
the result of the Transitional Arrangements. Moreover, this is due to the fact that the ICTR 
Trial Chamber did not indict before 1 July 2012, but instead chose to wait. That approach 
resulted in leaving further proceedings to the Residual Mechanism.279 Further, the Security 
Council intended a smooth transition to the Residual Mechanism by adopting Resolution 
1966 (2010), IRMCT Statute, and the Transitional Arrangements more than 18 months 
before the Commencement Date and by providing clear-cut and specific directives in the 
Transitional Arrangements on the transfer of obligations. This led to the conclusion that 
the Security Council did not leave the decision when and how to transfer matters to the 
Residual Mechanism to the discretion of the Tribunals.280 Article 4 (2) explicitly provides 
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that the Tribunals will only complete the contempt proceedings if the indictment was 
issued before the Commencement Date. This would not lead to absurd results.281 
 But the problem appeared of whether the ICTR Trial Chamber unquestionably has 
the inherent competence to start contempt proceedings, as this power is determined in the 
ICTR RPE since contempt is an inherent competence of every court.282 The ICTR 
Prosecutor argued, referring to Resolution 1966 (2010), the IRMCT Statute, and the 
Transitional Arrangements, that the Security Council did not intend to divest the Tribunals 
of their inherent competence to initiate contempt proceedings only because the contempt 
order was issued after 1 July 2012. However, the Single Judge agreed that it was necessary 
in a judicial system to penalise contempt and that the court seized of the underlying matter 
can take steps concerning further proceedings. But when adopting the Tribunals' Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence on contempt proceedings, the Tribunals’ judges relied on inherent 
competence because the Statutes did not regulate the matter, not because it was a 
prerogative for judges to regulate contempt proceedings. The Single Judge concluded this 
from the Security Council's inclusion of contempt in Article 1 (4) of the IRMCT Statute 
and Article 4 (2) of the Transitional Arrangements. Furthermore, the Single Judge argued 
that it is not an ‘inherent component of contempt proceedings that the bench seized with 
the underlying matter decides whether to indict.’283 The Tribunals’ judges adopted that 
approach, but the judges of the Residual Mechanism have adopted another solution, 
namely that the bench seized with the underlying matter only decides whether there is 
reason to believe that a person may be in contempt and, if so, refers the matter to the 
President, who in turn assigns a Single Judge to deal with the matter, thereby avoiding the 
potential that the matter of contempt could prejudice the proceedings in the underlying 
matter.284  
 The ICTR Prosecutor argued that the lack of reference to persons indicted by the 
Tribunals in Article 1 (4) of the IRMCT Statute shows that contempt proceedings are not 
initiated by an indictment, but can be initiated by an order in lieu of an indictment, which 
was done by the ICTR. Further, the Prosecutor explained that the use of the term 
‘complete’ in Article 4 (2) of the Transitional Arrangements indicates that the ICTR Trial 
Chamber retained its power to indict beyond the Commencement Date so that the matter 
which will be completed by the Residual Mechanism would also be on trial before the 
ICTR. However, the Single Judge replied that an order in lieu of an indictment usually 
includes a judicial indictment. Furthermore, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 																																																								
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regarding indictments issued by the Office of the Prosecutor apply to orders in lieu of 
indictment mutatis mutandis, according to Rule 90 (E) of the IRMCT RPE. Therefore, the 
Transitional Arrangements do cover judicial indictments.285  
 Article 4 (2) provides that the ICTR will complete the contempt proceedings, if the 
indictment was issued before 1 July 2012, provided the trial has started before that date. 
Conversely, the Residual Mechanism has the competence to indict on or after 1 July 
2012.286 Concerning this matter, the Transitional Arrangements provide an explicit date 
when the Tribunals’ jurisdiction ends and the jurisdiction of the Residual Mechanism 
begins. Uncertainties regarding jurisdiction would result in legal insecurity. Therefore, it is 
only consistent that decisions after the Commencement Date in such matters do not have a 
legal effect on the Residual Mechanism.  
 
c. Power to Conduct and Complete Contempt Cases 
Article 4 (2) of the Transitional Arrangements provides that the Residual Mechanism has 
the power to conduct and complete contempt cases where no indictment was confirmed 
before the Commencement Date of the respective branch. The case of Radovan Karadžić 
addressed the problem of whether the initial ‘reason to believe’ determination under Rule 
90 (C) of the IRMCT RPE would fall under the ‘conduct and complete’ provision 
referenced in the Transitional Arrangements.287 Where a contempt matter arises before the 
Tribunal on or after the Commencement Date, the trial or appeals chamber seized with the 
underlying matter is the chamber that according to Rule 90 (C) of the IRMCT RPE has the 
authority to determine whether there is reason to believe that a person may be in contempt 
and shall refer the matter to the President of the Residual Mechanism. Therefore, the 
Single Judge decided that because the ICTY Trial Chamber is seized of the underlying 
matter and the committed contempt is closely linked to the proceedings before the Trial 
Chamber, it has the competence to make the ‘reason to believe’ determination. Referring to 
the ruling on the ICTR Prosecutor's Motion for Reconsideration of the Sebureze and 
Turinabo Decision, he noted ‘where a contempt matter arises before the ICTR (or ICTY) it 
will, on or after 1 July 2012 (or on or after 1 July 2013) be the ICTR (or ICTY) trial or 
appeal chamber seized with the underlying matter which is the ‘[c]hamber" that pursuant 
to MICT Rule 90 (C) has the authority to determine whether there is reason to believe that 
a person may be in contempt, and shall refer the matter to the MICT President for the 
																																																								
285 Ibid., paras. 41-42. 
286 Ibid., paras. 45- 46. 
287 Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić (MICT-13-55-R90.3), see note 242. 
	
125	
appointment of a Single Judge to deal with the further proceedings’. 288 The Single Judge 
stated that ICTY or ICTR Trial or Appeals Chamber seized with a case beyond the 
Commencement Date of the relevant branch of the Residual Mechanism retains 
jurisdiction to make the ‘reason to believe’ determination under Rule 90 (C) of the IRMCT 
RPE in matters which are closely linked to the on-going trial or appeals proceedings.289  
 Further, according to Rule 90 (A) of the IRMCT RPE and Rule 77 (A) of the ICTY 
and ICTR RPE, the judges have inherent power to control contempt proceedings. In order 
to be able to effectively control the trial or appeals proceedings and to ensure their 
integrity, a Chamber or Single Judge has the competence to initiate contempt proceedings 
in matters linked to those proceedings. However, it would be untenable if the competence 
to initiate contempt proceedings, which is considered an inherent power under the Rules of 
the ICTY, the ICTR, and the Residual Mechanism, only applied to cases where the ‘reason 
to believe’ determinations were made prior to the Commencement Date of the respective 
branch of the Residual Mechanism or when the underlying case is before the Residual 
Mechanism.’290 The Security Council did not have any intention to reduce the power of the 
Tribunals’ Chambers and to control their proceedings through the Transitional 
Arrangements or the IRMCT Statute. Moreover, the Transitional Arrangements and the 
IRMCT Statute provide that the judges have to be in control of contempt proceedings. 
Further, Resolution 1966 (2010) notes that the IRMCT RPE has to be based on the ICTY 
RPE and ICTR RPE. Therefore, the Single Judge argued that the language ‘conduct and 
complete’ as used in Article 4 (2) of the Transitional Arrangements cannot be interpreted 
to include the initial determination as to whether there is ‘reason to believe’ that a person 
has committed contempt. However, this reasoning is comprehensible because the ‘reason 
to believe’ determination is closely linked to the proceedings. Therefore, it would be most 
efficient if the Trial Chamber conducts the ‘reason to believe’ determination, which is 
seized with the underlying matter in the first place. A different Chamber would first need 
to familiarise with the proceedings in order to be able to conduct the determination, what 
would take even more time. This decision, however, differs from the findings in the case of 
Deogritias Sebureze and Maximilien Turinabo, because the ‘reason to believe’ 
determination is only an examination of facts. But deciding whether to indict a contempt 
case would be a completely new legal step that needs to be taken by the Residual 
Mechanism after the Commencement Date. 
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E. Protection of Victims and Witnesses 
The Tribunals provide protection and related judicial or prosecutorial functions regarding 
all victims and witnesses concerning proceedings within the jurisdiction of the Tribunals, 
according to Articles 1 through 4 of the Transnational Arrangement. And the Residual 
Mechanism does the same for all proceedings for which the Residual Mechanism has 
competence.291 Because the ICTR completed all work in December 2015, this provision 
does not apply for the ICTR branch. The function of protecting witnesses in completed 
cases was transferred to the Residual Mechanism.292 In the case of Stansilav Galić, the 
Single Judge decided, referring to Articles 1 (1) and 5 (1) of the Transitional 
Arrangements, that he lacked jurisdiction over an application for access under Rule 86 (G) 
(i) of the IRMCT RPE. Stansilav Galić filed an application for access to confidential inter 
partes material in the case of Ratko Mladić, which was pending before the ICTY.293 Rule 
86 (G) (i) of the IRMCT RPE provides that a party to the second proceedings seeking to 
rescind, vary, or augment protective measures ordered in the first proceedings has to apply 
to the Chamber seized of the first proceedings.294 
 Pursuant to Article 5 (3) of the Transnational Arrangement, the Residual 
Mechanism has to provide for the protection of witnesses and victims and carry out all 
related judicial or prosecutorial functions where a person is a witness or victim concerning 
two or more cases for which the Residual Mechanism and the Tribunals have competence. 
The aim of the Transitional Arrangements to ensure a smooth transition of the main 
functions from the Tribunals to the Residual Mechanism is determined expressly in 
Articles 5 (4) and Article 6 of the Transnational Arrangements. Article 5 (4) provides that 
the Tribunals have to make the necessary arrangements to ensure as soon as possible a 
coordinated transition of the witness and victim’s protection function to the Residual 
Mechanism regarding all completed cases of the Tribunals. A smooth transfer is especially 
necessary concerning the protection of victims and witnesses, because the safety of victims 
and witnesses depends on a functioning protection.  
 
F. Coordinated Transition of other Functions 
As of the Commencement Date of each branch, the Residual Mechanism continues all 
related judicial or prosecutorial functions concerning cases. Regarding other functions of 
the Tribunals, the ICTY and ICTR respectively have to make the necessary arrangements 																																																								
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to guarantee a smooth transition to the Residual Mechanism, ‘including the supervision of 
enforcement of sentences, assistance requests by national authorities, and the management 
of records and archives.’ Consequently, as of the Commencement Date, the Residual 
Mechanism continues all related prosecutorial and judicial functions.295 
 
G. Transitional Arrangements for the President, Judges, Prosecutor, Registrar and 
Staff 
Article 7 of the Transitional Arrangements enables the President, Judges, Prosecutor and 
Registrar of the Residual Mechanism to hold the same office in the Tribunals and the 
Residual Mechanism. The staff members of the Residual Mechanism can also be staff 
members of the Tribunals. This provision ensures maximum efficiency, because the 
Residual Mechanism benefits from the Tribunals’ experienced staff. In addition, the 
workload of the Tribunals will decrease so it would be cost reducing to use staff for the 
Tribunals and the Residual Mechanism simultaneously.  
 
4. Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
The aim of the Residual Mechanism is to secure the legacy of the ICTY and the ICTR. 
Therefore, the Security Council requested the Residual Mechanism that apply the same 
modus operandi as the Tribunals. The Secretary-General was asked to submit a draft of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the Residual Mechanism that needed to be based on 
the Tribunals’ Rules of Procedure and Evidence.296 Further, Article 13 (1), (3) of the 
IRMCT Statute and Rule 1 of the IRMCT RPE provide that the judges of the Residual 
Mechanism have to adopt the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and that the ‘Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence and any amendments thereto shall take effect upon adoption by 
the judges of the Residual Mechanism unless the Security Council decides otherwise’.297 
The IRMCT RPE were adopted and entered into force on 8 June 2012.298  
 According to McIntyre, Article 13 (3) of the IRMCT Statute is noteworthy because 
it could be on the one hand an approach of the Security Council to guarantee that the 
Residual Mechanism adopts procedures similar to those of the Tribunals in order to 
prevent ‘a judicial revolution of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’.299 But on the other 
hand, it could also be an expression of the Security Council’s mistrust regarding the judges 
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of the Residual Mechanism.300 The Security Council is able to veto amendments to the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence made by the judges of the Residual Mechanism. 
Therefore, the Security Council is able to influence the conduct of the proceedings. The 
veto of the Security Council would most likely concern those amendments in particular 
that could lengthen proceedings. 301 According to McIntyre, this involvement of the 
Security Council is not acceptable because it is not appropriate for the Security Council to 
interfere in any judicial proceeding of the Residual Mechanism, just as it would have been 
inappropriate for the Security Council to attempt to interfere in any proceeding of the 
ICTY or ICTR.302 Therefore, McIntyre assumes that Article 13 (3) of the IRMCT Statute 
will never be utilised, but ‘that said, the fact that the Security Council considered it 
appropriate for reasons of political expediency to close the Tribunals suggests that in fact, 
direct interference in the Residual Mechanisms rules of procedure and evidence may be a 
possibility.’303  
 Amendments to the IRMCT RPE will be adopted if circulated to all judges and 
agreed to in writing by not less than thirteen judges or by a majority of the judges present 
at a plenary meeting convened by the President.304 This provision is derived from Rule 6 
(A), (B) of the ICTR RPE because according to the ICTR RPE the amendment will be 
adopted if agreed upon by not less than a majority of all judges at a plenary meeting or it is 
approved by at least two-thirds of all judges confirmed in writing, whereas according to the 
ICTY RPE amendments were adopted if agreed upon by not less than ten permanent 
judges at a plenary meeting or if unanimously approved by the permanent judges.305  
 Article 13 (4) of the IRMCT Statute provides that the IRMCT RPE have to be in 
accordance with the IRMCT Statute, whereas that provision is not found in the Statutes of 
the ICTY or ICTR. Article 13 (4) of the IRMCT Statute again is a provision that shows the 
Security Council’s intent to ensure that the procedure of the Residual Mechanism will be 
the same as the Tribunals’ procedures. Thereby, the continuity between the work of the 
Residual Mechanism and the Tribunals could be ensured and the Tribunals’ legacies 
preserved. Furthermore, according to Rule 24 (A) of the IRMCT Statute, the Security 
Council appoints the President of the Residual Mechanism, while under Tribunals’ 
provisions the judges at a plenary meeting elected the Tribunals’ Presidents.306 Therefore, 
the provisions regarding the election of the Presidents were changed in the IRMCT 																																																								
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Statute.307 This ensures a greater involvement of the Security Council regarding the work 
of the Residual Mechanism.  
 The IRMCT RPE include provisions copied from the Tribunals’ Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, 308 but also some completely new regulations.309 For example, the functions 
of the Registrar are specified further in Rule 31 (A) (i)-(iii) of the IRMCT RPE. The 
Registrar directs and administers the Chambers’ Legal Support Section, takes all necessary 
measures so the decisions made by the Chambers and judges are executed, and makes 
recommendations concerning the missions of the Registry that affect the judicial work of 
the Residual Mechanism. Rule 49 (C) of the IRMCT RPE regarding the joinder of crimes 
and trials is a new provision and provides a definition for the term transaction and states 
that ‘a transaction for the purpose of this Rule is to be understood as a number of acts or 
omissions whether occurring as one event or a number of events, at the same or different 
locations and being part of a common scheme, strategy, or plan’. Rule 146 (B) is a new 
provision and regulates the request for review and provides that the President composes a 
bench with the same number of judges as the original bench to decide the motion. To the 
extent possible, the judges who were part of the original Chamber shall be appointed. Rule 
32 (B) of the IRMCT RPE provides for an adoption of a gender-sensitive approach to 
support victims and witnesses, while the ICTY RPE and ICTR RPE suggest hiring women 
in support units for victims and witnesses. The IRMCT RPE is divided in eleven parts, in 
contrast to the ICTY RPE and ICTR RPE, which are divided in ten parts and nine parts, 
respectively. 
 
A. Disclosing Confidential Information 
Part eleven of the IRMCT RPE includes a new regulation regarding declassification of 
non-public records of proceedings and evidence.310 The Tribunals’ regulations regarding 
that matter were laid down in directives.311 According to Rule 155 (A) and (B) of the 
IRMCT RPE, after a case has been closed the President may assign a Single Judge to 
review the records of proceedings and evidence for the purpose of considering whether 
disclosure of all part of the records or evidence should be determined. However, when 
applying this Rule, the Single Judge shall have due regard for the protection of victims and 																																																								
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witnesses.312 According to Rule 155 (G) of the IRMCT RPE, a party or third party affected 
by the decision is allowed, within four months of the date of filing of the decision, to file a 
request for review. Paragraph (H) regulates that the Registrar is responsible for the 
implementation of any order for the declassification of records.  
 The access to material containing confidential information of witnesses was subject 
to some proceedings before the Residual Mechanism. Pursuant to Rule 86 (F) (i) of the 
IRMCT RPE, protective measures ordered in proceedings before the Tribunals continue to 
have effect in proceedings before the Residual Mechanism unless and until they are 
rescinded, varied or augmented.313 Because the IRMCT RPE are based on the ICTY and 
ICTR RPE, the standards developed in the ICTR and ICTY jurisprudence for allowing 
access to confidential information apply to Rule 86 of the IRMCT RPE as well. However, 
IRMCT RPE require the consent of the concerned protected witness for the variation of 
protective measures, like access to confidential information for use in proceedings. 
According to Rule 86 (I) of the IRMCT RPE, the Victims and Witness Section needs to 
ensure that the protected victim or witness has consented to the rescission, variation, or 
augmentation of protective measures. But where exigent circumstances appear or where a 
miscarriage of justice would otherwise result, the Chamber may order proprio motu the 
rescission, variation, or augmentation of protective measures in the absence of such 
consent, pursuant to Rule 86 (I) of the IRMCT RPE.314 The Residual Mechanism has to 
find a balance between the right of a party to have access to material in order to be able to 
prepare its case and the need to ensure the protection of witnesses and victims.315 The 
protection of witnesses and victims is very important for the proper functioning of the 
Residual Mechanism. 
 Rule 10 of the IRMCT RPE is a new provision and regulates information of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and provides that it is not obligated to 
disclose any information, including documents or other evidence, concerning the 
performance of its mandate. Nor can ‘such information acquired by a third party on a 																																																								
312 Rule 155 (E) (i) of the IRMCT RPE. 
313 Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu (Case No. MICT-13-30), see note 149, p. 542; Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu (Case No. MICT-
13-30), Decision on a Motion for Access to Confidential and Ex Parte Filings, 10 Juni 2016, p. 552; Prosecutor v. Paul Bagilishema 
(Case No. MICT-12-07), ‘Decision in Respect to Jacques Munungwarere’s Motions to Access Materials’, 18 Janaury 2013, para. 8. 
Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin (Case No. IT-99-36-A), Decision on Mico Stanisic's Motion for Access to All Confidential Materials in 
the Brdanin Case’, 24 January 2007, para. 10; Prosecutor v. Nikola Sainovir et al. (Case No. IT-05-87-A), ‘Decision on Vlastimir 
Dordevic's Motion for Access to Transcripts, Exhibits and Documents’, 16 February 2010, para. 19; Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popovic et 
al., (Case Nos. IT-05-88-A & IT-09-92-T), Decision on Motion by Ratko Mladic for Access to Confidential Material, 20 February 2013, 
p. 2; Tharcisse Muvunyi v. The Prosecutor, (Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-A), ‘Decision on Ildephonse Nizeyimana's Request for Access to 
Closed Session Transcripts’, 31 March 2011, para. 3; Eliezer Niyitegeka v, Prosecutor (Case No. WCT-12-16), ‘Decision of 
Niyitegeka's Urgent Request for Orders Relating to Prosecution Witnesses’, 29 January 2016, para. 8; Prosecutor v. Jean de Dieu 
Kamuhanda (Case No. MICT-13-33-R86.2), ‘Second Decision on Motion for Access to Confidential Material from the Nshogoza Case, 
9 November 2015, para. 4; Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić (MICT-13-55-R90.3), Decision on Motion for Access to Ex Parte Filings in 
Completed Cases, 10 May 2016. 
314 In Re. Ntakirutimana et al. (Case No. MICT -12-11), Decision in Respect to Jacques Mungwarere’s Motion to Access Materials, 18 
January 2013, paras . 7, 8. 
315 Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu (Case No. MICT-13-30), see note 149, p. 552. 
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confidential basis from the ICRC or by anyone while in the service of the ICRC be subject 
to disclosure or to witness testimony without the consent of the ICRC.’ However, in the 
case Šimić et al. the ICTY acknowledged this particular right of the ICRC. 316  Because the 
Residual Mechanism is obliged to continue the Tribunals’ jurisprudence, it could be argued 
that Rule 10 of the IRMCT RPE is superfluous.   
 
B. Legal Standing of Tribunals’ Parties before the Residual Mechanism and Vice 
Versa 
In the case of Deogritias Sebureze and Maximilien Turinabo the question appeared of 
whether the ICTR Prosecutor is a party to contempt proceedings of the Residual 
Mechanism so that he could have standing to move for reconsideration of a decision. Rule 
2 of the IRMCT RPE provides that unless the context otherwise requires it: ‘[p]arty’ shall 
mean ‘[t]he Prosecutor or the Defence’ and ‘[p]rosecutor’ shall mean ‘[t]he Prosecutor 
appointed pursuant to Article 14 of the [MICT] Statute’. Thus, the defence and the 
Prosecutor of the Residual Mechanism are parties to proceedings before the Residual 
Mechanism. The Single Judge noted that the fact that the ICTR Prosecutor was a party to 
the underlying trial proceedings did not in itself give him a legal standing to intervene in 
related contempt proceedings before the Residual Mechanism. This is because according to 
the Transitional Arrangements, the prosecutorial functions regarding contempt cases where 
no indictment was issued prior the Commencement Date have been transferred to the 
Prosecutor of the Residual Mechanism.317 But because the questioned decision concerned 
whether the ICTR had retained jurisdiction over the contempt case, the ICTR Prosecutor 
does have a legal standing.318 Further, in the decision on a motion by Stanislav Galić's 
defence regarding access to confidential materials in the case of Ratko Mladić, the 
Chamber pointed out that because of the ‘residual’ nature of the Residual Mechanism and 
for concerns of judicial economy and practicality, parties before the Residual Mechanism 
are considered parties before the Tribunal for the purposes of requesting access to 
confidential material.319 This approach is necessary because it prevents a legal gap. 
Otherwise, the Prosecutor of the Tribunals would not be able to question a decision made 
by the Residual Mechanism that concerns one of his cases. 
 
																																																								
316 Prosecutor v. Simić et al. (Case No. IT-95-9-PT), Decision on the Prosecution Motion under Rule 73 for a Ruling Concerning the 
Testimony of a Witness, 27 July 1999. 
317 In Re. Deogratias Sebureze and Maximilten Turinabo (Case No. MICT-13-40-R90), see note 217, para. 6. 
318 Ibid., paras. 9-10. 
319 Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić (Case No. IT-09-92-T), see note 164, para. 5. 
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C. Functions Exercised Remotely 
Rule 2 of the IRMCT RPE is similar to Rule 2 of the ICTY and ICTR RPE, but with 
relevant adjustments. Because the Residual Mechanism does not have any Bureau or ad 
litem judges, a definition for these is not required. 320 Instead, a definition is provided for a 
plenary as ‘a consultation of all judges, either by convening a plenary meeting, or remotely 
by written procedure, as decided by the President’. The definition became relevant because 
of the change that the Residual Mechanism’s judges are allowed to make decisions 
remotely. Furthermore, Rule 17 (C) IRMCT RPE is a new provision allowing judges to 
make the solemn declaration remotely by video-conference link, as decided by the 
President. While the Coordination Council met once a month at the initiative of the 
President under Tribunals’ provisions, according to Rule 25 (C) of the IRMCT RPE the 
President can convene a meeting of the Residual Mechanism Coordination Council at his 
own initiative or upon request of any of its members. 321 However, paragraph (D) is new 
and provides that the President may decide to hold Residual Mechanism Coordination 
Council meetings remotely by videoconference link.322 According to Rule 27 (C) of the 
IRMCT RPE, decisions can be taken remotely in plenary. These have to be adopted if 
circulated to all judges and agreed to in writing by not less than thirteen judges. In obliging 
the judges to work remotely, the Security Council ensured that the Residual Mechanism 
remains a small body with a high cost-efficiency. 
 
D. Keeping Proceedings Short 
Article 3 of the IRMCT RPE regarding languages was extended since paragraph (G) is 
new and provides that the Registrar has to ensure that translations are concluded in the 
shortest possible time. A sentence was added in paragraph (J) of Rule 90 of the IRMCT 
RPE regarding contempt providing that the respondent has to file a response within ten 
days of the filing of the appeal brief, and that the appellant may file a reply within four 
days of the filing of the response. A similar addition was made to Rule 108 (I) of the 
IRMCT Statute, which provides that the appellant has to file an appeal brief within fifteen 
days after filing the notice of appeal, and the respondent has to file a response within ten 
days of the filing of the appeal brief and the appellant may file a reply within four days of 
the filing of the response. Rule 42 (B) regarding the counsel provides that at the request of 
the accused, the Registrar may admit a defence counsel who does not speak either of the 																																																								
320 A body composed of the President, the Vice-President and the Presiding judges of the Trial Chambers, Rule 23 of the ICTY RPE and 
of the ICTR RPE; Also provisions regarding the Management Committee, Deputy Registrar, Deputy Prosecutor, and the Vice President 
have been removed, See Rule 20, Rule 21, Rule 23 ter, Rule 31, Rule 38 of the ICTY RPE and of the ICTR RPE, Rule, 33 bis of the 
ICTY RPE. 
321 Rule 23 bis (C) of the ICTY RPE, Rule 23 bis (C) of the ICTR RPE. 
322 Rule 25 (D) of the IRMCT RPE. 
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two working languages of the Residual Mechanism but who speaks the native language of 
the suspect or accused. But the Registrar can impose conditions, including the requirement 
that the counsel or accused has to pay all translation and interpretation costs, which are 
usually not met by the Residual Mechanism, and the counsel is not allowed to request any 
extensions of time as a result of the fact that he does not speak one of the working 
languages. The accused is allowed to require the President to review the Registrar’s 
decision. A sentence was added providing that the President’s decision on review is not 
subject to appeal. Rule 56 (C) (ii) regarding orders directed to states to produce documents 
provides that an appeal concerning these orders has to be filed within seven days of filing 
of the impugned decision. New to this provision is that the opposing party shall file a 
response within ten days of the filing of the appeal. The appellant may file a reply within 
four days of the filing of the response. While according to the Tribunals’ provisions, all 
sentences of imprisonment have to be supervised by the Tribunals or a body designated by 
it, according to Rule 128 of the IRMCT RPE the imprisonment takes place under the 
supervision of the Residual Mechanism during the period of its functioning.323 The 
Security Council has the power to create a body to assist it and to proceed to supervise the 
sentences after the Residual Mechanism legally ceases to exist. In Rule 142 (A) of the 
IRMCT regarding additional evidence, a sentence was added that provides when a party 
motions to present additional evidence before the Appeals Chamber, the opposing party 
has to file a response within thirty days of the filing of the motion. The moving party may 
file a reply within fourteen days of the filing of the response. Paragraph (C) also includes a 
new sentence governing the case where the Appeals Chamber finds that the evidence was 
available at trial. The evidence can still be admitted if the moving party can establish that 
the exclusion of it would amount to a miscarriage of justice. There is also an amendment to 
Rule 14 (E) of the IRMCT RPE regarding the referral of an indictment to another court 
providing that the appellant against a decision to refer a case can file an appeal brief within 
fifteen days after filing the notice of appeal. Whereas, the opposite party must file a 
response within ten days of the filing of the appeal brief, and the appellant must file a reply 
within four days of the filing of the response. A new provision regarding the interlocutory 
appeals was implemented.324 A party that wishes to appeal from a decision where an 
appeal lies as of right has to file an appeal within seven days of the filing of the impugned 
decision. The opposing party shall file a response within ten days of the filing of the 
appeal. The appellant may file a reply within four days of the filing of the response. 
According to Rule 132 (B), in the case a certification was granted, the party granted 																																																								
323 Rule 104 of the ICTY RPE, Rule 104 of the ICTR RPE. 
324 Rule of the 132 IRMCT RPE. 
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certification shall file an appeal within seven days of the filing of the decision to certify. 
The opposing party shall file a response within ten days of the filing of the appeal. The 
appellant may file a reply within four days of the filing of the response. Further, pursuant 
to paragraph (C), when the accused is not present or represented when the decision is 
pronounced, the time-limits prescribed under this Rule for filing an appeal or a notice of 
appeal shall run from the date on which the accused is notified of the decision. In addition, 
in the case the Trial Chamber or the Single Judge has indicated that a written decision will 
follow, the time limits prescribed under this Rule for filing an appeal or a notice of appeal 
shall run from the filing of the written decision. 
 The provisions regarding time limits were also changed. Rule 152 (A) of the 
IRMCT RPE provides that time limits run from, but do not include, the day upon which 
the relevant document is filed. Rule 126 of the ICTY RPE defines the starting point for the 
time limit as the occurrence of an event instead of filing the relevant document. Rule 153 
(B) is a new provision regarding time for filing responses to motions and provides that the 
appeal from judgement proceedings, a response to a motion filed by a party must be filed 
within ten days of the filing of the motion. A reply to the response has to be filed within 
four days of the filing of the response. Rule 154 (A) includes a new sentence concerning 
the variation of time limits, which provides that if the length of time prescribed has been 
increased, the total period must not exceed the maximum reasonable time limit for this 
type of procedural action. The amended provisions show the Security Council’s intention 
to ensure that proceedings are kept as short as possible.  
 
E. Restriction of Competence 
Because the IRMCT RPE need to be in accordance with the IRMCT Statute, the restriction 
regarding the jurisdiction of the Residual Mechanism is also found in the IRMCT RPE. 
Rule 11 of the IRMCT RPE expresses the restriction regarding the personal jurisdiction 
laid down in Article 1 (2) of the IRMCT Statute, which includes only high-level fugitives 
and provides that the Prosecutor can apply to a Trial Chamber to issue a formal request 
that a national court defer cases involving such persons to the competence of the Residual 
Mechanism. This restriction is also laid down in the provision regarding the conduct of 
investigations and provides that the Prosecutor only investigates persons already indicted 
by the Tribunals or persons covered by Article 1 (4) of the IRMCT Statute.325 Also, Rule 
125 (A) of the IRMCT RPE regarding penalties provides that only a person convicted of a 
crime under Article 1 (1)- (3) of the IRMCT Statute can be sentenced to imprisonment for 																																																								
325 Rule 36 (A) of the IRMCT RPE. 
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a term up to and including the remainder of the convicted person’s life. Rule 48 (B) of the 
IRMCT RPE restricts the ability of the Prosecutor to submit new inducements to the 
Registrar only regarding crimes defined in Article 1 (4) of the IRMCT Statute, thus 
including contempt and false testimony.  
 
F. Competence of the Single Judge 
Since the Single Judges were implanted for the trials at the Residual Mechanism, new 
provisions have been created regarding Single Judges.326 Modifications in competence 
were implemented.327 Rule 19 (G) of the IRMCT RPE regulates the absence of judges and 
provides that if a Single Judge is not able to continue sitting in a partially heard case for a 
period which is likely to be of longer duration, the President is allowed to assign another 
Single Judge to the case and order either a rehearing or continuation of the proceedings. 
But after the opening statements or the beginning of the presentation of evidence the 
continuation of the proceedings can only be ordered with the consent of the accused. Rule 
90 of the IRMCT RPE provides that contempt cases need to be carried out before a Single 
Judge instead of a full Chamber of judges, which was required by the ICTR RPE and the 
ICTY RPE. The ICC adopted that approach and amended Rule 165 ICC RPE. The Single 
Judge is allowed to perform functions that would usually be exercised by a full Chamber in 
proceedings on alleged offences against the administration of justice, according to Rule 
165 ICC RPE.328 
 
G. Defence Counsel 
Rule 43 (A) of the IRMCT RPE regulates the assignment of the Defence Counsel and 
provides that the assignment has to be in accordance with a directive set out by the 
Registrar and approved by the President. According to the provisions of the Tribunals’ 
Statutes, the directive needs to be approved by the judges.329 In addition, while the 
Tribunals’ provisions provide that the permanent judges need to be consulted when 
establishing the criteria for the payment of fees to assigned counsel, pursuant to Article 43 
(D) of the IRMCT RPE the Registrar establishes the criteria in consultation with the 
President. Further, in paragraph (C), a list was added regarding the ‘Duty Counsel’ and 
provides that: (1) the Duty Counsel needs to be situated within reasonable proximity to the 
detention facility of the relevant branch of the Residual Mechanism; (2) the Registrar must 																																																								
326 Rule 28, Rule 48 (A), Rule 50, Rule 51, Rule 57, Rules 63-65, Rule 69, Rule 78, Rule 86 (H), Rule 91, Rule 108. 
327 Rule 8, Rule 18 (B), Rule 70 (N), Rule 75, Rules 93-95, Rule 144. 
328 Report on the Adoption by the Judges of Provisional Amendments to Rule 165 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 29 February 
2016, para. 3. 
329 Rule 45 (A) of the ICTY RPE, Rule 45 (B) of the ICTR RPE. 
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at all times ensure that the Duty Counsel will be available to attend the detention facility of 
the relevant branch of the Residual Mechanism in the event of being summoned; (3) if an 
accused or suspected person is unrepresented at any time after being transferred to the 
Residual Mechanism, the Registrar needs to maintain a separate list of counsel who 
represent the accused until the counsel is engaged by the accused or assigned; and (4) 
when providing initial legal advice and assistance to an accused, the Duty Counsel needs to 
advise him of his rights including the rights under the IRMCT Statute and IRMCT RPE. 
Rule 43 (G) of the IRMCT RPE is a new provision and provides that under exceptional 
circumstances, at the request of the accused or his counsel, the Chamber can request the 
‘Registrar to replace an assigned counsel upon good cause being shown and after having 
been satisfied that the request is not designed to delay the proceedings’. 
 Another new provision regarding the counsel is Rule 47 (B) and (C) of the IRMCT 
RPE, which concerns sanctions for misconduct of the counsel and provides that sanctions 
are subject to appeal.330 Further, if a counsel assigned pursuant to Rule 43 is sanctioned 
with being refused audience the Chamber is able to instruct the Registrar to replace the 
counsel. But when an appeal against the decision imposing sanctions is filed, the Registrar 
shall not replace counsel before the Appeals Chamber determines the appeal. Paragraph 
(E) provides that the Registrar needs to publish and oversee the implementation of a Code 
of Professional Conduct for a Defence Counsel who appears before the Residual 
Mechanism, which is also subject to approval by the President. This provision was 
extended and provides that amendments to the code have to be made in consultation with 
representatives of the Prosecutor and Advisory Panel, and are subject to approval by the 
President. In March 2016, policies for remunerating the Defence Counsel in pretrial and 
appeals proceedings were issued. In addition, remuneration policies for trial, contempt 
proceedings, and self-represented accused persons are being finalised. According to the 
assessment and progress report, these documents reflect best practices from both the 
Tribunals.331 However, there was some criticism concerning the remuneration of the 
Defence Counsel, because the remuneration system of the Residual Mechanism would 
expect the Defence Counsel to do a lot of pro bono work. 332 The Defence Counsel for 
Ngirabatware and Kamuhanda is acting on a pro bono basis. In the case of Eliézer 
Niyitegeka the Defence Counsel was assigned only for a limited period of three months to 
help him prepare his review. The Residual Mechanism refused to allocate additional funds 
beyond that period, explaining that ‘as a matter of principle, it is not for the Mechanism to 																																																								
330 Rule 47 (B) of the IRMCT RPE.  
331 Assessment and progress report of the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Theodor 
Meron, for the period from 16 November 2015 to 15 May 2016, UN Doc. S/2016/453, 17 May 2016, para. 47.  
332 Yvonne McDermott, ‘Fairness before the Mechanism for the International Criminal Tribunals’ QIL 40 (2017), p. 48. 
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assist a convicted person whose case has reached finality with any new investigation he 
would like to conduct or any new motion he may wish to bring by assigning him legal 
assistance at the Mechanism’s expense.’ 333 This legal assistance is insufficient. The 
Defence Counsel should not be required to work pro bono. In order to be able to work on 
the case properly, the Defence Counsel needs to be appropriately remunerated. Otherwise, 
the fair trial rights of the accused could be violated. 
 
H. Rights of the Accused 
Rule 68 (B) of the IRMCT RPE regarding provisional release includes a new sentence, 
which requires that the existence of sufficiently compelling humanitarian grounds may be 
considered in granting such release. This is an improvement of the accused’s rights. Rule 
59 of the IRMCT RPE concerning the procedure after arrest was extended for paragraph 
(B) that provides that when an arrest is executed in respect of a warrant issued, the 
Registrar arranges for the transfer of an accused to the state named in the warrant of arrest. 
Rule 84 (B) is a new provision regarding the medical examination of the accused, who in 
the event of medical necessity is allowed to request an alternative or additional medical 
examination at a recognised medical institution that he believes to be capable of providing 
an impartial and qualified report on his medical condition in case he or she has reasonable 
grounds for such a request. However, the Residual Mechanism needs to duly consider such 
requests and also the following report.  
 A completely new provision is Rule 85, which regulates the case of the accused’s 
death while detained under the authority of the Residual Mechanism. In the case an 
investigation was carried out, a copy of the entire dossier of the investigations and findings 
has to be transmitted to the President of the Security Council within fourteen days from its 
compilation. Rule 77 (B) of the IRMCT Statute regarding depositions also requires the 
proprio motu order that be in writing and shall ‘indicate the name and whereabouts of the 
person whose deposition is sought, the date and place at which the deposition is to be 
taken, a statement of the matters on which the person is to be examined and of the 
circumstances justifying the taking of the deposition.’ According to Rule 71 (B) of the 
ICTY RPE and Rule 71 of the ICTR RPE, these requirements need to be fulfilled just for 
the motion of a party to a deposition, but not for the proprio motu order.  
 A new provision is found in Rule 87 of the IRMCT RPE regulating requests for 
assistance of the Residual Mechanism in obtaining testimony. According to paragraph (A), 
a judge or bench in another jurisdiction or parties in another jurisdiction that are authorised 																																																								
333 Eliézer Niyitegeka v. Prosecutor (MICT-12-16-R), Decision on Niyitegeka’s Motion for an Extension of the Assignment of his 
Counsel, 27 May 2016, para. 7. 
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by an appropriate judicial authority (‘Requesting Authority’) has the right to request the 
assistance of the Residual Mechanism in obtaining the testimony of a person under the 
authority of the Residual Mechanism for use in an on-going investigation or prosecution 
taking place in the jurisdiction of the Requesting Authority for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of former Yugoslavia or the 
territory of Rwanda or committed by Rwandan citizens in the territory of Rwanda’s 
neighbouring states. This request has to be submitted to the President of the Residual 
Mechanism, who refers the application to a Single Judge, according to Rule 87 (B) of the 
IRMCT RPE. However, the request cannot be granted if granting the request would 
prejudice on-going investigations or proceedings before the Residual Mechanism, 
according to Rule 87 (C) of the IRMCT RPE. According to paragraph (D), the Single 
Judge hears the parties to the proceedings and is allowed to grant a request after having 
verified that: (1) Granting the request will not risk the rights of the person under the 
authority of the Residual Mechanism; (2) provisions and assurances are in place for 
observing any protective measures granted by the Tribunals or the Residual Mechanism to 
the person under its authority; (3) granting the request will not result in a danger or risk to 
any witness, victim, or other person; and (4) no overriding grounds oppose granting the 
request.  
 Another completely new provision regulates the transfer of persons for the purpose 
of testimony in proceedings not pending before the Residual Mechanism. According to 
Rule 88 (A), a Single Judge considers the transfer of a person and is not allowed to grant 
unless the individual under the authority of the Residual Mechanism was duly summoned 
to testify and has provided his consent to the transfer. In addition, the host country to 
which the individual is to be transferred (‘Requesting State”) has to be given the 
opportunity to be heard and this state needs to provide written guarantees.334 The transfer 
of the individual must not extend the period of the person’s detention as foreseen by the 
Tribunals or the Residual Mechanism. Finally, no overriding grounds exist for not 
transferring the person to the territory of the Requesting State.335 A person under the 
authority of the Residual Mechanism is an accused or convicted person detained on the 
premises of the detention unit or facility of the relevant branch of the Residual 
Mechanism.336 The Single Judge is able to impose conditions upon the transfer of the 
individual, ‘including the execution of a bail bond and the observance of such conditions 																																																								
334 Rule 88 (A) (iv), like to the return of the transferred individual within a stipulated period, the non-transfer of the person to another 
jurisdiction, the appropriate conditions of detention, and immunities from prosecution and service of process for acts, omissions, or 
convictions prior to the person’s arrival in the territory of the Requesting State. 
335 Rule 88 (A) (i)-(vI) of the IRMCT RPE. 
336 According to Rule 88 (C) of the IRMCT RPE, the phrase ‘person under the authority of the Residual Mechanism’ means an accused 
or convicted person detained on the premises of the detention unit or facility of the relevant branch of the Residual Mechanism. 
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as necessary to ensure the presence of the person for trial thereafter and the protection of 
others.’337 The Single Judge can also issue a warrant of arrest to secure the presence of a 
person who was transferred, if needed.338 But the Single Judge can also revoke the order 
and make a formal request for the return of the transferred person.339  
 Rule 90 (G) of the IRMCT RPE includes a change regarding the maximum penalty 
for contempt. According to Rule 77 (G) of the ICTY RPE, the maximum penalty that can 
be imposed on an individual shall not exceed 100 000 EUR, and according to Rule 77 (G) 
of the ICTR RPE in the case of the ICTR the fine shall not exceed 10 000 USD. Pursuant 
to paragraph (G) of the IRMCT RPE, a fine shall not exceed 50 000 EUR. The fine 
regarding false testimony under oath has been changed as well, from 100 000 EUR under 
ICTY provision and 10 000 USD under ICTR provision to 50 000 EUR, according to Rule 
108 (G) of the IRMCT RPE.340 
 A new regulation is laid down in Rule 98 of the IRMCT RPE for the case that the 
accused refuses to appear before the Residual Mechanism for trial. The Trial Chamber is 
allowed to order that the trial proceeds in the absence of the accused. But the requirements 
are that the accused has made an initial appearance, the Registrar has notified the accused 
to be present for trial, the accused is physically and mentally fit, the accused has 
voluntarily and unequivocally waived or forfeited the right to be tried in his or her 
presence, and a counsel represents the interests of the accused. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The judicial continuity between the Tribunals and the Residual Mechanism is essential for 
the legacy of the ICTY and the ICTR. The Residual Mechanism is bound to interpret its 
Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence in accordance with the jurisprudence of the 
Tribunals. In cases where their respective Rules of Procedure and Evidence or Statutes are 
at issue, the Residual Mechanism is bound to consider the relevant precedent of these 
Tribunals when interpreting them. 341 The IRMCT RPE reflects the Security Council’s aim 
to guarantee that the proceedings of the Residual Mechanism mirror those of the 
Tribunals.342 Additionally, time limits were included, which show the Security Council’s 																																																								
337 Rule 88 (B) of the IRMCT RPE. 
338 Rule 88 (D) of the IRMCT RPE. 
339 Rule 88 (E) of the IRMCT RPE. 
340 91 (G) ICTY RPE, 91 (G) ICTR RPE. 
341 Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić (MICT-13-55-R90.3, MICT-13-58-R90.1), Decsion on Karažić Request to Appoint an Amicus 
Curiae Prosecutor to Investigate Contempt Allegations Against Former ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte, 27 November 2013, para. 7; 
Phénéas Munyarugarama v. Prosecutor (Case No. MICT-12-09-AR14), see note 81, paraa. 5-6; Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić 
(MICT-13-55-R90.3), Decision on Karadžić’s Request to Appoint an Amicus Curiae Prosecutor to Investigate Officials of United States 
of America and in Prosecution Motions to Strike Karadžić’s Supplemental Submissions, 13 March 2014, para. 12; Prosecutor v. Milan 
Lukić and Sredoje Lukić (Case No. MICT-13-52-R.1), Order Assigning Judges to a Case Before the Appeals Chamber, 24 February 
2014, p. 54. 
342 Secretary General’s Report, see note 58, para. 80; Rule 119 of the ICTY RPE; Rule 120 of the ICTR RPE. 
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intention to ensure that proceedings are kept as short as possible. This intention also 
explains the new provision found in Article 13 (3) of the IRMCT Statute, which provides 
that any amendments of the IRMCT RPE take effect upon adoption by the judges unless 
the Security Council decides otherwise. This is meant to prevent the Residual Mechanism 
from making changes to the IRMCT RPE that could jeopardise the Security Council’s aim 
to keep the Residual Mechanism small. Therefore, the judges are not able to amend the 
IRMCT RPE in such manner, that proceedings would be extended. Further, Article 13 (3) 
of the IRMCT Statute ensures that the Residual Mechanism adopts procedures similar to 
that of the Tribunals. Thus, a judicial revolution of the IRMCT RPE shall be prevented in 
order to ensure the legacy of the Tribunals  
 The Transitional Arrangements allow a smooth transfer of the Tribunals’ functions 
and responsibilities to the Residual Mechanism. In order to ensure legal certainty, 
decisions taken by a Trial or Appeals Chamber of the Tribunals while properly seized of 
the matter and prior the Commencement Date retain their validity before the Residual 
Mechanism. The Transitional Arrangements provide an explicit date when the Tribunals’ 
jurisdiction ends and the jurisdiction of the Residual Mechanism begins. Because 
uncertainties regarding jurisdiction would result in legal insecurity, it is only consistent 
that decisions taken by the Tribunals after the Commencement Date do not have a legal 
effect on the Residual Mechanism. Thus, the Transitional Arrangements provide a clear-
cut path regarding the jurisdiction of the Tribunals and the Residual Mechanism.  
 Indeed, the Security Council considered the criticism against the establishment of 
the Residual Mechanism and provided provisions addressing that criticism. First, when 
establishing the structure, it was ensured that the Residual Mechanism is a small and 
efficient body. The number of Trial Chambers was reduced, since the Residual Mechanism 
has one for each branch. The Residual Mechanism consists of the Prosecutor and the 
Registry common to both branches. The IRMCT Statute provides for a common President, 
who will exercise the functions at each seat of the Residual Mechanism when it is needed. 
A Single Judge will from now on conduct proceedings for contempt and false testimony, 
and the Appeals Chamber shall now be composed of three judges instead of five. The 
Residual Mechanism’s judges are allowed to make decisions remotely, and the judges 
receive remuneration only for the day they exercise their function. Appropriate 
remuneration for the judges is necessary in order to guarantee the quality of their decisions 
and avoid corruption. But taking into account that the Tribunals’ costs have already been 
under strong criticism, the Security Council needed to reduce the costs of the Residual 
Mechanism as much as possible when creating the Residual Mechanism. The remuneration 
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system needs to allow judges to work with full concentration on their cases. The Security 
Council could solve the problem by returning judges for certain cases to The Hague on a 
permanent basis. For example, in appeal cases the judge could receive remuneration while 
in The Hague until the decision has been issued, which would make the remuneration 
fairer. These changes downsize the Residual Mechanism to a small body, which also leads 
to saving of costs. But at the same time, the quality of the jurisdiction needs to be 
guaranteed. Otherwise the establishment of the Residual Mechanism would be useless. 
 Second, provisions were included in the IRMCT Statue that were not statutory 
provisions of the Tribunals. Of greatest importance are Article 1 (3) of the IRMCT Statute, 
which requires the Residual Mechanism only to prosecute high-level fugitives, and Article 
6 (1) of the IRMCT Statute, which obliges the Residual Mechanism to refer cases to 
national jurisdiction concerning persons, who are not high-level fugitives. The Security 
Council addressed the criticism against the establishment of the Residual Mechanism by 
putting an important regulation of the Completion Strategy into the IRCMT Statute. This is 
an indication of the Security Council´s vision that referrals should be an important part in 
the functioning of the Residual Mechanism. This approach demonstrates the Security 
Council’s objective to oblige the Residual Mechanism to refer cases when requirements 
are met. The decision to impose a mandatory obligation on the Residual Mechanism 
ensures that the Residual Mechanism’s work is as limited as possible. This amendment 
appears to be the consequence for the Tribunals’ practice of not referring contempt cases to 
national jurisdictions although they have the power to transfer those cases. Transferring 
cases of contempt could have reduced the Tribunals’ workload. Hence, Article 1 (4) of the 
IRMCT Statute obliges the Residual Mechanism to transfer contempt cases to national 
jurisdiction in order to prevent the Residual Mechanism from taking over the Tribunals’ 
practice. Further, Article 1 (5) of the IRMCT Statute ensures that the Residual Mechanism 
is not able to extend its jurisdictional competence by refusing the power to issue any new 
indictments against persons who are not among the most senior leaders. Article 16 of the 
IRMCT Statute supports this by prohibiting the Prosecutor from preparing new indictments 
against persons other than those. The workload of the Residual Mechanism is thus reduced, 
because the Residual Mechanism is obliged to transfer cases when requirements are met. 
These amendments are able to ensure that the Residual Mechanism completes its work 
expeditiously. However, as Stahn has pointed out, ‘“lean” justice should not turn into 
“cheap justice”’.343 The IRMCT Statute and the IRMCT RPE provide regulations in 
accordance with fair trial rights.  																																																								
343 Carsten Stahn, ‘Tribunals are Dead, Long Live Tribunals: MICT, the Kosovo Specialist 
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 The Security Council needed to provide a Statute for the Residual Mechanism, 
which is in accordance with the Tribunals’ Statutes. Provisions having only slight 
variations from analogous provisions in the Tribunals’ Statutes show that the Residual 
Mechanism has inherited role of the Tribunals’ legacy. The continuity of jurisprudence 
needs to be guaranteed in order to avoid legal uncertainty. Therefore, the Security Council 
needed to amend provisions in order to reduce the workload of the Residual Mechanism 
but at the same time preserve legal continuity between the Tribunals and the Residual 
Mechanism. Thanks to these amendments, the Residual Mechanism is a small body and the 
workload will be reduced, as the Residual Mechanism is now obliged to transfer cases to 
national jurisdiction.  
																																																																																																																																																																							
Chambers and the Turn to New Hybridity’ EJIL: Talk!, availiable at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/tribunals-are-dead-long-live-tribunals-
mict-the-kosovo-specialist-chambers- and-the-turn-to-new-hybridity/ (last visited  on 30 May 2017). 
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VIII. Residual Function: Preservation and Management of Archives 
The management and preservation of the Tribunals’ archives is the second most important 
function of the Residual Mechanism. Article 27 of the IRMCT Statute governs the 
management of the Tribunals’ archives as one of the main tasks of the Residual 
Mechanism. Like Article 6 of the IRMCT Statute, which the concerns referral of cases to 
national authorities, it is a completely new statutory provision regarding to the ICTY and 
ICTR Statutes, but in contrast to Article 6 of the IRMCT Statute, it does not have a basis in 
the Tribunals’ Rules of Procedure and Evidence. According to Article 27 (1) of the 
IRMCT Statute, the archives of the Tribunals and the Residual Mechanism shall remain 
the property of the UN. Therefore, the archives require special protection.1 Furthermore, 
the archives need to be inviolable wherever they are located according to Section 4 of the 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN of 13 February 1946.2 Pursuant to 
Article 27 (2) of the IRMCT Statute, the Residual Mechanism is responsible the access to 
and preservation of the archives. The Tribunals’ archives have to be co-located with the 
respective branches of the Residual Mechanism.3 The Arusha branch of the Residual 
Mechanism is home to the ICTR’s archives and the ICTY’s archives are located at The 
Hague branch of the Residual Mechanism.4 Paragraph (3) ensures the protection of 
confidential information. This includes information regarding protected witnesses and 
records provided on a confidential basis. In order to ensure this purpose, the Residual 
Mechanism has to implement an information security and access system, in particular for 
the classification and declassification of information. Since the Commencement Dates of 
the respective branches the Residual Mechanism, has been responsible for the management 
of the archives.5 The Tribunals are responsible for preparing their records for transfer to 
the Residual Mechanism, and each Tribunal is responsible for managing the materials of 
any case that will be conducted by the Tribunals until its completion or transfer to the 
Residual Mechanism. 6  Pursuant to Article 6 of the Transitional Arrangements, the 
Tribunals were requested to make all necessary arrangements to ensure, as soon as 
possible, a coordinated transfer of records and archives. While the ICTR has completed the 																																																								
1 Secretary-General’s Report on the Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Options for Possible Locations for the Archives of the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Seat of the Residual 
Mechanism(s) for the Tribunals, UN Doc. S/2009/258, 21 May 2009; Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. 
S/PRST/2008/47,19 December 2008, para. 15. 
2 UN General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on 13 February 1946 (1 UNTS 15). This Convention appeared In the Journal of the General Assembly, I, No. 34 (7 March 
1946), pages 687-693; and in Document A/43, Annex I, pp. 5-15. 
3 Article 27 (2) of the IRMCT Statute. 
4 Article 3 of the IRMCT Statute. 
5 Article 27 (2) of the IRMCT Statute; Article 6 of the Transitional Arrangements.  
6 Report of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals on the progress of its work in the initial period, UN Doc. 
S/2015/896, 20 November 2015, para. 60; Assessment and progress report of the President of the International Residual Mechanism for 
Criminal Tribunals, Judge Theodor Meron, for the period from 23 May 2013 to 15 November 2013, UN Doc. S/2013/679, 18 November 
2013, para. 59. 
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transfer of its records, the ICTY has transferred 41% of its physical records and 80% of its 
digital records to the Residual Mechanism thus far.7 Regulating the management of the 
archives is one of the main provisions in the IRMCT Statute, because that task represents 
an essential residual function that needs to be carried out by the Residual Mechanism. 
 
1. The Great Significance of the Archives 
The Tribunals’ archives were primarily used for their judicial activities. But, their 
secondary value for memory, education, and research should not be underestimated. 
According to the Secretary-General’s report, the archivists suggest that the records also 
have great value for the creation of future institutions, comparable with the Residual 
Mechanism.8 Therefore, the archives need to be saved for use in future projects. 
 First, the proper execution of the other residual functions by the Residual 
Mechanism requires access to the Tribunals’ records. For example, in order to carry out the 
victims and witness protection properly, the Residual Mechanism needs access to the 
records regarding victims and witnesses. In the case a witness who testified before the 
ICTY or ICTR is afraid for his or her security, the witnesses` case file needs to be 
available for the Residual Mechanism in order to decide about further measures to 
guarantee the safety of the witness. But access to the relevant original records of 
proceedings before the ICTY or ICTR is also of crucial importance when also when there 
are requests for review of judgement and allegations of contempt. Another example is 
when a decision is made regarding the referral of a case to national authorities or when a 
referral is revoked, necessitating on access to information on similar cases, like prior 
decisions, orders, and other relevant material. And if requests for pardon or commutation 
of sentences are filed, the convicted person’s file has to be available. Any evidence 
regarding cooperation with the Office of the Prosecutor needs to be included.9  
 But after a certain period, the archives’ secondary value in education and memory 
will progressively predominate. The content of the Tribunals’ archives is very important to 
witnesses, victims, and their families, and the populations of the affected regions. 
Therefore, a significant part of the Tribunals’ legacy are its archives, ‘which are sometimes 																																																								
7 Assessment and progress report of the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Theodor 
Meron, for the period from 16 May to 15 November 2016, UN Doc. S/2016/975, 17 November 2016, paras. 82, 84; Assessment and 
report of Judge Theodor Meron, President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, provided to the Security Council 
pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1534 (2004) covering the period from 16 May 2015 to 16 November 2015, UN 
Doc. S/2015/874, 16 November 2015, para. 34; Report on the completion of the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda as at 15 November 2015, UN Doc. S/2015/884, 17 November 2015, para.165; Assessment and progress report of the President 
of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Theodor Meron, for the period from 16 November 2015 to 15 
May 2016, UN Doc. S/2016/453, 17 May 2016, paras. 71- 72. 
8 Report of the Secretary-General on the administrative and budgetary aspects of the options for possible locations for the archives of 
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the seat of the Residual 
Mechanism(s) for the Tribunals, UN Doc. S/2009/258, 21 May 2009, para. 53. 
9 Ibid., para. 55; Gabriel Oosthuizen, ‘The residual functions oft he UN international tribunals oft he former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone: the potential role oft he International Criminal Court’ ICSL (2008) 14. 
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said to be the physical manifestation of society’s collective memory, subject to responsible 
storage and collection for its future interpreters and narrators’.10 As historians Schwartz 
and Cook stated, ‘through archives the past is controlled.’11  And fighting over the 
management of the archives is like a battle to control the future.12 According to Schwartz 
and Cook, archives as records contain power to shape the direction of scholarship, 
collective memory, and national identity.13 Hence, archives represent human identity, and 
the control of the Tribunals’ archives equals the symbolic and physical control of the past 
and the control of the future. 14 
 
2. Contents of the Archives 
The archives of the two Tribunals contain information connected to the conflicts in 
Rwanda and former Yugoslavia. During their activities, the Tribunals have generated many 
records that are different in form and medium, including electronic, audio-visual formats, 
paper formats, maps, photographs, objects and formats in the form of artefacts.15 All 
hearings that have taken place and many interviews of witnesses and other persons of 
interest to the Tribunals are part of the records. The materials further include 
investigations, indictments and court proceedings, documents regarding the detention of 
accused individuals, the protection of witnesses and enforcement of sentences but also 
documents from states, other law enforcement authorities, international and non-
governmental organisations.16 
 It was initially estimated that the archives of the two Tribunals would collectively 
amount to approximately 15 000 linear metres of physical records. 17 But after a more 
detailed inventory and appraisal, it is now estimated that the total volume is approximately 
10 000 linear metres. The digital archives contain nearly three petabytes of data and tens of 
thousands of hours of audio-visual recordings.18 
 																																																								
10 Irene C. Lu, ‘Curtain Call at Closing: The Multi-Dimensional Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda’ U. Pa. J. 
Int'l L. 34 (2013) 859, 891; Kenneth E. Foote ‘To Remember and Forget: Archives, memory, and Culture’ American Archivist 53 (1990) 
378. 
11 Joan M. Schwartz and Terry Cook, ‘Archives, Records, and Power: The Making of Modern Memory’ Archival Science 2 (2002) 2. 
12 Irene C. Lu, ‘Curtain Call at Closing: The Multi-Dimensional Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda’ U. Pa. J. 
Int'l L. 34 (2013) 859, 892. 
13 Joan M. Schwartz and Terry Cook, ‘Archives, Records, and Power: The Making of Modern Memory’ Archival Science 2 (2002) 2. 
14 Irene C. Lu, ‘Curtain Call at Closing: The Multi-Dimensional Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda’ U. Pa. J. 
Int'l L. 34 (2013) 859, 893; Brigitte Benoit Landale and Huw Llewellyn, ‘The International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals: 
The Beginning oft he End fort he ICTY and ICTR’ Int'l Org. L. Rev 8 (2011) 349, 363.  
15 Secretary-General’s Report, see note 1, para. 43. 
16 Assessment and progress report of the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Theodor 
Meron, for the period from 16 November 2014 to 15 May 2015, UN Doc. S/2015/341, 15 May 2015. 
17 Third annual report of the International Residual Mechanism Criminal Tribunals, UN Doc. A/70/225-S/2015/586, 31 July 2015, para. 
62. 
18 Assessment and report of Judge Theodor Meron, President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, provided to the 
Security Council pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1534 (2004), and covering the period from 23 May 2012 to 16 
November 2012, UN Doc. S/2012/847, 19 November 2012, para. 66; First Annual Report of the International Residual Mechanism for 
Criminal Tribunals, UN Doc. A/68/219-S/2013/464, 2 August 2013, para. 64; Second annual report of the International Residual 
Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, UN Doc. A/69/226-S/2014/555, 1 August 2014, para. 25. 
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The records of the Tribunals can be classified into three main categories: (a) Judicial 
records related to the cases, (b) Records that are not part of the judicial records stricto 
sensu but were produced in relation to the judicial process, and (c) Administrative 
records.19 
 Judicial records consist of records of each case that were produced by the Registry, 
the Chambers, the Prosecutor, the Defence, the accused person, and the third parties like 
the states or the amicus curiae.20 These are motions, transcripts, exhibits, orders, decisions, 
and judgements. Further, judicial records include the video and audio recordings of the 
proceedings as well as submitted artefacts. For every case the indictments, correspondence, 
motions, orders, internal memorandums, judgement, decisions, exhibits, disclosure, and 
transcripts are preserved, in hard copy and/or electronic format in English and in French. 
The Court Management Support Services of the ICTY Registry and the Court Management 
Section of the ICTR Registry managed those records.21  
 The second category contains records regarding the judicial process, but which do 
not belong to the judicial records of the case, like records of plenary meetings of judges 
and of other sub-organ or inter-organ meetings, correspondence with the UN and other 
entities, diplomatic meetings, data on witnesses and detainees, press releases, contracts, 
and commercial agreements and interviews.22 These records were generated and managed 
by the Office of the Prosecutor, the Registry and the Office of the President. The records 
generated by the Office of the Prosecutor that were not used during the trial proceedings 
are managed and preserved by the Office of the Prosecutor. These records include 
documents connected to prosecution policy, practice, and correspondence. The Office of 
the Prosecutor keeps the different material and documents, including audiotapes and 
videotapes, interviews and statements of suspects, victims, witnesses, and accused, 
artefacts, information obtained from governments, UN organs, and intergovernmental and 
non-governmental organisations. 23  
 The Prosecutor’s records were managed separately from the records kept by the 
Registry.24 The Office of the Registrar produced and retained different records, like those 
concerning privileges and immunities of the Tribunal, contracts and commercial 
arrangements, agreements with the host country, agreements on enforcement of sentences, 
claims against the organisation, agreements on relocation, diplomatic relations and other 
representational matters, and records regarding meetings and general correspondence. In 																																																								
19 Secretary-General’s Report, see note 1, para. 44. 
20 Ibid., para. 45. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., para. 47. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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addition, the Public Information Section of the Registry issued reports, press releases, 
booklets, photographs, posters, audiotapes, and videotapes, and administers the Tribunals’ 
websites.”25 And the Office of the President detained information connected to meetings of 
the Tribunals’ sub-organs participating in main decisions concerning its functioning, 
plenary meetings of the judges, diplomatic relations, annual reports, and completion 
strategy reports as well as various correspondence.26 
 The administrative records of each Tribunal are records regarding procurement, 
human resources, finance, and other administrative support functions. They were produced 
and managed by the Registry of each Tribunal.27 
 
3. Categorisation and Disposal of Records  
But not all of the Tribunals’ records were important enough to be permanently preserved 
and transferred to the Residual Mechanism.28 The Secretary-General's bulletin on ‘Record-
keeping and the management of the United Nations Archives’ defines archives as 'records 
to be permanently preserved for their administrative, fiscal, legal historical or information 
value’.29 Hence, the Tribunals faced the challenge of analysing which information have 
permanent value and will, therefore, be determined as Tribunals’ archives, and which have 
only temporary value and how long these records need to be kept. 30  
 In order to work out the records worthy of permanent preservation, the Tribunals 
worked in close cooperation towards the development of a common policy of retention and 
preservation for all records of the Tribunals. The ICTY recruited an archivist in July 2009 
to establish a system that identified records.31 Furthermore, the President of the ICTY 
appointed the Chief of the Court Management and Support Section to implement a plan 
regulating the review of case records and determining which records need to be 
declassified and which witness protection measures need to be varied. 32 The archivist 
worked with the Archives and Records Management Section and the Joint Tribunal 
Archival Strategy Working Group on the development of a records retention policy. The 
policy included identifying duplicate records and administrative records eligible for 																																																								
25 Ibid., para. 49. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid, para. 42. 
29 Secretary-General’s bulletin, Section 1 (a), UN Doc. ST/SGB/2007/5, 12 February 2007. 
30 Secretary-General’s Report, see note 1, para. 87. 
31 Assessment and report of Judge Patrick Robinson, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
provided to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 6 of Council resolution 1534 (2004), covering the period from 15 May to 15 
November 2009, UN Doc. S/2009/589, 13 November 2009, para. 62; Assessment and report of Judge Patrick Robinson, President of the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, provided to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council 
resolution 1534 (2004), covering the period from 15 May 2010 to 15 November 2010, UN Doc. S/2010/588, 19 November 2010, para. 
81; Report on the completion strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (as of 1 November 2010), UN Doc. 
S/2010/574, 5 November 2010, para. 71. 
32 Ibid. 
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disposal as well as administrative records with continuing value for transfer to the 
archives. The ICTR established the Legacy Committee of the Tribunal, which included 
representatives of the Tribunals’ three organs that coordinated the work that was on-going 
in all sections of the Tribunal. A legal team reviewed witness protection orders and 
decisions issued by the Tribunal since its inception. 33 
 The Tribunals, the Joint Archives Strategy Working Group, the Archives and 
Records Management Section, and the Office of Legal Affairs met in February 2011 at the 
ICTY and worked together to establish an information security and access system for the 
records of the Tribunals and the Residual Mechanism. 34  In 2012, the Residual 
Mechanism’s Archives and Records Section took over the implementation and 
development of the record-keeping policies for the Tribunals. A new Secretary-General’s 
bulletin was implemented for these purposes.35 On 20 July 2012, the Secretary-General 
issued a bulletin entitled ‘International Criminal Tribunals: information sensitivity, 
classification, handling and access,’ which describes the classification process of records 
and information. 36 In addition, the handling of the records needed to be in accordance with 
the Secretary-General’s bulletins ‘Record-keeping and the management of the United 
Nations Archives’ and ‘Information sensitivity, classification and handling,’ both issued in 
2007.37 In recognition of the unique nature of the work of the ICTY, the ICTR, and the 
Residual Mechanism, the bulletin provided information concerning the management of the 
documents for the three institutions. It also established the basis for the security and access 
policies as well as procedures to be applied to the records after they were transferred and 
the practices to be put in place regarding the security, access and handling of the 
information and records generated during the work of the Residual Mechanism.38  
 According to section 3.1 of the Secretary-General bulletin ‘International Criminal 
Tribunals: information sensitivity, classification, handling and access’, each of the 
Tribunals is responsible for determining the security level of all records and information 
within its competence.39 The determination of security classification levels of the judicial 
records lies with the Chambers or the President of the Tribunal that has competence.40 But 																																																								
33 Report on the completion strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UN Doc. S/2009/587, 12 November 2009, para. 
71; Report on the completion strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UN Doc. S/2011/731, 16 November 2011, 
para. 95. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Assessment and report of Judge Patrick Robinson, President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, provided to the 
Security Council pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1534 (2004), UN Doc. S/2011/316’ 18 May 2011, para. 102. 
36 Secretary-General’s bulletin, International Criminal Tribunals: information sensitivity, classification, handling and access, UN Doc. 
ST/SGB/2012/3, 20 July 2012. 
37 Ibid., Section 1.1.  
38 Assessment and report of Judge Theodor Meron, President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, provided to the 
Security Council pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1534 (2004), and covering the period from 23 May 2012 to 16 
November 2012, UN Doc. S/2012/847, 19 November 2012, para. 71. 
39 Section 3.1 of the Secretary-General’s bulletin, International Criminal Tribunals: information sensitivity, classification, handling and 
access, UN Doc. ST/SGB/2012/3, 20 July 2012. 
40 Ibid., Section 3.2. 
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the authority to determine the security classification levels of non-judicial records and 
information lies with the head of the organ that initially created them.41 Section 1 of the 
Secretary-General’s bulletin ‘Information sensitivity, classification and handling’ and 
Section 4 of the Secretary-General’s bulletin ‘International Criminal Tribunals: 
information sensitivity, classification, handling and access’ contains the classification 
principles including the description of when a document has to be classified as sensitive, 
like in the case of personal information related to persons or families of such persons who 
have been or are currently detained by the ICTY or ICTR.42  
 When categorising records, the provisions regarding the change in classification 
were of particular importance. Section 6.1 of the Secretary-General’s bulletin 
‘International Criminal Tribunals: information sensitivity, classification, handling and 
access’ regulates that changes to the classification levels of judicial records shall be 
effected only after judicial authorisation or as otherwise provided for by the applicable 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the respective Tribunal. Non-judicial records and 
information may be reviewed for possible declassification 50 years or 20 years after the 
date of creation depending on the type of classified non-judicial records and information.43 
However, the head of the organ that originally classified the information or the successor 
of that original organ may review on an item-by-item basis non-judicial records which do 
not contain information classified by judicial authority and which initially were classified 
as ‘strictly confidential’. The declassification is possible 20 years after the date of 
creation. 44  And records that are classified as ‘confidential’ shall be declassified 
automatically 20 years after the date of creation or acquisition.45 But according to Frisso, 
the application of that provision to the Tribunals' records raises some issues. Documents 
that include decisions that are classified as confidential cannot be automatically 
declassified without a judicial decision.46 This could result in misuse and consequently 
endanger the victims and witnesses. The alternative mentioned by Acquaviva is that 
confidentiality should not be lifted before all convicted persons and other persons involved 
in the decisions have passed away.47 On the one hand, it is more practical to declassify 
confidential information automatically after 20 years. The workload would be reduced 
because the amount of confidential information that requires special protection would 																																																								
41 Ibid., Section 3.3. 
42 Ibid., Section 4. 2 (c). 
43 Ibid., Section 6. 2 and 6.4. 
44 Ibid., Section 6.5 (a). 
45 Ibid., Section 6.5 (b). 
46 Giovanna M. Frisso, ‘The Winding Down of the ICTY: The Impact of the Completion Strategy and the Residual Mechanism on 
Victims’ GoJIL 3 (2011) 1039, 1119. 
47 Guido Acquaviva, ’Best Before the Date Indicated: Residual Mechanisms at the ICTY’, ’Best Before the Date Indicated: Residual 
Mechanisms at the ICTY’ in Albertus Henricus Joannes Swart, Alexander Zahar, Göran Sluiter (eds.) The Legacy of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011), p. 24. 
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decrease. The special management measures for confidential documents necessitate being 
kept separately from public documents and under strict security conditions.48 The Residual 
Mechanism will be responsible for guaranteeing protection of those confidential records. 
Hence, the Residual Mechanism needs to implement special security measures regarding 
confidential information, so that no unwarranted outside access is possible. Since the 
Tribunals started their mandate they have received many confidential documents and 
information but on the presumption that these documents would never be made public. 
Documents regarding protected witnesses were classified as confidential. But also 
transcripts of closed trial sessions or confidential administrative documents are considered 
as confidential information.49 A huge part of the documents at the Office of the Prosecutor 
were provided to the Prosecutor on a confidential basis.50 According to Rule 70 of the 
ICTY and ICTR RPE, these records shall not be disclosed without the consent of the 
person or entity that provided information in the first place. This would result in an 
obstruction for the Prosecutor to get information.  
 The proportion of confidential records to public records varies.51 But it will vary 
even more over time because more records will be declassified and made publicly 
available. The accessibility of the records is important for the people of the affected 
countries in order to understand and to process what they have experienced. Also of great 
importance is the commemorative function of the archives. However, it is necessary to find 
a balance between protecting the confidentiality of sensitive records and ensuring the 
accessibility of the records. The safety of the victims and witnesses is of crucial 
importance. Conflicts still exist between the different ethnic groups left and information 
regarding victims and witnesses could put them in danger. Therefore, the solution to 
declassify information after the death of the convicted person and other persons involved 
in the decision would be preferable in order to guarantee the safety of victims and 
witnesses. Supporting the Tribunals’ efforts, the Residual Mechanism Archives and 
Records Section provided training and prepared guidelines to ensure that the records were 
prepared in conformity with the applicable standards. The training contained executive 
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briefings for Tribunal managers and half-day training sessions for designated staff that will 
carry out the detailed work of preparing and transferring records. 52 
 
4. Finding a Suitable Location for the Archives  
One of the main issues was to find a suitable location to house the archives. Starting from 
the premise that the control of the Tribunals’ archives equates the symbolic and physical 
control of the past and the control of the future.53 For that reason, the affected countries 
have not been considered as a suitable location for the archives.  
 
A. Decision-Making Process 
In their decision-making processes the ICTY and the ICTR had to conduct further study 
before providing their position on the matter to the Security Council. Thereafter, the 
Registrars of the Tribunals created a joint an Advisory Committee on Archives (ACA) in 
September 2007, chaired by Justice Richard Goldstone, to analyse the needs for the future 
location and management of the archives.54 But at the same time the mandate included an 
independent analysis of how best to ensure future accessibility of the archives.55 The ACA 
undertook consultations with relevant stakeholders including governments, victims groups, 
international organisations, regional organisations, and civil society worldwide.56 The 
results in accordance with the outputs of other on-going consultations undertaken by the 
Tribunals formed the basis of their recommendations to the Security Council for its 
consideration. The difficulty was to balance practical and financial considerations with the 
need to provide access to the victims and the public at large. 
 In September 2008, the ACA provided a final report, made 34 recommendations, 
and submitted a comparative examination of two options for the housing of the archives of 
the ICTY and the ICTR. One option was to locate both archives at UN Headquarters in 
New York, and the other option was to have two separate locations, one in Europe for the 
ICTY archives (The Hague, Geneva, Vienna or Budapest) and one in Africa for the ICTR 
archives (Nairobi, Arusha or Addis Ababa).57 However, the ACA strongly recommended 
separate locations for the archives, which should be located on the continent of each 																																																								
52 Assessment and report of Judge Theodor Meron, President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, provided to the 
Security Council pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1534 (2004) and covering the period from 19 November 2013 
to 16 May 2014, UN Doc. S/2014/351,16 May 2014, para. 56. 
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affected area. Further, the ACA pointed out that the archives of the Tribunals would be 
inextricably linked to the performance of residual functions. According to the ACA’s 
report, as long as the archives contain confidential information they should not be 
transferred to the affected countries.58 But at the same time, the ACA suggested that when 
there is no longer confidential information the archives, the UN could transfer the archives 
to an affected country while retaining ownership.59 Most of the recommendations made by 
the ACA were endorsed by the Tribunals, like the suggestion of locating the archives of 
each Tribunal separately in Europe and in Africa. The Tribunals agreed that some criteria 
needed to be taken into account when evaluating the suitability of a location, including 
archival integrity, security, preservation, access, technology, classification, and 
declassification.60 At the same time the ICTY did not support the ACA’s recommendation 
that the UN should consider transferring physical custody of the archives to the countries 
of former Yugoslavia when confidential information no longer existed. According to the 
ICTY, it would be necessary to copy the entire archive for each of the countries of former 
Yugoslavia, which would be impossible to do in the future, both politically and 
logistically. But the ICTY agreed on the option of transferring the archives to one location 
in the countries of former Yugoslavia after all the confidential records were declassified. 
The Tribunal also recommended as possible locations other locations in Europe where 
large UN common system operations are present, such as Bonn, Rome and Paris.61 
 The Secretary-General relied on the report of the ACA when considering possible 
locations for the archives. But he also made his own consultations with the UN and other 
offices at possible locations as the locations recommended by the ACA. 62 However, the 
principles highlighted in the Secretary-General's report and the results of his preliminary 
consultations with possible locations provided a good basis for the Security Council’s 
decisions regarding the location of the Tribunals' archives. The Secretary-General's report 
considered thirteen potential locations in Africa and Europe where the UN is present, in 
addition to further eight ‘non-Tribunal’ agency offices.63 In addition, The Hague and 
Arusha were considered because they were the locations of the Tribunals, and the ICTY as 
well as the ICTR provided much information about their current locations. The report also 
pointed out that there were long-term strategic considerations to bear in mind as well. 
Besides the ICTY and ICTR, several other ad hoc UN or UN-assisted criminal tribunals 																																																								
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exist, which will require some sort of residual mechanisms with functions similar to those 
of the Residual Mechanism.64 The interests of the people who were affected by the horrible 
conflicts are important. Therefore, it is of crucial importance that the archives’ public 
parts, which guarantee fostering memory and reconciliation, are accessible to the affected 
people. But at the same time, it is necessary to protect the confidential information in the 
Tribunals’ archives that were provided to the ICTY and the ICTR by individuals, entities, 
and states. Therefore, the report suggested a location for two branches of a Residual 
Mechanism or two Residual Mechanisms, in Europe regarding the ICTY and in Africa 
regarding the ICTR. The Residual Mechanism should be attached to existing UN offices or 
to a different international organisation offering similar security and enjoying similar 
privileges and immunities, like the ICC. The Archives and Records Management Section 
in New York indicated that it is not able to house the Tribunals’ archives at the UN 
Headquarters. In addition, capital investment would be necessary to do so. However, there 
is no criminal courtroom facility at the UN Headquarters for the judicial work of the 
Residual Mechanism.65  
 
B. The Decisive Criteria 
Some criteria and standards needed to be considered when deciding on the location for the 
archives of the Tribunals and the Residual Mechanism. First, the archives needed to be 
kept as an entity. This belongs to the principle of archival integrity, as 'the records of a 
given agency should be kept together as the records of that agency, such records should be 
kept, as far as possible, in the arrangement given them in the agency in the course of its 
official business, such records should be kept in their entirety, without mutilation, 
alteration, or unauthorised destruction of portions of them’.66 According to this, each of the 
Tribunals’ archives should be kept as a complete entity and, thus, transferring the 
confidential records and the public records to different locations would not have been in 
accordance with this principle.  
 Keeping the archives accessible was another important criterion. The archives 
provide important information for the people of the affected countries that could help to 
contextualise the experiences and also alleviate their suffering. This information may 
vindicate their memory and status. Furthermore, the access to the archives is guaranteed in 
the victims’ rights to the truth.67 But it needed to be balanced with the requirement to 																																																								
64 Apart from ICTY and ICTR, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. The Extraordinary Chambers in 
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protect confidential records provided by individuals, entities and states, like protected 
witnesses and governments providing confidential information to the Prosecutor.68 In order 
to prevent unauthorised access to confidential records and to preserve the integrity and 
authenticity of the archives, the security of the documents must be guaranteed. Otherwise, 
individuals who submitted information or testified before the ICTY or ICTR could be in 
danger. Furthermore, a failure to ensure the security of the archives would raise problems 
of national security for states and breach the Tribunals’ obligation to uphold 
confidentiality. Therefore, confidential information had to be appropriately classified or 
declassified and protected from unauthorised access. The institution that would house the 
archives needed a robust physical security infrastructure.69 
 And as technology changes in order to preserve the Tribunals’ archives, in 
particular audio-visual and other digital records, it was required to move to new 
applications to guarantee that the archives are kept accessible. In addition, preservation 
also required that the physical infrastructure was able to provide the capacity to house the 
hard copy and digital material in appropriate environmental and storage conditions.70 The 
ICTY as well as the ICTR estimated that at least 700 square metres are required to manage 
its respective archives. This includes ‘approximately 400 square metres for repository floor 
space and 150 to 200 square metres for office space and a study area.’71 Therefore, access 
also refers to the ability to locate information by using catalogues, indexes, or finding aids. 
But the permission to locate and receive the information needed to be limited by legally 
established restrictions of privacy, confidentiality, and security clearance.72 Therefore, the 
Secretary-General’s report recommended ‘a free-standing facility or a part of a shared 
building that is capable of being completely isolated from other activities’, which needed 
to afford ‘protection against fire, flood, damp, dust, pollutants, and pests, with floors able 
to bear the heavy load of compact shelving. But separate storage areas meeting 
international standards of climate control and protection against dust, dirt, and pollutant 
gases were also needed’.73  
 
 a. Potential Users as Important Criteria 
In order to be able to determine which records needed to be preserved and what access 
needed to be provided, it was first necessary to clarify who the users of the archives would 																																																																																																																																																																							
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68 Secretary-General’s Report, see note 1, paras. 201, 202. 
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be. That was an important factor when deciding the location of the archives, because 
location of the Tribunals depended also on the interests of potential users. The people 
directly affected by the conflicts will be very interested in the archives. Thus, the archives’ 
function is to foster memory and reconciliation. But government officials, other 
international tribunals and courts, journalists, historians, legal researchers, and political 
scientists will also request access to the Tribunals’ archives.74  
 Of great importance was that national authorities and also national immigration 
authorities would have access to the records of the Tribunals, including confidential 
materials, when investigating and prosecuting persons. According to the Secretary- 
General’s report, the national authorities of the affected countries and also other countries 
that are holding trials have requested records of the ICTY as well as of the ICTR 
increasingly over the years.75 But administrative records, too, will have primary value for 
former staff members of the ICTY and ICTR who may wish to access their personal data 
in the years after the closure of the Tribunals. But only a small amount of administrative 
material will likely have archival value.76 Different parts of the public will be interested in 
accessing the archives both for their legal and commemorative value, including 
prosecutors, national judges, defence counsel, and victims. For example, if they wish to 
raise new challenges regarding old cases based on existing material, they may need support 
for filing or challenging new indictments in their own domestic jurisdictions or in 
gathering information on protected witnesses. Other governmental agencies may also have 
an interest in accessing such records. This raises the question of which entities will be 
allowed access to confidential information and under what conditions. Since the Residual 
Mechanism started functioning, the main users of the records have been the Prosecutors, 
the Registrars, the judges, the respective staff members, and the Defence counsel. For 
example, in the case of the arrest and trial of a fugitive, it is necessary that the material 
connected to the case is made available. That includes the supporting material, the 
indictment, and other material regarding the case, such as the Prosecution files and orders 
and decisions issued by a judge or Chamber. Furthermore, any party in a case at the 
Residual Mechanism or authorised parties in other jurisdictions need access to the 
Tribunals’ records connected to their case when requested.77 
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b. Affected Countries as Potential Location 
Locating the archives in the affected areas appeared unfeasible because there was no 
existing location in the affected countries that would meet international standards for 
security, preservation, and access to the archives.78 Other options were more feasible to 
guarantee that the Tribunals’ public records remain available to the populations of the 
affected countries, in particular locations close to the affected areas and information 
centres.79  
 Regarding the ICTY archives, it would be very challenging to find a feasible 
location in the affected countries meeting all necessary requirements. The ICTY archives 
concern six different countries. The City of Sarajevo in BIH was willing to house the 
ICTY archives,80 but Serbia and Croatia explained their concerns and requested that the 
Residual Mechanism as well as the archives be located outside the area of former 
Yugoslavia.81 Both countries preferred the option of locating the archives in a single site, 
such as The Hague, where they are currently located. According to the government of 
Croatia, it is also necessary that the ICTY archives remain in Europe. But other locations 
where the UN has a presence and where the required archiving capacity and protocol is 
available needed to be considered as well.82 Croatia and Serbia preferred the ICTY 
archives being centralised as an entity and managed at one location. But Croatia and Serbia 
refused to locate the archives of the ICTY in any of the countries in the area of former 
Yugoslavia, because they feared that the access to the archives would not be equal for the 
people of all affected countries.83 Further, Croatia doubted that the required archiving 
standards would be met if the archives were located in the area of the affected countries. 
Conversely, Serbia expressed the view that if the ICTY archives were returned to the 
region of former Yugoslavia, they should be located in the Archives of Yugoslavia in 
Belgrade.84 Furthermore, an accurate protection of the records of the atrocities committed 
in former Yugoslavia was necessary in order avoid a future denial that the horrible crimes 
happened.85 According to the Prosecutor’s report on the Completion Strategy, a serious 
problem in the context of denial is the general political climate throughout the region. 
Some media obviously serves the interests of alleged war criminals and often presented 																																																								
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these as ‘national heroes, while neither the victims nor the crimes receive much attention, 
as the latter are not simply denied.’86 Because of the fear of reprisals, witnesses, and 
especially insider witnesses, might refuse to testify. 
 But Rwanda also expressed its desire and willingness to house the ICTR archives.87 
It highlighted the important historical value of these archives in the reconciliation process. 
The bid for custody gained the support of the East African Community.88 The Secretary 
General of the East African Community, Richard Sezibera, sent a letter to the UN in 
October 2012 in order to support Rwanda’s housing the archives.89 According to Monique 
Mukaruliza, the Minister of the East African Community, ‘it would not be fair for the 
documents of the Genocide that happened in Rwanda to be hosted in Arusha.’90 But in 
March 2010, an Expert Group Meeting pointed out the importance of securing the 
Tribunals’ archives. Its final report highlighted the ‘need to retain an accessible archive 
which will notably assist to prevent historical revisionism in the affected regions and 
therefore avoid fuelling future conflict.’91 Furthermore, this report included a specific 
section on the special considerations involving the ICTR archives, which are ‘essential to 
the long-term memory or memorialization of the conflict.’92 In Rwanda, the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front-dominated government disseminated a national reconciliation program 
protecting the singular narrative of Rwandan genocide history.93 However, this twisted 
narrative reduces the participation of the Rwandan Patriotic Front in atrocities committed 
during the genocide. The aim to erase differences in ‘ethnic identities is an essential 
element of institutionalizing the hegemonic power aspirations of a minority Tutsi elite. It is 
perpetuated through the indoctrination of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans in 
mandatory live-in solidarity educations camps (ingandos), civic education camps, and 
preserved by Gacaca courts.’94 According to Denis, the Rwandan national reconciliation 
program is a part of the government’s systematic strategy to manipulate the historical 																																																								
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narrative in order to suit current regime interests.95 Further, Denis states that the records 
‘of universal collective memory narratives of accountability and responsibility, should not 
be held hostage to a regime that has tried-and thus far with success-to extinguish 
inconvenient truths of the crimes it committed against humanity under the shadow of the 
genocide.’96 
 But one of the key considerations raised in discussions concerning the archives was 
the need for the people affected by the conflicts to have access to them. In particular, the 
argument that the Tribunals were created to support the ‘process of national reconciliation 
and restoration and maintenance of peace in the affected countries’ was used.97 However, 
the secure adherence of the archives to international standards and the continued protection 
of confidential information had to be guaranteed. These important considerations were 
balanced with the strong judicial and practical arguments in favour of co-location of the 
archives with the respective branches of the Residual Mechanism. Because of the special 
nature of the Tribunals and the Residual Mechanism as judicial institutions and the link 
between them, a co-location was the most secure and efficient option. Concerning the 
Commencement Dates for the two branches with significant transitional overlap periods 
with the ICTY and ICTR, co-locating the archives with the Residual Mechanism was the 
more reasonable solution. Most of the functions performed by the Residual Mechanism 
require access to the Tribunals’ original records. But the Residual Mechanism will also 
generate new records related to the archives of the ICTY and the ICTR. If the archives 
were located and managed separately from the Residual Mechanism, some kind of archives 
unit would be necessary to manage the records of the Residual Mechanism.  
 Over time, however, the staffing estimate regarding such an archives unit would 
become similar to the estimate regarding stand-alone management of the archives. 
Therefore, in the case that the Security Council had established a stand-alone unit to 
manage the Tribunals’ archives, that stand-alone unit would have duplicated most of the 
work of the archives unit of the Residual Mechanism and consequently increased costs. 
The access to information or other documents in the archives required as evidence in a trial 
is quicker, cheaper and more secure since the archives are co-located with the Residual 
Mechanism. On the one hand, creating a ‘chain of custody’ over the evidence is more 
straightforward, while on the other hand, the security or physical risks associated with 
moving the evidence is lower. Hence, the administration of the archives by the Residual 																																																								
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Mechanism strengthens the efficiency of the Residual Mechanism and reduces the risks 
and costs that would have been generated by separate management and/or separate 
location. Thus, separate locations and management would have produced more risks and 
costs concerning the transport of original records from the archives of the ICTY and the 
ICTR to the Residual Mechanism whenever needed for use in a trial or for the residual 
functions. The most practical solution to maintain the Tribunals' archives in The Hague 
and Arusha whilst encouraging the establishment of information centres in the affected 
countries to facilitate access. However, housing the archives at any of the potential 
locations would have involved significant initial capital spending. And moving them to 
another location would have inevitably involved capital spending as well as issues that 
could occur when moving all records. Therefore, housing the Tribunals’ archives in two 
locations for only a couple of years and then moving them to another location was not 
considered by the Security Council, because this would not have been reasonable. 
 
C. Establishing Information Centres 
The Secretary-General recommended the implementation of 'information centres' where 
copies of the most important public records would be made available.98 It is questionable 
whether information centres are a sufficient approach to support the process of national 
reconciliation.99 However, the affected countries have considered this suggestion a suitable 
option. The Security Council implemented the recommendation in Resolution 1966 (2010), 
which requests the Tribunals and the Residual Mechanism according to Article 15 of the 
IRMCT Statute ‘to cooperate with the countries of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as 
well as with interested entities to facilitate the establishment of information and 
documentation centres by providing access to copies of public records of the archives of 
the Tribunals and the Residual Mechanism, including through their websites'. According to 
Frisso, providing information centres in the affected countries of former Yugoslavia seems 
particularly important, because the wars in the region of former Yugoslavia were driven by 
betrayal and denial, and the population can only overcome their past within the family, 
community, and society at large.100 
 The Head of Chambers was asked in September 2009 to work on a feasibility study. 
The Head of Chambers went on a mission to the area of former Yugoslavia and talked with 
government officials, non-governmental organisations, legal professionals, victims’ 																																																								
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groups, scholars, and others. In January 2010, she sent the report to the Security Council 
for its consideration. Subsequently, The Secretary-General sent this report to the Security 
Council’s President for distribution to the members of the Security Council. The report 
came to the conclusion that the region approved of the idea of creating information centres 
but that national officials also expected a concrete request upon the establishment of such 
centres before giving any support. The President created the Informal Consultative 
Working Group on the Establishment of Information Centres in the Region of former 
Yugoslavia. This working group was made up of national officials from that area. UN 
Development Programme representatives from each of affected the countries and a 
representative from the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute were asked 
to observe the Informal Consultative Working Group. However, the aim of the Working 
Group is to allow national authorities to analyse whether they want an information centre 
to be created within their territories. In addition, they need to develop an idea of the 
composition of such information centres. These ideas will subsequently be further 
developed and modified through talks with civil society in that particular area.  
 The first meeting of the Informal Consultative Working Group was held in 
Slovenia, in September 2010. The Slovenian government co-organised and hosted the 
meeting. Further, it allowed the Working Group to identify the steps needed to establish 
the information centres. The Tribunals prepared the specific project proposal regarding the 
establishment of information centres, and members of the Working Group commented on 
those proposals. Thereafter, options for soliciting funding for the project, including the 
organisation of a donors’ conference, were discussed.101 Pursuant to Article 15 of the 
IRMCT Statute, the Residual Mechanism and the ICTY sought the cooperation of the 
governments of the states of former Yugoslavia in establishing information and 
documentation centres to provide public access to the Tribunals’ public records and 
archives. The government in BIH supported the establishment of information centres in 
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Sarajevo and Srebrenica. 102 The Web Unit of the Communications Service led a major 
multimedia project on the occasion of the twentieth commemoration of the Srebrenica 
genocide. This multichannel and multilingual communications campaign paid tribute to the 
victims and presented the work of the Tribunal in adjudicating the crimes committed in 
1995.103 The Web Unit reached a milestone in the Legacy Websites Project with the 
integration of the redesigned website of the ICTY into a unified content management 
system in which the websites of the Residual Mechanism and ICTR already operate. 104 
 The ICTR continued the work through its outreach programme in showcasing, 
disseminating, and sensitising the people of the Great Lakes region, the population of 
Rwanda at the grass-roots level, and visitors of the Tribunal headquarters in Rwanda and 
the United Republic of Tanzania about the challenges and achievements at this difficult 
point of the Completion Strategy.105 Through its External Relations and Strategic Planning 
Section, the ICTR has continued to provide the Umusanzu mu Bwiyunge Information and 
Document Centre in Kigali and its 10 provincial satellite centres in Rwanda with technical 
support. At the same time, the ICTR continuously assessed their impact and progress on 
the targeted beneficiaries.106 The Residual Mechanism worked with the staff of these 
centres to enhance accessibility to the public records and archives of the ICTR. Such 
efforts included providing training to the Umusanzu staff in April 2011.107 The centres are 
one of the main parts of the Tribunals’ legacy for future generations. Further, the 
information centres serve as the UN’s reference centre regarding information and 
knowledge on genocide for the benefit of the whole international community.  
 The establishment of information centres in the affected countries to give access to 
copies of the public records is a proper solution. On the one hand, the people of the 
affected countries are able to access information regarding the crimes committed against 
humanity and on the other hand, the protection of the records is guaranteed. The co-
locations in The Hague and Arusha meet international standards for security and 
preservation. Therefore, the information centres are the best option to support the process 																																																								
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of national reconciliation and guarantee the protection of the archives at the same time.  
 
D. The Tribunals’ Archives as property of the UN 
The archival records of the UN include ‘the archives of the United Nations Secretariat 
units away from Headquarters and subsidiary organizations of the United Nations’.108 
According to the Secretary-General’s bulletin ‘Record-keeping and the management of 
United Nations archives’, these are records that need to be ‘permanently preserved for their 
administrative, fiscal, legal, historical or informational value’.109 Because the ICTY and 
the ICTR are subsidiary organs of the Security Council, their archives are the property of 
the UN. Consequently, it has been regulated in Article 27 (1) of the IRMCT Statute that 
the UN has ownership over the archives of the ICTY and the ICTR and these archives are 
located with the respective branches of the Residual Mechanism, Article 27 (2). 110 But 
there could arise a confusion regarding the ownership of the records. As mentioned above, 
the Tribunals are subsidiary organs of the Security Council, and therefore the UN 
considers the Tribunals’ records a part of their archives.111 Consequently, because the 
archives are the property of the UN, they need to be kept under the control of the UN. The 
archives of the UN contain records that, regardless of their form or medium, need to be 
permanently safeguarded for their legal, administrative, fiscal, informational, or historical 
value.112 However, that definition was drafted with ordinary UN archives in mind where 
most of the material was generated and stored by UN personnel, primarily for internal 
use.113 But the consequences of applying this definition to the records of the Tribunals is 
that according to the UN General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN, 
the Tribunals’ archives need to be protected from unauthorised access in the same way as 
the archives of the UN.114  
 Pursuant to Article II, Section 3 of the UN General Convention, the property and 
assets of the UN have to be inviolable. Furthermore, the property needs to be immune from 
search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation, and any other form of interference whether 
by executive, administrative, judicial, or legislative action. Also according to Section 4, the 
archives of the UN and in general all documents belonging to or held by it have to be 
inviolable wherever located. Therefore, pursuant to the UN General Convention, all 																																																								
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materials and information managed by the Tribunals enjoy immunity from outside 
intrusion and unwarranted access.115 However, the decision that the UN archiving policy 
applies automatically to the Tribunals’ archives is problematic, because the handling in 
general of these records is difficult. To balance the following interests, it is of crucial 
importance that the availability of the material and the information to the public has to be 
guaranteed versus the protection of the victims and witnesses as well as sensitive 
documents. Therefore, the special nature of the Tribunals’ judicial records needs to be 
taken into consideration when managing the Tribunals’ archives. The issue of archives is 
very important to communities in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, who see the records as 
part of their history. 
 It needs to be taken into consideration that a part of the records may not fall under 
the legal property of the UN because, for example, it was secured in the region of former 
Yugoslavia. On the grounds that everything coming into the possession of an international 
tribunal becomes ipso facto its property, the Tribunals assume that all materials that are in 
the custody of the Tribunal are UN property.116 Consequently, the UN deprives the original 
owner of his property rights. Regarding this approach Acquaviva argues that there is no 
existing title that would justify the UN claims to property for records that were retrieved by 
investigators and other personnel from archives of former Yugoslavia, or records 
composed of private diaries or pictures seized from individuals. 117 Further, there is no 
existing title that could trump competing claims by states or private parties. In some 
domestic jurisdictions, when proceedings come to an end a person whose property has 
been seized for investigation purposes is able to reclaim it.118 As long as the owner wants 
to exercise his right, the right belongs to the owner because there is no clear legal basis for 
a title trumping the claims of the original owners regarding property rights of documents 
and other items seized in connection with the proceedings. However, in international 
criminal law and procedure, a provision regulating this situation does not exist. 119 
Acquaviva also points out that the legal basis for the decision of the Security Council to 
explicitly tie the property of the Tribunals’ archives to the UN is questionable. According 
to Acquaviva, ‘It would be hard to argue that a threat to international peace and security 
(the basis for a binding resolution under Chapter VII) requires divesting national 
authorities and private individuals of their rights over the records in question after the 
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threat itself has ceased to require an international tribunal.’120  
 Although there are cases in which judges ordered the return of material that was 
collected as potential evidence to the original owner because of a lack of judicial interest, 
the examination of case law does not solve the issue. In the decision Prosecutor v. Delalić 
et al.121 the Chamber directed the Prosecution ‘to return to the accused such items of 
evidence as were seized from, or belonging to, the accused Zejnil Delalić which are not 
material to the preparation of its case.’ Acquaviva argues that ambiguous wording leads to 
the assumption that the Tribunals do not actually consider themselves owners of the 
material seized from the accused.122 In fact, as soon as property is not important to the 
proceedings, the original material is no longer needed and can be consequently returned to 
the original owner. However, relevant original records, such as a personal diary, may be 
copied faithfully and afterwards returned to the owner. But the Tribunals still hold rights 
over their own creations, including all files and copies made from original material. 123 
 It must be noted that state archives are normally the property of states, including the 
archives of all public bodies and agencies. Treaties regulate explicit instances of state 
succession and archives, as in the specific situation of former Yugoslavia.124 In principle, 
the states that arise from the dissolution of a former state have the right to request the part 
of the original archives needed for the administration of its territory. Furthermore, the new 
states may provide each other with copies of the parts of the archives that were allotted to 
them.125 Therefore, according to Acquaviva it could be argued that, for example, each of 
the states that arose from the dissolution of former Yugoslavia has become owner of part 
of the federation’s former archives.126  
 In the case of the Yugoslav archives, the records were collected by the ICTY in 
order to carry out its mandate. A part of the material was reproduced in the form of copies 
or scans. The reproduced records are property of the ICTY but the ownership of the 
original seized or gathered records is not so certain. According to the Secretary-General’s 
report, the Tribunals’ archives are the property of the UN. But the report does not mention 
the issue that competing claims from other private or public subjects are possible.127 It is 
noted that the Tribunals are custodians of the material as long as is necessary for the case, 
including protection of witnesses or other sensitive sources. However, there is no reason to 																																																								
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limit original property rights when the records are no longer necessary. Therefore, the 
option of transferring the archives to the affected countries after confidential documents 
have been declassified could be considered. But it would be very expensive to move the 
archives to another location, and in the case of former Yugoslavia it would be difficult to 
decide which of the six countries concerned should house the archives. To copy all 
documents would be very costly and time-consuming. Further, splitting the archives would 
violate the principle of archival integrity, which provides the archives should be kept as a 
single entity.128 In addition, the archives also have a value for memory, education, and 
research. The control over the archives equates the control over the past and the future.129 
Therefore, the accuracy of the records needs to be guaranteed. Historical revisionism in the 
affected countries could endanger this accuracy. Thus, it was a necessary solution to locate 
the archives to The Hague and Arusha. 
 
E. Preparation of Records for Migration to the Residual Mechanism 
The Residual Mechanism assumed responsibility for the management of the archives of 
both Tribunals and the Tribunals retained responsibility for the preparation of their records 
for transfer.130 Under the leadership of the Registrar, the Registry is responsible for 
carrying out the essential function regarding the preservation and management of the 
archives. The Residual Mechanisms Archives and Records Section was established to 
coordinate, in close cooperation with the two Tribunals, the transfer of custody of the 
Tribunals’ archives to the Residual Mechanism.131 The Residual Mechanisms Archives and 
Records Section developed standards for the preparation and transfer of records of the 
Tribunals. Furthermore, it reviews and streamlines the current procedures, policies and 
systems for the operation and the management of the centres where those records will be 
kept. The Residual Mechanism Archives and Records Section also determined appropriate 
classification levels in accordance with the Secretary-General’s bulletin.132  
 In accordance with international standards, the Section preserves the archives and 
provides secure storage for physical and digital records. The Section developed a trusted 
digital repository designed to ensure secure storage for these records.133 The Residual 																																																								
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Mechanism has a twofold task of making access to records possible while at the same time 
ensuring the strong protection of confidential information. However, the archives will 
receive increasing attention in the future. The Archives and Records Section mounted the 
first public exhibitions of the archives of the ICTY for International Archives Day in June 
2015 and The Hague International Day in September 2015. 134  A revamped, fully 
searchable online judicial database was provided along with public exhibitions and 
participation in archives awareness events.135 The Residual Mechanisms Archives and 
Records Section and the Office of the Registrar are developing a policy to allow public 
access to records of the Tribunals and the Residual Mechanism, based on the principle of 
openness and transparency of the work of the UN.136 
 Further, the Residual Mechanism Archives and Records Section supports Tribunal 
offices in preparing their records for transfer to the Residual Mechanism. It provides 
training for staff and briefings for managers to guarantee that the required standards are 
met. And the Tribunal offices continue to identify and appraise their records and prepare 
appropriate records for transfer.137 The Residual Mechanisms Archives and Records 
Section also implemented a new computer system to increase the efficiency and speed up 
of the transfer process.138 In addition, the Registrar established a high-level Records and 
Archives Working Group to coordinate and monitor the transfer of Tribunal records and 
archives to the Residual Mechanism. The Group drew up an overall plan and a 
comprehensive risk assessment for the project.139 A working group responsible for the 
establishment of the emergency response and disaster recovery plan for physical records 
was established. However, the group has since been disbanded and replaced by a standing 
committee.140.  
 It is planned that the transfer is completed by the time that the ICTY and ICTR are 
liquidated.141 According to the report, the transfer has progressed according to schedule.142 																																																								
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The ICTY transferred the physical records of all completed cases to the Residual 
Mechanism. According to the Residual Mechanism’s progress report, approximately 41% 
of its anticipated volume of physical archives and 80% of its digital records have been 
transferred to the Residual Mechanism.143 Since 1 March 2014, the Section is further 
responsible for managing the Judicial Records Unit of the ICTY, which manages that 
Tribunal’s judicial records and is preparing them for transfer to the Residual 
Mechanism.144 The Office of the Prosecutor is also working with the Office of the 
Prosecutor of the ICTY to prepare the records to be transferred to The Hague branch. 
Further, the ICTY has also begun transferring digital records. The Tribunal is consulting 
the Archives and Records Section and the Information Technology Service Section in 
order to enhance its records management system and procedure.145 This shall improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of these transfers. A major part of the records is still being 
prepared for transfer and training of managers and staff is on-going. In September 2015, 
the Archives and Records Section assumed responsibility for the management of an 
additional temporary repository at the premises of the International Tribunal for former 
Yugoslavia in order to provide secure, short-term storage for physical records and 
archives.146 
 According to the Residual Mechanism’s progress report, the Residual Mechanism 
Archives and Records Section has completed the transfer of all physical records of the 
ICTR.147 The Arusha branch houses 3,489 boxes of material received from the Office of 
the Prosecutor of the ICTR. In addition, the Prosecutor’s evidence vault, with a collection 
comprising 105.55 linear metres of documents, was transferred to the custody of the 
Arusha branch of the Office of the Prosecutor in April 2015. In addition, 8.3 terabytes of 
digital records have been transferred from the ICTR to the Residual Mechanism. On 4 
March 2015 and 1 May 2015 an Associate Records Manager and an Associate Information 
Manager were recruited on an ad hoc basis in order to manage the Prosecutor’s records and 
evidence collection efficiently. In accordance with the Secretary-General’s bulletin on 																																																																																																																																																																							
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‘International Criminal Tribunals: information sensitivity, classification, handling and 
access’ regarding international criminal tribunals and the Residual Mechanism’s standard 
for the preparation and transfer of records for digital records, they worked closely with 
staff of the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTR concerning the classification of its 
evidence and records. 148  The Residual Mechanism’s Archives and Records Section 
planned new premises for the Residual Mechanism in Arusha by providing additional 
functional requirements, specifications, and estimates of resource requirements for the 
archives building.149 But the Section also works on the development of a digital repository 
for secure storage of the digital archives. This shall enable their long-term preservation and 
access for current and future generations.150 Additionally, record-keeping policies and 
systems for the Residual Mechanism have been developed, including systems for the 
management of judicial and non-judicial records in order to increase operational efficiency 
and effectiveness.151 Furthermore, since 1 January 2014, the Residual Mechanism Archives 
and Records Section has been responsible for managing the resource and research centre of 
the ICTR, which is one of the best international law research resources in East Africa. The 
centre provides research and reference services to the Tribunal and Residual Mechanism 
staff, as well as to external users, including the general public.152  
 The Residual Mechanism subscribed in June 2015 to the Universal Declaration on 
Archives reaffirming its commitment to best practices in the management of archives and 
the provision of access to them.153 In November 2011, the Universal Declaration on 
Archives was adopted by the 36th Session of the General Conference of UNESCO. The 
aim of the Universal Declaration on Archives is inter alia to support the management of 
archives and to ensure their authenticity, reliability, and integrity as well as usability. The 
Declaration was developed by a special working group of the International Council on 
Archives in order to improve understanding and awareness of archives among the general 
public and key decision-makers.154 The International Council on Archives is a collective of 
archival institutions and archives and records management professionals worldwide and 																																																								
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was established at UNESCO on 9 June 1948.155 The Archives and Records Section also 
continues to lead or contribute to the development of policies, including a comprehensive 
access policy, and record-keeping systems for the Residual Mechanism, including systems 
for the management of judicial and non-judicial records in the interest of enhancing 
operational efficiency and effectiveness.156 
 
5. Transferring the Management and Preservation of the Tribunals’ Archives to 
National Authorities 
According to Section 7 of the Secretary-General’s bulletin ‘International Criminal 
Tribunals: information sensitivity, classification, handling and access’, the Tribunals ‘shall 
ensure that sufficient measures are taken to protect the confidentiality and integrity of 
sensitive records and information, and that their management and handling in all formats is 
appropriate to their security classification.’157 But at the time the Residual Mechanism was 
established, there was no existing location in the affected countries that would meet the 
standards for preservation and access to the archives. In addition, the administrative and 
judicial functions are all strongly intertwined with the Tribunals’ archives. Most of the 
activities of the Residual Mechanism could hardly be envisaged without access to the 
records of past proceedings, both public and confidential. Furthermore, the execution of 
the residual functions by the Residual Mechanism will also produce new material that will 
be closely connected to the Tribunals’ records. The national authorities could not be 
entrusted with such a task. The Tribunals’ records include a great deal of confidential 
documents, the security of which needs to be guaranteed in order to ensure the protection 
of victims and witnesses. This can only be ensured if the archives are preserved in a 
country that has not been affected by the atrocities. Furthermore, the archives exist in order 
to prevent historical revisionism in the affected regions. It is very important that the 
historical narrative cannot be manipulated in order to suit regime interests, which has 
already been attempted in Rwanda. Under these circumstances, and based on the premise 
that the control of the Tribunals’ archives equates control of the past the future, it would 
not be feasible to transfer the archives to domestic systems.  
																																																								
155 Ibid. 
156 Assessment and progress report of the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge Theodor 
Meron, for the period from 16 May to 15 November 2015, UN Doc. S/2015/883, 17 November 2015, para. 55. 
157 Secretary-General’s bulletin, International Criminal Tribunals: information sensitivity, classification, handling and access UN Doc. 
ST/SGB/2012/3, 20 July 2012. 
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IX. Conclusion 
The reason for the Security Council to establish the ad hoc Tribunals was that the national 
jurisdictions in Rwanda and the states of former Yugoslavia were not reliable. But by the 
time the Residual Mechanism was established, the judicial capacities had improved in the 
affected countries. However, when the Completion Strategy was developed the Security 
Council was faced with the crucial question of how to deal with the case of the remaining 
fugitives after the Tribunals’ closure. On the one hand, there was a need for justice and the 
goal of the Tribunals to achieve the mandate of ending impunity for the most serious 
breaches of international humanitarian law. But on the other hand, the Tribunals faced a 
huge financial burden.  
 This thesis answers the research question of whether it was necessary to establish 
the Residual Mechanism or whether another solution would have been preferable. The 
ICTY transferred eight cases to states of former Yugoslavia, and the ICTR transferred 
three cases to Rwanda. The review of the transferred cases and the monitoring reports 
show that the countries of Rwanda and former Yugoslavia can conduct war crimes cases in 
accordance with international standards. But although judicial capacities have improved, 
issues still exist. Concerns exist regarding witness protection, custody questions, and the 
transparency of proceedings. Further, while deciding on the establishment of the Residual 
Mechanism, Ratko Mladić, who was one of the most prominent war criminals of the war, 
was still at large. And at the time when the Security Council decided to establish the 
Residual Mechanism, no monitoring reports were available that could show if the justice 
systems were able to conduct fair trials. Therefore, transferring the judicial responsibility 
of cases concerning high-level fugitives to national jurisdictions of the affected countries 
was not a good option.  
 Even today it would be difficult to transfer residual functions to national authorities 
in order to reduce the workload as well as the costs of the Residual Mechanism. It would 
make sense to transfer the supervision and enforcement of sentences to national authorities, 
since national authorities contribute to this residual function already. Furthermore, 
according to Rule 128 of the IRMCT RPE the Security Council is allowed to designate a 
body to supervise the sentences after the Residual Mechanism is closed. A good solution 
could be to transfer the function to national authorities and implement a monitoring 
system. This would reduce the workload of the Residual Mechanism. But in order to avoid 
unfairness, the Residual Mechanism would need to rely on monitoring reports submitted 
by independent experts and intervene, if unjustified unequal treatment occurs. In addition, 
the Residual Mechanism could transfer proceedings concerning contempt cases to national 
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jurisdictions. The Residual Mechanism has the jurisdiction to refer cases concerning 
offences against the administration of justice to national jurisdictions. Article 70 (4) of the 
Rome Statute regulates that contempt offences can be prosecuted by national jurisdictions 
instead of the Court. Hence, this approach is recognised in international criminal justice, 
and so the Residual Mechanism could adopt that procedure. 
 The residual function that will likely never come to an end is the management and 
preservation of the Tribunals’ archives. These are primarily used for judicial activities, 
though their secondary value for memory, education and research should not be 
underestimated. The records hold great value for future projects, like the creation of future 
institutions comparable with the Residual Mechanism. Locating the archives in the 
affected countries was not feasible, because there was no existing location in those 
countries that would meet international standards for security, preservation, and access to 
the archives. Furthermore, an accurate protection of the records of the atrocities committed 
is necessary in order to avoid denial of the crimes. In the context of denial, a serious 
problem is the general political climate throughout the region of former Yugoslavia. It is 
enormously important to prevent the glorification of war criminals as heroes. The most 
practical solution has been to maintain the Tribunals' archives in The Hague and Arusha, 
whilst encouraging the establishment of information centres in the affected countries to 
facilitate access. The centres remain one of the key components of the Tribunals’ legacy 
for future generations while serving as the UN reference centre for information on 
genocide for the benefit of the entire international community. On the one hand, the people 
of the affected countries are able to access information regarding the crimes committed 
against humanity and, on the other hand, the protection of the records is guaranteed. The 
co-locations in The Hague and Arusha meet international standards for security and 
preservation. Therefore, the information centres were the best option to support the process 
of national reconciliation and guarantee the protection of the archives at the same time.  
 The most important residual function is the Tribunals’ trial activities. Residual 
issues involve the tasks of on-going legal and moral responsibilities to those directly 
affected by the Tribunals. Therefore, in order to maintain the Tribunals’ legacy, it is of 
crucial importance to guarantee a proper trial for the high-level fugitives still at large. 
Although the support for domestic prosecutions of members of the ethnic majority and the 
willingness to cooperate with the Tribunals have increased in the states of former 
Yugoslavia, the risk is left that the high-level fugitives are still supported by some political 
elites. Further, the escape of Stanković invited criticism. The predominant supportive 
atmosphere in which war crime trials against accused persons of one certain ethnic group 
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were conducted influenced witnesses. Some media presented war criminals as national 
heroes. In such a negative atmosphere witnesses particularly insider witnesses, may refuse 
to testify for fear of reprisals. 
 Although Croatia is part of the European Union and Serbia wants to become a part 
of the European Union, which requires the achievement of European judicial standards, it 
would not be reasonable to transfer the residual functions to one of these countries. 
Because of the longstanding conflict between the different ethnicities, which culminated 
during the terrible war, it is not possible to pick out one country that should have the power 
to judge the war crimes. This might create new conflicts between these countries. 
Therefore, it is the preferable option to locate the residual functions outside the area of 
former Yugoslavia. This way, none of the countries is disadvantaged. 
 Regarding Rwanda, a critical point is the fact that the Rwandan Prosecution did not 
always pursue atrocities perpetrated by the Rwandan Patriotic Front. Although the 
Rwandan justice system was found to be sufficiently independent from executive 
influence, concerns appeared regarding genocide cases. Outside pressure on the judiciary 
regarding genocide cases existed because of the past actions of the government. The 
analyses of the monitoring reports do not demonstrate any violation of the accused’s fair 
trial rights. But it is not guaranteed that the impartiality would have been extended to high-
level accused persons. The successful completion of the Tribunals’ work depends on trials 
conducted with the highest standards of international human rights and due process. In 
addition, it is necessary that possible impunity will be excluded.  
 In order to demonstrate that the international legal system is working and to achieve 
a deterrent effect, the preferable option was to create the Residual Mechanism and not to 
transfer the functions of the Tribunals to the states of former Yugoslavia or Rwanda. 
Considering the atrocities occurred in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, it is plausible that 
tension between the various ethnicities still exists. In the affected states of former 
Yugoslavia there are still problems with denial. In Rwanda, the government disseminated a 
national reconciliation program that protects the singular narrative of Rwandan genocide 
history, which minimizes the participation of the Rwandan Patriotic Front in atrocities 
committed during the genocide. Therefore, although the judicial capacity has improved, 
the victims’ interests overweight this improvement. The high-level fugitives must be tried 
before an international and certainly impartial court. Further, in the case of referral to 
domestic courts, the downside would be that there is no guarantee that proper prosecutions 
will take place and that the rights of the accused will be safeguarded at a level deemed 
acceptable by the UN. Securing fairness and due process standards is especially important 
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for a legal system, which would be at risk when transferring the cases of the remaining 
fugitives to domestic courts. In particular, referring the cases of a high-level fugitives to 
countries affected by their atrocities would risk the rights of the accused as there is an 
aftermath of the war left in the lives and minds of the effected populations. With regard to 
the longstanding conflict between the ethnicities of former Yugoslavia and the atrocities 
committed against the Tutsi population in Rwanda, it cannot be expected that people have 
forgotten what happened. Therefore, it was not certain whether the affected countries could 
provide fair trials in compliance with international standards.  
 It also needs to be considered that the authority of an international body, like the 
Tribunals, is more powerful than that of individual states. Rwanda or the states of former 
Yugoslavia would not enjoy the benefit from such authority when asking for international 
cooperation to arrest the high-level fugitives. High-level fugitives in particular do often 
benefit from the help and protection of state entities, and the Tribunals can ask these states 
to operate according to international legal obligations. Therefore, the Residual Mechanism 
has an authority similar to that of the Tribunals, which simplifies the request for 
cooperation from other states. Implementing the Residual Mechanism is an appropriate 
decision as only an institution on an international level may have the power and the 
authority to urge the states to cooperate. And the assistance of the international community 
is easier to achieve for an international body like the Residual Mechanism. 
 Furthermore, it has been experienced that only few states were willing and able to 
undertake the expensive and complex trials. So it would be even more difficult to find a 
state that would take over the trial function of the Tribunals. And referring the cases to 
different national authorities would result in divergent application of the Tribunals’ 
provisions and case law. This would lead to an uncertain legal situation and could result in 
a violation of the accused’s rights and risk the Tribunals’ legacy. In addition, national 
jurisdictions could not be required to review judgements based on the Tribunals’ Statutes 
and Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The lack of knowledge of the Tribunals’ 
jurisprudence could result in an unfair limitation of the convicted persons’ rights. 
Furthermore, domestic courts would be able to set aside the judgements of the Tribunals. 
That would destroy the Tribunals’ legacy. The Residual Mechanism avoids these issues as 
it is an unbiased international body that provides the review of judgment on an 
international level. 
 It is not possible to transfer residual functions to different states or institutions. The 
residual functions are closely intertwined. In addition, the Residual Mechanism has the 
authority to issue decisions that bind states, individuals, and other entities when necessary. 
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Therefore, the effectiveness of the residual functions system would be at risk if the 
functionality of the Residual Mechanism relied on cooperation among different entities. 
Transferring all residual functions of both Tribunals to one state or each Tribunal to 
different states would be very difficult, because only a few states have the capacity to 
perform all residual functions of the Tribunals and it is unlikely that one of those would 
take on such a burden. Furthermore, it would be questionable whether such states would 
have the authority to perform residual functions toward external entities. The ICC could 
have played and still could play various roles in the performance of residual functions. But 
there are also legally important differences between the ICC and the Tribunals. The ICC 
has different temporal and geographic jurisdiction. Some of the crimes are differently 
defined in the Rome Statute, while Rwanda is not even a state party to the Rome Statute. 
Further, the procedures used by each of the Tribunals differ from those of the ICC. This 
option would not be more feasible regarding political, policy, legal, financial, and practical 
questions than creating the independent Residual Mechanism. The changes required for the 
ICC to perform residual functions in its own name would necessitate amendments to the 
Rome Statute. This would make a complete absorption of residual functions by the ICC 
unrealistic. Even considering the least involved options, like using the ICC facilities or 
ICC staff, raises problems. The staff of the ICC is busy and the facilities are occupied. 
Furthermore, the Residual Mechanism employs its own staff and has its own facilities 
already. This path was and still would be simply impracticable. In addition, the Residual 
Mechanism with one branch seated in Arusha offers logistical advantages and ensures a 
fixed presence in eastern and central Africa.  
 The establishment of the Residual Mechanism was not accepted uncritically. The 
Russian Federation required Resolution 1966 (2010) to be the last on the issue of the 
duration of the Tribunals’ activities. The Tribunals were required to take all possible 
measures to expeditiously complete all their remaining work. In response to the criticism, 
the Security Council aimed to create the Residual Mechanism as a small and efficient 
body. The IRMCT Statute and the IRMCT RPE provide regulations that are appropriate to 
reduce the workload of the Residual Mechanism. First, when establishing the structure, it 
has been made sure that the Residual Mechanism remains a small and efficient body. The 
number of Trial Chambers has been reduced, since the Residual Mechanism has one for 
each branch. The Residual Mechanism consists of the Prosecutor and the Registry common 
to both branches. The IRMCT Statute provides for a common President of the Residual 
Mechanism, who will exercise his functions at each seat of the Residual Mechanism when 
it is necessary. A Single Judge conducts proceedings for contempt and false testimony and 
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the Appeals Chamber is composed of three judges instead of five. These changes do 
downsize the Residual Mechanism to a small body, leading to cost reductions. Second, 
provisions were included in the IRMCT Statue that were not statutory provisions for the 
Tribunals. Of most importance are Article 1 (3) IRMCT Statute, which requires the 
Residual Mechanism to prosecute high-level fugitives only and Article 6 (1) of the IRMCT 
Statute, which obliges the Residual Mechanism to refer cases to national jurisdiction 
concerning persons who are not high-level fugitives. The decision to impose a mandatory 
obligation on the Residual Mechanism ensures that the Residual Mechanism’s work is as 
limited as possible. This amendment appears to be the consequence for the Tribunals’ 
practice of not referring contempt cases to national jurisdictions although they had the 
power to transfer those cases. Transferring cases of contempt could have reduced the 
Tribunals’ workload. Hence, Article 1 (4) of the IRMCT Statute obliges the Residual 
Mechanism to transfer contempt cases to national jurisdictions in order to prevent the 
Residual Mechanism from taking over the Tribunals’ practice. In cases concerning the 
lower-level fugitives, it does not result in impunity because the national courts have 
jurisdiction to rule on those fugitives. And as the monitoring reports show, the national 
courts are able to conduct trials of war criminals that are not among the high-level 
fugitives. In addition, the Residual Mechanism does not have the power to issue any new 
indictments. The Residual Mechanism only has the power to conduct new indictments 
regarding contempt and false testimony cases. This approach will reduce the workload of 
the Residual Mechanism and costs regarding the trial activity.  
 Further, the IRMCT RPE provides the obligation for the judges to work remotely, 
and time limits have been included to keep proceedings as short as possible. The roster 
system of the judges works on a per diem basis, so the judges receive remuneration for 
each day they exercise their function and not only for being on the roster. This shows the 
Security Council’s intention to ensure that the Residual Mechanism remains a small body 
with a high cost-efficiency. However, it is necessary that the Residual Mechanism’s judges 
will be properly remunerated because a high quality of the Residual Mechanism’s 
jurisdiction needs to be ensured. Otherwise the establishment of the Residual Mechanism 
would be useless. The remuneration system needs to allow judges to work with full 
concentration on their cases. The Security Council could solve the problem by returning 
judges to the Residual Mechanism on a permanent basis for certain cases. For example, in 
appeals cases the judge could receive remuneration while in The Hague until the decision 
has been issued. 
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 But at the same time Resolution 1966 (2010) provides provisions that prepare a 
smooth transfer of the residual functions from the Tribunals to the Residual Mechanism. A 
smooth transfer was very important to ensure the Tribunals’ legacy. Closing a criminal 
court is not a usual affair and certain legal and practical obligations of the Tribunals will 
necessarily continue beyond their closure. The IRMCT Statute is in accordance with the 
Tribunals’ Statutes. The provisions contain only slight variations from analogous 
provisions from the Tribunals’ Statutes. This illustrates that the Residual Mechanism has 
the role of inheriting the Tribunals’ legacy.  
 The Transitional Arrangements provide for a smooth transfer of the Tribunals’ 
functions and responsibilities to the Residual Mechanism. The Transitional Arrangements 
provide the Commencement Date as the explicit date when the Tribunals’ jurisdiction ends 
and the jurisdiction of the Residual Mechanism begins. Because uncertainties regarding the 
jurisdiction would result in legal insecurity, it is only consistent that decisions taken by the 
Tribunals after the Commencement Date do not have a legal effect on the Residual 
Mechanism. Thus, the Transitional Arrangements provide a clear-cut procedure regarding 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunals and the Residual Mechanism. And, in order to ensure legal 
certainty, decisions taken by the Tribunals while properly seized of the matter and prior the 
Commencement Date retain their validity before the Residual Mechanism. Article 5 (4) of 
the Transitional Arrangements provides that the Tribunals have to make the necessary 
arrangements to ensure a coordinated transfer of the residual function concerning the 
protection of witnesses and victims regarding all completed cases as soon as possible. 
Especially concerning the protection of victims and witnesses, a smooth transfer is 
necessary because the safety of victims and witnesses depends on a working protection 
strategy. The great majority of the Tribunals witnesses enjoy protection. Further, according 
to Article 13 (3) IRMCT Statute, the Security Council is able to veto amendments to the 
IRMCT RPE made by the judges of the Residual Mechanism. This ensures that the 
procedure of the Residual Mechanism will be the same as the Tribunals’ procedures. 
Thereby, the continuity between the work of the Residual Mechanism and the Tribunals 
should be ensured and the Tribunals’ legacy preserved. But at the same time, Article 13 (3) 
prevents the Residual Mechanism’s judges from adopting provisions that would increase 
their workload or prolong trial proceedings. Thus, a judicial revolution of the IRMCT RPE 
shall be prevented in order to ensure the legacy of the Tribunals. 
 The jurisdiction continuity between the Tribunals and the Residual Mechanism is 
essential for the legacy of the ICTY and the ICTR. Although the Tribunals’ jurisprudence 
is not expressly binding for the Residual Mechanism, the judges of the Residual 
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Mechanism attempt to continue their jurisdiction in concordance with the Tribunals’ 
jurisprudence. In cases where their respective Rules of Procedure and Evidence or Statutes 
are at issue, the Residual Mechanism is bound to consider the relevant precedent of the 
Tribunals when interpreting them. The IRMCT RPE reflect the Security Council’s 
intention to ensure that the Residual Mechanism’s proceedings mirror those of the 
Tribunals. This continuity between the Tribunals and the Residual Mechanism is necessary 
because otherwise, all accused persons of referred cases could attempt to request a  
revocation of the referral in their cases. This would result in a massive workload for the 
Residual Mechanism and would contradict the Security Council’s intention to reduce the 
work of the Residual Mechanism as much as possible. 
 Creating a joint Residual Mechanism including the SCSL, the ICTY, and the ICTR 
would have been a better option. The RSCSL in Sierra Leone provides accessibility to the 
trials and documents for victims and witnesses and the visibility of the progressing work of 
the court in the country. The access to the archives is of special importance. Further, the 
work of the SCSL is a possibility to rebuild the Sierra Leonean jurisdictional system, and it 
also serves as a symbol against impunity for atrocities committed in that region. This could 
be at risk if the Residual Mechanism were located outside Sierra Leone. Further, the legal 
basis of the SCSL differs from that of the ICTY and the ICTR. These legal differences 
could make a joint Residual Mechanism complicated. But the legal differences would not 
make that option unfeasible. When deciding on a joint Residual Mechanism, the question 
would have been where to locate the institution. It would have been a good option to create 
a third branch of the ICTY and ICTR Residual Mechanism with regard to funding and 
efficiency.  
 The establishment of the Residual Mechanism sends a strong message against 
impunity and is the manifestation of the full determination of the international community 
not to tolerate impunity. The Tribunals have significantly contributed to the facilitation of 
international criminal justice. The Residual Mechanism is a important organ that will take 
over essential functions and maintain the legacy of the Tribunals. It has the potential to 
create a safe space for those traumatised by their experiences. Because the residual issues 
refer to the enduring tasks of legal and moral obligations to the affected individuals, the 
Residual Mechanism continues the objectives of the Tribunals, including important 
responsibilities such as matters of life or death and the protection of fundamental human 
rights. Legacy should be the basis for future efforts to prevent a recurrence of crimes by 
and build faith in judicial processes. Beside the ICTY and ICTR, there are several ad hoc 
UN or UN-assisted criminal tribunals that will be likely to require Residual Mechanisms 
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with functions similar to those of the Residual Mechanism. Future tribunals, like the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, could be attached to the Residual Mechanism. This would 
demonstrate that the international legal system is functioning and at the same time it could 
reduce spending.  
 At the time the Residual Mechanism was created, a strong signal was sent not only 
to the countries that were hiding fugitives, but also to the entire world community. The 
opportunity to complete the work of the ad hoc Tribunals ensures a form of continuity and 
is a guarantee that the international legal system is working. The Residual Mechanism’s 
existence is one of the foundations of legal certainty. 
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